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Chapter 1
Feminist Extinction
The Bloated Monster
As the human race hurtles toward extinction, primarily as a result anni-
hilating its own milieu, we feminists might respond by saying, ‘I told 
you so.’ Feminism is, like any ‘ism,’ perhaps too diverse to be given any 
grounding identity, yet it has most certainly been marked by critiques of 
man. Even in its earliest, liberal, and inclusive phases, feminism’s claim to 
include women within the category of ‘man’ or humanity did so not so 
much for its own sake as for the sake of life in general. It was not a ques-
tion of women selfishly making a claim for themselves so much as a call 
for a better life for all in a new world of sex equality. Feminism has never 
been a special interests claim but has always appealed to some broader 
justice in which all humans would be included. As long as man excluded 
and enslaved what was other than himself—as long as he treated women 
as mere chattels—his own humanity would be diminished. As Mary 
Wollstonecraft pointed out in 1792, the relation of master to slave not 
only enslaves the weaker party, but also precludes the full development 
of ‘man’ as a rational being: ‘Birth, riches, and every extrinsic advantage 
that exalt a man above his fellows, without any mental exertion, sink him 
in reality below them. In proportion to his weakness, he is played upon 
by designing men, till the bloated monster has lost all traces of humanity’ 
(Wollstonecraft 2008, 53).
Wollstonecraft’s argument is a typical early instance of an insistence 
on feminism as a better logic for all life. Even before the emergence of 
explicitly ecological modes of feminism, there had been a long-standing 
criticism of the limits or self-enclosure of man. But this long-standing 
resistance to man is intrinsic to the history of humanist self-critique. 
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Feminism is best seen as an ultra-humanism in that it has, from its incep-
tion, been based on the idea that man can only come to himself and be 
properly human through the recognition of women. The very concept 
of feminist emancipation harbors an implicit ecology. From liberal to 
radical and post-structuralist feminisms, women have always fought for 
themselves in the name of justice and equilibrium (and not as a warring 
special-interest group). It should come as no surprise, then, that femi-
nism would eventually claim an affinity to otherness in general (Schwab 
1996, 34; Hitchcock 1993), and see itself as extending naturally into 
environmental and class concerns:
More and more men are embracing eco-feminism because 
they see the depth of the analysis and realize that in shedding 
the privileges of a male-dominated culture they do more than 
create equal rights for all, that this great effort may actually 
save the earth and the life it supports. (Plant 1997, 129)
There is—according to most forms of eco-feminism—something like 
an affinity and passion for life as such that has been deflected by a male or 
masculinist tendency towards mastery and domination of all otherness; 
this care or concern for life in general might be redeemed by a return to 
a saved earth. The relation between environmentalism and ethics is co-
determining: without a concern for our milieu or the earth we could not 
possibly build a world of social justice, but without a harmonious and 
sexually ethical social order we could not possibly respond properly to 
our ecological milieu. It is not only in the specific branch of an ‘ethics 
of care’ or eco-feminism that the critique of masculinism becomes inter-
twined with a concern for the nonhuman. Eco-feminism is no minor off-
shoot of feminist thought but structures its genealogy: liberal feminism 
begins by saying that one cannot exclude a group of bodies from the 
rights of the humanity in general. Insofar as one is human (and therefore 
finite) there can be no precedence or pre-political mastery over any other 
being: sexual equality follows on from a liberal refusal of transcendence. 
But that refusal of transcendence not only precludes human-human mas-
tery but indicates an overcoming of mastery as such. In the absence of 
any transcendent or absolute moral order we are all placed in a position of 
humility (Langton 1988). If an appeal to humanity in general overturns 
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any possibility of a pre-given political hierarchy, because all humans are 
born equally rational, then that same humanizing gesture will lead to a 
questioning of the human. By what right can humanity be declared to 
be definitively rational, definitively self-conscious or definitively social-
political? Who defines these privileged predicates? 
Second-wave feminism questions the very nature of ‘the human,’ and 
certainly does not embrace liberalism’s ‘self-evident’ values of instru-
mental reason and universalism. Perhaps the notion of the self freed 
from all prejudice is an elevation of a certain type of self, and perhaps 
another ethics of local attachments, embodied passions and specificity 
would be just as worthy of being deemed to be human. By the time eco-
feminism emerges, the concern for the environment explicitly takes femi-
nism from a mode of human-human combat (women fighting for their 
rights, for the sake of all humanity) to a war on the man of reason; for it 
is man whose drive to mastery for the sake of his own self-maintenance 
has resulted in an unwitting suicide. Enter posthumanism: ‘we’ no lon-
ger contest what should count as the properly human, for the very defi-
nition of the ‘properly human’ constitutes a chauvinistic exceptionalism 
of the species and enables an ongoing hegemony in which the label of 
‘human’ smuggles in historical, cultural, sexual, racial and class norms. 
Posthumanism, of course, takes many forms—ranging from granting 
non-humans highly human qualities such as rights and cognition, to a 
questioning or rejection of the very qualities that had defined human-
ity (such as reason, language and technological progress). In all cases, 
though, there is a rejection of any simple notion of ‘man’ as a proper form 
or ground. Far from the posthuman ‘turn’ being a vanquishing of femi-
nism, one might say that the posthuman is required by feminism’s critical 
trajectory. The very concept of the feminine splits humanity in two, pre-
cluding any simple human norm: either humanity must be redefined or 
broadened to include women, or the very question that enabled women 
to challenge the rights of man, will lead to a full-scale destruction of any 
assumed right whatsoever.
Feminism’s recent turn to life (in environmentalism and ‘new mate-
rialisms’) should not appear as an addition or supplement but as the 
unfolding of the women’s movement’s proper potentiality. Indeed, 
this is just how eco-feminism has presented itself. It makes no sense to 
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strive to transform our relation to the environment without transform-
ing our own mode of being. Feminist criticisms of man would not be 
add-ons to environmentalism but would be crucial to any reconfigura-
tion of ecological thinking. Insofar as man has always been defined as a 
rational animal who calculates, manipulates, and represents a world that 
is his proper domain—and if we assume that ‘a dominating position 
alienates human beings from the environment on which their survival 
depends’—a thought of life without or beyond man becomes impera-
tive: ‘When human beings ignore natural processes, their antagonistic 
attitude towards nature leads not only to the destruction of the environ-
ment but also to self-destruction’ (Braidotti, Charkiewicz, Hausler and 
Wieringa 1994, 149).
It is with this recognition of self-destruction that feminism gains 
general purchase. Feminism’s criticism of man will not only transform 
humanity and its milieu but will open up a new thought of life. It is not 
only the case that a reformed relation to the environment requires a 
reconfiguration of man; it is also the case that the project of transform-
ing man—allowing him to become something other than the subject of 
instrumental reason—requires going beyond the bounds of the organ-
ism to consider life in general.
But here we arrive at two questions: is care for the environment really 
an exit from the mode of anthropocentric blindness that has accelerated 
the destruction of the biosphere? And, would not a thought of life beyond 
the human environment—beyond our world, our environment, the place 
or home for which we care—be a more adequate response to man’s sui-
cidal world tour?1 Put differently, what I am suggesting here is that the 
very concept of ‘the environment’ (seen as that which environs, is vul-
nerable to our destruction and therefore worthy of concern) shares all 
those features and affective tendencies that structured the self-enclosed 
Cartesian subject that feminism has always had in its sites. The very 
notion of an environment that encircles our range of living practice, and 
the very notion of ‘woman’ as tied to place and oriented to care, always 
figure the world as our world. To say, as eco-feminists do, that we are 
essentially world-oriented and placed in a relation of care and concern 
to a world that is always place rather than meaningless space is to repeat 
the (masculine) reduction of the world to its sense for us. The problem, 
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despite our protestations, is that we do not care. All the shrill protesta-
tions of proper care and connectedness maintain the anthropocentric 
alibi. Indeed, the criticism of the scientific disenchantment of the world, 
along with the lament that the world loses its meaning to become mere 
raw material as we fall further into a mode of patriarchal domination, 
maintains an insistence on the figure of the connected globe, or the envi-
ronment as an auto-poetic, self-furthering and self-organizing totality: it 
is assumed that the proper relation to the milieu that sustains us would 
be an extension of virtues of respect, care, concern, and even communi-
cation to a nonhuman that is always presented in a normatively homely 
manner.2 What remains out of play is a consideration of forces of life that 
are not discernible from within our milieu, and that do not perturb our 
coupling with nature.
Even when the word vitalism is not used explicitly, we might observe, 
today, a vitalist ethics in general that dominates our time. Just as tradi-
tional vitalism set itself against René Descartes’ positing of an extended 
substance that was the basis for a mechanistic and calculable material 
world, so there is now a persistent, vehement, and near-universal denun-
ciation of Cartesianism, summed up by Antonio Damasio as ‘Descartes’ 
error’ (Damasio 1994). Against the idea of a mental substance that rep-
resents an inert material world, neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, 
cognitive archaeologists, researchers of artificial life, and philosophers 
have insisted on characterizing life not in static or centered terms but as 
a plural and dynamic creativity. The mind or the self emerges from life 
rather than being the privileged point from which life is known. One 
could characterize this late twentieth-century anti-cognitive turn to life 
as a vitalism precisely because, like its pre-modern counterpart, it places 
an emphasis on dynamism, relations, active becoming, and creativity. 
Cartesianism, today, is deemed to be horrific for all the same reasons 
that it was condemned (mainly by theologians) in its first articulation: 
the Cartesian subject is a disconnected, character-less, disembodied, dis-
enchanted, and disaffected ghost in a machine. If life has meaning—if it 
is never mere matter but always this particular felt life for this particular 
living organism—then one must discard Descartes’ error and arrive at a 
new Spinozism. For Damasio, this means that there is no self who per-
ceives the world in a certain way and who is then affected emotionally by 
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some external input. Rather, in the beginning is affect: an emotion that 
may or may not come to consciousness. The self is the ‘feeling’ of this 
event, which is also to say that the self does not end with the borders of 
the biological body.
In terms of environmentalism and questions of the human being’s rela-
tion to the milieu that it has for so long disregarded, this might seem to 
be a salutary elimination of man as homo faber. It appears, perhaps, that 
from within their own trajectory, theories of ‘mind’ have arrived at the 
immersion of mind in life, at the recognition of the inextricable inter-
twining of the mind with its milieu—and perhaps even at the most pro-
found of feminisms. Man as master of representation, cognition, calcula-
tion and disembodied distance has, without assistance, and in his own 
good time, recognized himself as an originally environmental being. 
Feminists have, in other words, been right all along, but man was capable 
of realizing the truths of feminist care and concern without the explicit 
intervention of feminism. Indeed, one of the definitive theorists of post-
humanism, Cary Wolfe, negotiates his definition of posthumanism by 
shuttling back and forth between feminism’s insistence on the power rela-
tions among various knowledge practices and systems theory’s emphasis 
on embodied, situated and world-constituting knowledge, and then con-
cludes that both disciplines have their limits in their containment within 
the human, the limit of which needs to be shattered by an exit from the 
human, possibly towards the animal: ‘the question is not who will get to 
be human, but what kinds of couplings across the humanist divide are 
possible and indeed unavoidable when we begin to observe the end of 
man’ (Wolfe 1995, 66). 
But is redemption this easy? Although we know that events are occur-
ring for which the old models of calculative reason are inadequate, it is 
uncertain just what or how much we could tackle from our supposedly 
new point of view of engaged, dynamic, extended, embodied, and emo-
tive selfhood. Is this new vitalism or anim(al)ism really a felicitous shift 
in modes of thinking that will allow us to deal with the current critical 
state of our milieu, or is it a reaction formation? I would suggest the latter, 
especially if we consider not only the joyous affirmations of life—with 
the discovery of empathy (Rivkin 2009), affect (Gregg and Seigworth 
2010), embodiment (Rowlands 2010), universal creativity (Russell 
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2007), and wondrous futures (Levy 1997)—but also seemingly dire 
warnings. James Lovelock’s ‘final’ warning is, after all, a warning for us—
otherwise it would not be final. It assumes our duration, the end of life for 
us (Lovelock 2009). To say that Gaia is vanishing is to equate our system 
of life with systematicity tout court. Could we not see the present as the 
end of this Gaia, if Gaia really is an apt figure? What is not considered—
beyond questions of warning, surviving, saving, and death knells—is 
what kind of life the actual death of man might enable, whether ‘we’ 
ought to live on, and just what or who this saved ‘we’ approaching finality 
might be. If we are seeking to save ourselves then are we also saving the 
survival mechanisms that have brought the human species and its milieu 
to the brink of destruction? If we wish to destroy ‘man’ as the rapacious 
Cartesian, calculative subject of instrumental reason in order to save life, 
who is the ground of this futural and counter-human annihilation? For 
all the problems of destroying man in the name of something other than 
the human, and for all the resonance of this survivalist self-destruction 
with the very grips of humanism it is aiming to vanquish, so much of the 
posthuman rhetoric today appears to declare itself as already attuned to 
the life that ‘man’ so lamentable ignored (up until now).
It is just at the point at which the future’s potentiality and openness 
appears to be radically lacking in life that what counts as thinking (rang-
ing from high theory to popular science) has discovered a life that goes 
beyond the old, limited, finite, and all too concrete models of mind. This 
seeming revolution of over-turning man for the sake of the life that man 
has denied is—far from being man’s other—the very hallmark of the end 
of man. Man has always existed as a being who ends himself: as soon as 
the human is given some natural or limited definition, man discovers that 
his real, creative, futural being lies in some not-yet realized becoming 
that will always save him from a past that he can denounce as both mis-
guided and as at an end (Derrida 1969). Today, just as the human species 
faces possible and quite literal extinction, ‘man’ extinguishes himself: he 
declares that he is neither a brain in a body nor a mind in a machine, but 
always already ecological—sympathetically, emotionally, and systemi-
cally attuned to a broader milieu of life. Such claims range from popular 
neuroscience’s claims for emotional and affective selves, to system theo-
ry’s arguments for a self that extends beyond the bounds of the individual 
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body and a whole series of appropriations of non-Western traditions of 
mindfulness in which the self can overcome its egoistic prison. Once 
again what is affirmed—against all the evidence for a malevolent relation 
or intrinsically suicidal system of humanity and its environs—is an origi-
nal human connectedness, an irreducible system in which the world is 
never alien raw matter but always this particular world as it is disclosed 
for this particular organic life.
But has man really extinguished himself? Has there not always 
been an insistence that thinking and being are the same, that—in old 
Parmenidean terms—to think is to be in accord with a movement of life 
that affirms and sustains itself? That is to say, man has continually real-
ized that the world that he has depicted is to some extent a projection 
of his own mastering reason, and he has then gone on to claim that—
after the Enlightenment—the same mythic world of his own imagina-
tion has been extirpated in order that man might arrive at life as it really 
is (Adorno and Horkheimer 2002). If there has continually—since 
Aristotle—been a reaction against Platonism and intellectualism, has this 
not been because such idealisms set themselves and their values above 
life? For the systems theory of Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, 
which has been so influential across a range of domains, there is not a pri-
mary world that is taken up and represented by a separate subject, since 
there is just this coupling of organism and the world that the organism 
inhabits (Maturana and Varela 1992). It is against this anti-Platonism or 
naïve literalism that I would suggest that we consider the world not as 
our own milieu but in its own duration. Perhaps we should think again 
about the supposedly evil Cartesian separation between mind and world, 
not as separate substances but as a separation between one being (man) 
for whom there can be something like substance, and whatever else in all 
its contingency would remain? Should we not be considering ourselves 
and conscious life not as emergent properties, but as a monstrosity that 
we do not feel, live, or determine but rather witness partially and ex post 
facto? That is to say: the end of man is both desirable and necessary, yet 
also impossible. Any attempt to vanquish man as a blight on earth has 
always depended on the notion of a proper human who would find him-
self, again, being at one with the earth.
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The Sex of Extinction
Here we must turn to the sex of extinction, or what I will refer to as (s)ex-
tinction: life, at least as it has been figured through the imaginary of man, 
always desires to exit itself, negating any determined or merely actual 
being. As man, today, faces his death in the literal sense, he summons 
forth his figural death; he demands and declares that man must become 
one with the life of which he is an expression. In this becoming-with-the-
world has man become woman? In one sense the answer is yes, but this 
is not a new becoming-woman, nor is it a new vitalism. There has always 
been an affirmation of the life from which man emerges, a life that can 
be relived, reaffirmed, and plundered so that man may overcome his iso-
lated subjective detachment in order to feel at one with his world. (This 
was, indeed, the shift from Platonism to Neo-Platonism, where the gap 
between ideals and the world as it is is covered over with a theory of ema-
nation, in which all forms emerge from one fecund life.) Man has always 
been an environmental animal, has always viewed the world as his envi-
rons, has always been a mode of becoming-woman: he lives his proper 
being not in fully actualized and detached isolation, but through a more 
profound autonomy in which he recognizes and affirms himself through a 
world that is never alien, never mere matter, but always a sign of his proper 
and profound life. That is—and this is in the spirit of a quick, moral, and 
unthinking anti-Cartesianism—man is most properly himself when he 
relates to and lives himself through his own indispensable otherness.3 If 
there has been a historical shift from instrumental Cartesianism—where 
the world is dead matter to be mastered—to environmentalism, then the 
latter move is a hyper-Cartesianism (since for the environmentalist the 
world is not really other, alien, or inhuman but always already at one with 
man’s proper life).
A feminist critique of man—a man who has always been vitalist in his 
profound communion with life—would be the most tired of gestures. 
Man lives on by feminist critique, by continually surpassing and reviving 
his rationality through imbibing the blood of the dead, by returning to 
and retrieving the life beyond the bounds of his own life. Neither a tradi-
tional vitalism that regards matter as supplemented by spirit, nor a ‘new’ 
vitalism where matter is already dynamic will save us. What any vitalism 
will sustain is just this lure of saving life (as though one might find, in life, 
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means for salvation). What we need to consider is the dead end of life: 
man lives on either by gathering all proper life within himself (seeing all 
life as mindful) or by positing a good life that will save him from himself. 
It is perhaps in this double bind (where man maintains himself in the 
face of extinction by extinguishing himself) that a radical feminism could 
provide a genuine thought of life beyond the human. Here, there would 
be no woman who remains close to the earth, life, and cosmos: no woman 
who provides man with the other he has always required for his own 
redemption. Feminism, today, facing the extinction of the human, should 
turn neither to man nor to woman: both of these figures remain human, 
all too human, as does the concept of the environment that has always 
allowed man to live on through a vitalist ethic. One would also need to 
say the same about posthumanism, which is more often than not an ultra-
humanism. In many ways, what passes for posthumanism consists in the 
assertion that man is not an isolated animal with any specific features that 
would mark him off from life, for he is always already at one with life, ani-
mality, and technology. Rather than thinking of woman, the finality and 
redemption of man, or living beyond man in an era of the unified posthu-
man (which takes heed of the final warning for us), what really needs to 
be confronted is the way in which the figure of ‘life’ has always justified 
man as an intrinsically posthuman animal. Man has always been other 
than himself, always more than his own mere being.
If vitalism has any general sense—and it has at least a performative 
force in current calls for a new vitalism—then it does so in opposition 
to what is perceived to be a long-standing condition of Western man. 
Man, according to anti-Cartesian and posthuman critiques, has con-
ceived of himself as an autonomous, mastering, representing, elevated, 
and rational near-divinity who owes nothing to his world. The turn to the 
environment, to becoming one with a vitality that exceeds the bounds 
of his own being, would supposedly be a departure from a history of 
instrumental reason. But the turn to vitalism is another vampire gesture: 
man consumes himself, and then imagines that he is no longer the rapa-
cious animal he once was. Man believes he has exited his self-enclosure 
to find the world and his better post-feminist self. The concept of the 
environment—as that surrounding and infusing life from which we have 
emerged, and which, so the argument goes, would be retrievable through 
Feminist Extinction 17
a vitalist overcoming of our malevolent detachment—maintains the 
same structure of anthropomorphism. What needs to be thought today is 
that which cannot be thought, lived, retrieved, or revitalized as the saving 
grace of man or woman.
Not the Post-apocalyptic (Not the Posthuman), Not Now
To give a sense of what this might mean both critically and positively, we 
should perhaps ask what the future would be like beyond the figure of 
man (a figure that has always included both the posthuman and woman). 
What if we were to approach the future through sexual difference, where 
sexual desire would be distinct from any notion of survival or organic 
self-maintenance? Here, one would need to abandon notions of survival, 
and of the posthuman, precisely because these are recuperating gestures. 
If one considered sexual difference outside dualist gender binaries, one 
might confront proliferating differences. Difference is sexual, rather than 
gendered, when it is not the coupling of two kinds (or genres) for the 
sake of mutual self-maintenance and ongoing recognition. If a body con-
nects with another body, not for the sake of its own survival or repro-
duction but through something like touch as such, then sexual difference 
would relate to what is other than itself without a view to shoring up its 
own being. To be open to what is not one’s own—to what cannot be fig-
ured as environment, ecology (with all its motifs of oikos and intercon-
nectedness) or the posthuman—would have two consequences.
First, one might ask about future modes of existence that are not based 
on survival (for any survival, as living on, would always be an extension 
of the present). Margaret Atwood’s great counter-post-apocalyptic novel 
The Year of the Flood does just that. In this novel, Atwood seems to be 
opening with a (now) standard post-apocalyptic landscape in which 
human life in its civilized and urbane modes has been destroyed, leaving a 
world of fragile living on. Through the use of flashbacks, Atwood describes 
a world prior to this wasted landscape: a world of traffic in women, of 
the manipulation of life for corporate expediency and commercial nov-
elty, of a subclass of humans who function as manipulable matter for a 
techno-scientific capitalist elite, and of a language of noise and brand-
names. Here, Atwood opens one path for thought: our post-apocalyptic 
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future has already arrived. The nightmare dystopia of some supposedly 
science-fiction inhuman future whereby we have sacrificed our human-
ity to rapacity and venality has already arrived, and that is because that is 
how man has always lived. It is no accident that Atwood’s earlier fiction 
was remarkably prescient. Her depiction of a world in The Handmaid’s 
Tale in which women are bio-politically managed is not so much a warn-
ing for the future as it is a diagnosis of what humanity has always been: 
a passionate commitment to life that will allow the vital order to act as a 
foundation for moral managerialism. Second, and more important for my 
purposes here, The Year of the Flood describes another cult of the future—
the Gardeners—whose ecological discourse of sacred life and the purity 
of the origins of their own retrieved humanity is structurally akin to the 
imagined ‘biopolitical’ corporatism that also establishes the extension 
and maximization of life as its lore. What Atwood suggests, against the 
present idea that man might surpass himself and find a new ecological 
future, is that such redemptive imaginaries have always allowed man to 
master life in order to maintain himself. Life—or its moral imaginary—
has always been biopolitical: green, eco-feminist, vitalist and posthuman 
‘turns’ to animality and the ecology all vanquish man as he has been for 
the sake of a new redeemed future, and do so because of a commitment 
to an ethical self who can always cast off what he is in order to become.
But The Year of the Flood is not only critical and diagnostic. (This is 
where it differs from other twenty-first century critiques of life manage-
ment, such as Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go of 2005). In addition 
to the ironic depiction of a world war between green appeals to life as it 
is and biopolitical futures celebrating a life that has survived beyond all 
human limits, Atwood presents the hint of a future of refusal in which the 
women who are traded, exchanged, and managed for the sake of biologi-
cal variation and reproduction reject the biological family and familial 
production to produce new modes of haphazard social bonding (beyond 
sexuality) and new forms of bio-art that decay upon impact. In a world 
where a war takes place between eco-fascism (or saving life at all costs) 
and bio-politics (the management of life for the sake of maximized repro-
duction), Atwood describes fragile female characters who make their way 
through this landscape, forming lateral alliances of friendship rather than 
filial communities of reproduction. One of the characters has a successful 
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career in bio-art, where she uses wasted bodily materials to produce art-
works that are fleeting and ephemeral: ‘She liked to watch things move 
and grow and then disappear.’4 Atwood challenges the fetishized motif of 
life, the human mode of monumental archives, and the idea that in turn-
ing to ‘life,’ art and man might find endurance.
What Atwood poses is a world beyond ‘woman’ as man’s better other. 
The Year of the Flood continues two critical traditions in feminist writ-
ing—one Romantic (that refuses what Freud referred to as the oceanic 
feeling or pre-Oedipal plenitude), and one modernist (that refuses a 
feminine fecundity that would revitalize all the dead systems of reified 
language and technology). Like Mary Shelley in Frankenstein, a novel 
that aligned the romantic artists who imagine nature as a benevolent 
feminine other with the scientist’s domination of nature as dead matter, 
The Year of the Flood presents a world in which ecological redemption (as 
eco-fascism) is the flipside of a bio-political management of life. The two 
warring factions in Atwood’s novel both make a claim to be acting for a 
life that would destroy previous modes of human self-imprisonment: the 
Adamic cult of Gardeners appeal to the vital value of the earth as a way 
of controlling bodies, production, and reproduction, while the govern-
ing corporation (CorpSeCorp) aims at maximizing life through genetic 
manipulation and data management. Both these factions are enabled by 
the post-apocalyptic imaginary or, to borrow a phrase from Lovelock, the 
imaginary of ‘final warning.’ If our only value and horizon is that of life, 
then only one path is permitted: that which saves and survives.
Both Shelley’s Frankenstein and Atwood’s Year of the Flood display 
a quite common motif in feminist fiction writing to question the value 
of the maximization of life. In this respect one would have to associate 
at least one form of feminism, not with finding a ‘woman’ beyond man, 
but with a critique of all that has stood for ‘woman’ as man’s other. Such 
literature instead conducts thought experiments of futures that open up 
reproduction beyond any notion of self-managing humanity. The Year of 
the Flood continues a feminist-novelistic-radical capacity to question the 
very value of survival (which is also to say the value of value, if value has 
always been given as that which furthers life). It would be incorrect to 
label this tradition as science fiction, for the worlds depicted are those of 
the present scientific imaginary: in both Frankenstein and The Year of the 
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Flood it is both science (as instrumental reason) and its supposed other 
(the ecological connectedness with life) that are presented as redemp-
tion narratives that fail to question just who this ‘man’ is whose survival 
we seek to maintain. One might say that the consequences one can draw 
from this feminist tradition are that man always plans his escape through 
imagined posthuman futures and others, and that what is required to 
think beyond man as survival machine is a sense of the contamination of 
the ecological imaginary. This brings us to the second consequence, and 
the second tradition, in which the very figures of art, creativity, and pro-
duction—tied to fruitful life—are also interrogated.
This second critical tradition extended and radicalized by The Year of 
the Flood is the feminist modernist counter-aesthetic. In Virginia Woolf ’s 
To the Lighthouse—a novel that, like Atwood’s, ends with an ambivalent 
figure of the approach to (or refusal of) light—the central maternal nur-
turing figure, Mrs. Ramsay, dies. After an interlude (‘Time Passes’) that 
presents a falling of darkness, the final section of the novel concludes 
with the young female artist, Lily Briscoe, having a vision that prompts 
her to act almost destructively toward the conventional canvas. Not 
only does her vision result in a single dark line painted down the center 
of the picture of Mrs. Ramsay that she has been struggling to compose 
throughout the novel; her creative act is coupled with a recognition of 
art’s decay—as though Briscoe’s refusal of art history and representa-
tion is also an embrace of transience. This is not man as homo faber, being 
infused with a life other than his own that he goes on to present, repre-
sent, and preserve, for Lily’s approach to her canvas occurs quickly and 
almost as a distraction:
Quickly, as if she were recalled by something over there, she 
turned to her canvas. There it was—her picture. Yes, with all 
its green and blues, its lines running up and across, its attempt 
at something […]. With a sudden intensity, as if she saw it 
clear for a second, she drew a line there, in the centre. It was 
done; it was finished. Yes, she thought, laying down her brush 
in extreme fatigue, I have had my vision. (Woolf 2006, 170)
The Year of the Flood also presents an art event amid a world of destruc-
tion, where the artwork is similarly confronted with impersonal forces 
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of transience and that takes place in a milieu of posthuman destruction, 
a destruction that has occurred because of the shrill and myopic desire 
for life. Just as To the Lighthouse is structured around the falling of an 
immense darkness (the ‘great’ war) that is the consequence rather than 
the overcoming of man’s apocalyptic imaginary (where man will arrive 
fully at nothing other than his own mastery), so The Year of the Flood 
presents the future of man. This future is one in which life is maximized, 
in which survival harnesses technology and nature for the sake of a time 
of continuity and extended futures. The minor ray of disturbance is given 
in a practice of bio-art that, quite unlike the dominant bio-art of the pres-
ent that maintains man’s watchfulness over life, embraces disappearance:
Amanda was in the Wisconsin desert, putting together one 
of the Bioart installations she’s been doing now that she’s 
into what she calls the art caper. It was cow bones this time. 
Wisconsin’s covered with cow bones […] and she was drag-
ging the cow bones into a pattern so big it could only be 
seen from above: huge capital letters, spelling out a word. 
Later she’d cover it in pancake syrup and wait until the insect 
life was all over it, and then take videos of it from the air, to 
put into galleries. She liked to watch things move and grow 
and then disappear […]. Her Wisconsin thing was part of a 
series called The Living Word—she said for a joke that it was 
inspired by the Gardeners because they’d repressed us so 
much about writing things down. She’d begun with one-letter 
words—I and A and O—and then done two-letter words like 
It, and then three letters, and four, and five. Now she was up 
to six. They’d been written in all different materials, includ-
ing fish guts and toxic-spill-killed birds and toilets from build-
ing demolition sites filled with used cooking oil and set on 
fire. (Atwood 2009, 56-57)
Atwood depicts the artist, Amanda, not as one who will retrieve all 
that is proper, foundational, and eternal in life, but as a scammer, joker, 
or player who will take man’s game of life, money, and survival—includ-
ing the sanctity of the word—and play with nonexistence. Beyond ‘man,’ 
there is perhaps only ‘woman’ and ‘life’; and this is why man has always 
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sustained himself by (figures of) becoming woman. Rather than think 
apocalyptically in terms of our own finality (or our own beyond or our 
very own posthumanity) we might—finally—be given the opportunity 
to think of a world without ends.
Here lies the significance of Atwood’s work. First, she presents the 
imagined nightmare of a future world of man’s psychotic drive to master 
life as already evidenced in the present (rather than being some imagined 
or possible post-apocalyptic future). We are always and already so tied to 
life that it becomes the screen or tableau upon which we imagine noth-
ing other than our own living. Second, like Shelley before her, she does 
not place a feminized nature outside man, for beyond ‘man’ one cannot 
figure the good life but only contingent, fragile, insecure, and ephemeral 
lives. Finally, one cannot appeal here to art or the aesthetic, for here, too, 
one encounters the fetishized figure of redemptive creation. In its place, 
Atwood, like Woolf and Shelley before her, imagines what life would be 
like if one could abandon the fantasy of one’s own endurance.
Notes
1.  I use the term man quite deliberately here: for it is this figure of man that has 
been adopted by both parties, both those who deploy notions of a generic 
humanity and those feminists who seek to find a space of ‘woman’ outside the 
man of reason. The concept of man also brings with it a certain concept of 
world: as Heidegger and others have pointed out, the earth becomes ‘world’ 
when it is lived as our own. 
2.  For a stringent critique of the myopias of environmental thinking, see 
Donna Haraway, When Species Meet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2008) 18.
3.  It is for this reason that Luce Irigaray (1985) does not see Descartes as an 
‘error’ in the history of thought but instead recognizes in the Cartesian cogito 
an ongoing appeal to a necessary otherness that will enable man to return to 
himself, and live himself as nothing more than the process of reflecting his 
own outside. 
4.  For an insightful criticism of bio-art’s putative break with ‘man’ —a critique 
that would resonate with Atwood’s attempt to figure a bio-art of dead waste—
see Nicole Anderson, ‘(Auto)Immunity: The Deconstruction and Politics of 
‘Bio-Art’ and Criticism,’ Parallax 16:4 (2010): 101–116.
Chapter 2
Norm Wars
It might seem at first glance that Gilles Deleuze would be the anti-nor-
mative theorist par excellence and that we could turn to his work to draw 
from his rich lexicon of seemingly counter-normative concepts, including 
immanence (as the refusal of any imposed order), affect (or forces disrup-
tive of calculated propriety) and the body without organs (that appears 
to signal, even if he did not used the word, some sense of a body’s capac-
ity to generate instability). The body without organs, more than imma-
nence and affect, offers two modes of counter-normativity: the first lies 
with the use of the word organs, for it is organs or parts that seem to grant 
some functioning wholeness to bodies. The body without organs seems 
to reverse the organicist idea that beings become what they are (and take 
on function, order and organization) only in relations to a whole. The 
body without organs suggests that there can be something like a body—a 
whole—that does not have functioning parts; as long as fragments, parts 
or forces are not organized or functional then they cannot be said to be 
organs. By contrast, another performative mode of reading this term 
would suggest just the reverse; there are acts or performances—move-
ments or functions—that compose or perform a body, but that body 
never takes on a final or definitive wholeness. Despite the complexity and 
polyvalence of the term ‘body without organs’ it can nevertheless pro-
vide a clear and distinct path beyond performative approaches to norma-
tivity. On a generally performative account, immanence is true and good 
because it frees us from any imposed or given norms; immanence is a 
radical liberal refusal of any authority that might dictate order in advance. 
Further, affect also disturbs standard, prescriptive, calculative or imposed 
orders of the self; affects occur without decision or mastery and the poli-
tics of affect takes us out of the domain of selves and interests and into 
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a realm where politics would proceed by creating and performing: pro-
ducing or working with affects rather than simply negotiating informa-
tion. As already suggested, immanence and affect seem to have the vogue 
that they do today (if they still do) both because of Deleuze’s work and 
because of a general shift towards performativity, or the idea that politics 
and identity occur through ongoing creation and not by appeal to prin-
ciples. If performativity is true then it follows that selves become what 
they are in ongoing actions that relate to, are affected by, and affect, oth-
ers. If performativity is true then it also follows that we have no founda-
tion outside our self-creating performance of who we are. We would all, 
potentially, be ‘bodies witout organs’ capable of dismantling any identity 
to which we have been subjected, but never by decision or fiat so much as 
precarious and heteronomous engagements with others. It would seem 
then that immanence, affect and performativity would be the anti-nor-
mative concepts par excellence, freeing us from the negativity of critique.
 I will argue that all these concepts of immanance, affect and perfor-
mativity—have two sides: one is anti-normative, and therefore defined 
against (and within the same terrain as) normativity. The other side 
would neither be normative nor anti-normative but would be posed in 
terms of a different problem, a problem on a plane distinct from that of 
performativity. For it is performativity—in its shift from linguistic to 
political modes—that stresses that there are not identities, forms, sys-
tems, meanings or terms that are then repeated by language users; nor is 
language use or the taking on of identity the adoption of some external 
system. Rather, terms and systems are created and constituted through 
ongoing performance. It would follow then that individuals do not take 
up norms and identities and then find space for critique, for there is no 
norm or identity outside performance, and so all performance is at once 
repetition and disturbance, consolidation and critique. In this respect 
the very possibility of a norm—that it is given through repetition and 
performance—is also the impossibility of a norm, for no repetition is or 
coincides with the norm itself. One is always necessarily subjected, for 
there is no self or subject outside the norm, but one is also necessarily 
never fully or finally ‘a subject’ precisely because every performance of a 
norm is never the norm as such. Norms emerge from, but are disturbed 
by, the very performance they make possible. But it is for just this reason 
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that performative modes of defining affect and immanence remain sub-
jectivist. Affect becomes that destabilizing force of bodies in perfor-
mance and relation, while immanence precludes any reference to a force 
or power that would exceed performing bodies. These reactive modes of 
defining anti-normativity are subjectivist in Heidegger’s sense: they posit 
some ground from which all relations emerge (and, further, in rejecting 
Descartes’ subject of mental substance they posit some other ultimate 
subject—such as life, affect, embodiment or immanence). Deleuze’s con-
cepts of immanence, affect and act or fiat (rather than performativity) 
are—I will argue—composed on another plane, from a different style of 
problem.1 It might seem at first that performativity might be a counter-
vitalist concept: without any foundation or appeal to life all we have are 
actions and relations among bodies, from which we then posit some foun-
dation or subject that must have been. Certainly such a mode of thinking 
performativity might be possible but it would need first to free perfor-
mance both from language acts and acting bodies, perhaps thinking of 
performative forces beyond all that we have come to think of as acting, 
and would also need to be freed from the problems of norm and iden-
tity. (As an example one might think of all the cosmic performances of 
geological powers that do not seem to have been active or identified until 
now and that have a being or force beyond systems of recognition.) As 
conceived, the concepts of immanence, affect and performative—those 
that seem to have waged war on normativity and especially insofar as 
they are opposed to normativity—constitute something like a new sub-
jectivism of life. For if one appeals to the affects of bodies as destabilizing 
powers that would wage war on the rigidity of norms, or if one thinks 
of performativity as radical insofar as it takes on (and then destabilizes) 
norms then one repeats, reactively, a disjunction between the system of 
norms on the one hand and the force of disturbance on the other.
This has direct consequences for disciplines and disciplinarity. If it 
were the case that one might appeal to some generative ground—such 
as life—from which relations would emerge, then knowledge would be 
a single field, and may enjoy something like interdisciplinarity, which 
would encompass all the different but conversant and convergent ways 
in which life appears. Seeming disciplinary divergence—such as literary 
theorists’ or art critics’ tendencies to treat works of art as detached from 
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life, or philosophy’s approach to logic as having some Platonic reality, or 
the scientist’s disenchantment and reification of life—could all be rem-
edied by an acknowledgment of the genesis and emergence of all these 
faculties from one self-furthering life. Habermas, the great theorist of 
inescapable normativity, has insisted that we need some reflective prac-
tice—such as critical philosophy—that locates and negotiates the knowl-
edge practices of various lifeworlds:
The difference between lifeworld and communicative action 
is not taken back in any unity; it is even deepened to the extent 
that the reproduction of the lifeworld is no longer merely 
routed through the medium of action oriented toward reach-
ing understanding, but is saddled on the interpretive perfor-
mances of its agents. To the degree that yes/no decisions that 
sustain the communicative practice of everyday life do not 
derive from an ascribed normative consensus but emerge 
from the cooperative interpretive processes of the participants 
themselves, concrete forms of life and universal structures of 
the lifeworld become separated. Naturally, there are family 
resemblances among the plurality of totalities of life forms; 
they overlap and interlock, but they are not embraced in turn 
by some supertotality. Multiplicity and diffusion arise in the 
course of an abstraction process through which the contents 
of particular lifeworlds are set off ever more starkly from the 
universal structures of the lifeworld. (Habermas 1990, 343)
No discipline should be a world unto itself, rigidly imposing its field 
upon life. The task of the disciplines, and especially the humanities, today 
would lie in just this ideal, but not actuality of, convergence. All this 
would seem to follow from at least one notion of immanence: disciplines 
emerge from life and cannot stand above life (or other disciplines); nor 
could there be a specialist ‘moral’ or biological science that would pro-
vide some law for life, for these practices too emerge from, and are there-
fore immanent to, life.
By contrast, Deleuze and Guattari (1994) focus on the incommensu-
rable and divergent nature of the faculties—lacking anything like a sensus 
communis, good sense, common sense, lifeworld or ‘lived.’ The concepts 
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created by philosophy have a thought and consistency of their own, and 
are responses to problems that take hold of and do violence to thinking. 
If there is an immanence it is not immanence to a life of the ‘lived’—
not this life of ours that we negotiate from practices and can never step 
outside. Rather, the immanence is inhuman, which means that ‘we’ (we 
humans) cannot locate all that is within any life, for life is not given as 
such, as some ground from which difference emerges. The disciplines—
then—far from being traceable back to praxis exist and insist in their 
immanence, irreducible to anything other than themselves. Works of art 
manage (at least in part) to tear something like ‘affects’ from affections: as 
though the lived affection were the expression of a pure power or quality. 
Scientific functions are definitely not those of the lived, but have success 
insofar as they formulate new ‘observers’ that would allow for a consis-
tency and truth that is certainly not that of human experience. It is not 
the case, then, that we have competing systems—all emerging from life, 
each composing a reality of its own that we then need to adjudicate via 
reflective critique. Nor are we imprisoned in a human domain of per-
formed or constituted normative orders from which the only exit would 
be destabilization from within. If we think beyond normativity and its 
others to a different way of thinking about the concept of immanence we 
would be presented with multiple powers, all of them opening up diver-
gent potentials and assembled systems. Each such diverging line would 
be expressive of the infinite in its own way. The problem with normativity 
would neither be that norms in their rigidity do violence to the dynamic 
praxis of life, nor that without norms we would fall into the chaos of the 
undifferentiated. Certainly, then, there would be no distinction between 
the hard world of scientific facts, and then the norm-constitutive or 
meaning-productive humanities. Nor would there be some imprisoning 
and reactively nihilist sense that the sciences, too, are normative or value-
producing, and that beyond normativity there only exists some reality or 
life that is known ex post facto as beyond the sense we make of it. 
Life, as articulated by Deleuze, is not a generative ground. It is not life 
in general as some force or algorithm that generates a ‘vital normativity,’ 
such as the imperative for life to maintain and persevere in itself (Esposito 
2008). Nor is life some negated or mourned real that is given only 
through the narrow forms that we impose upon it. Rather, by referring to 
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‘a’ life that is distinct from the actualized individual, life does not become 
some imperative of retrieval, redemption or repair. It does not have the 
sense of drawing our attention back to the ground of life from which indi-
viduals have emerged. On the contrary, ‘life’ is—like the three faculties of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s What is Philosophy?—a detaching power. 
This is because it is ‘a’ life: neither the life of an individual, nor 
life in general:
We will say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and noth-
ing else. It is not immanence to life, but the immanent that 
is in nothing is itself a life. A life is the immanence of imma-
nence, absolute immanence; it is complete power, complete 
bliss[…] it is an absolute immediate consciousness whose 
very activity no longer refers to a being but is ceaselessly 
posed in a life. (Deleuze 1991, 27)
If normativity is a commitment to one’s life, such that I could not be 
who I am if I were not committed to some ongoing, stable and disci-
plined self, then ‘a’ life shifts the terrain of the problem. One is neither 
a free, self-creating individual, always other than any reified or imposed 
norm (anti-normative subjectivism); nor is one a self who gives a law to 
oneself, recognizing oneself through the capacity to be someone. In con-
trast to one’s life or dynamic life in general, Deleuze’s ‘a’ life has two distin-
guishing features. First, Deleuze argues that this potential for thought—
for thinking about immanence as ‘a’ life—is expressed in literature. That 
is, in order for this strange thought of ‘a’ life to emerge it needs to be 
distilled, articulated or constituted through some specific faculty. When 
Charles Dickens describes the loathsome character Riderhood—whose 
organized and identifiable individuality no one would seek to save—he 
manages to articulate a moment at which all the general and stable quali-
ties, including the character’s personal striving, fall away:
Between his life and his death there is a moment that is only 
that of a life playing with death. The life of the individual gives 
way to an impersonal and yet singular life that releases a pure 
event freed from the accidents of internal and external life, 
that is, from the subjectivity and objectivity of what happens: 
a ‘Homo tantum’ with whom everyone empathizes and who 
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attains a sort of beatitude. It is a heacceity no longer of indi-
viduation but of singularization: a life of pure immanence, 
neutral, beyond good and evil, for it was only the subject 
that incarnated it in the midst of things that made it good or 
bad. (Deleuze 1991, 28-29)
 One is given not an individual who wants to live, nor life in general but 
something like a ‘spark’—one force in an eternity and infinity of forces 
that flickers here and now, and that may or may not endure. If there is an 
individual who endures as a relatively stable ongoing collection of predi-
cates, all given form through relations to other individuals and predicates, 
then this is because there are individuating ‘sparks,’ flickers of ‘a’ life that 
might create a differentiated person located in a specific point of view. 
Life, given as ‘a’ life, would therefore be closer to a power of dispersal and 
positive destruction: ‘a’ life is that which is stabilized when individuals 
are brought into being, but which appears as individuating when the indi-
vidual falls apart and is now the potentiality for individuation. Second, 
this way of thinking about immanence is radically destructive and anti-
foundational. Rather than posit something like life, humanity, labor, 
responsiveness, affect, being or the lived as that receding ground from 
which relations emerge, ‘a’ life is counter-actualizing or anti-relational. It 
does not express itself via some normative commitment that something 
is only insofar as it is recognized, maintained as itself, and constitutive of 
ongoing stability; nor is life that which is given as other than any fixed 
norm (as it would be in the Romanticist notion of the subject as above 
and beyond any of his expressed personae). 
This can be explained more concretely by looking at one of the few 
occasions when Deleuze and Guattari address the relation between 
norms and desire. In Anti-Oedipus they examine the colonizing power of 
the figure of Oedipus. The power of their diatribe against psychoanalysis 
lay in their astute understanding of the truth of the Oedipus complex, 
that Oedipus was, indeed, the structure of the modern subject. We imag-
ine that either we subject ourselves to the prohibiting normativity of the 
law, or fall back into a chaotic and nightmarish psychosis. Discussing 
the ways in which psychoanalysts approached an African tribe, Deleuze 
and Guattari criticize the assumption that psychoanalysis can and 
should begin not when disturbances and forces are distributed beyond 
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individuals humans but when crises are located within a subject and a 
psyche. Why, they ask, should individuation be tied exclusively to an indi-
vidual and a subject’s relation to norms?
Why think that supernatural powers and magical aggressions 
constitute a myth that is inferior to Oedipus? On the contrary, 
is it not true that they move desire in the direction of more 
intense and more adequate investments of the social field , in 
its organization as well as its disorganizations? […]
Could it not be said that Oedipus is also a traditional norm—
our own to be exact? How can one say that Oedipus makes 
us speak in our own name, when one also goes on to say that 
its resolution teaches us ‘the incurable inadequacy of being’ 
and universal castration? And what is this ‘demand’ that is 
invoked to justify Oedipus? It goes without saying, the subject 
demands and redemands daddy-mommy: but which subject, 
and in what state? Is that the means ‘to situate oneself per-
sonally in one own’s society’? And which society? The neo-
colonized society that is constructed for the subject, and that 
finally succeeds in what colonization was only able to outline: 
an effective reduction of the forces of the desire to Oedipus, 
to a father’s name, in the grotesque triangle? (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1983, 170-71)
Deleuze and Guattari’s argument against Oedipus as a structure per-
tains directly to normativity: the structural account of Oedipus insists 
that either one submit to the prohibiting law of normativity and renounce 
the fullness of desire, or one falls back into the dark night of the undiffer-
entiated. One accepts normativity as the very condition for being a self; 
other than the normative recognized self there is only a silent and inar-
ticulable negativity. In terms of theories of the political subject this can 
be charted in terms of two positions today: normativity is the enabling, 
ennobling and productive condition of granting one’s life sense, worth 
and recognition (Korsgaard 1996, 237); or, the self that is constituted 
through normativity and recognition is the outcome of a process of sub-
jection, beyond which lies a negated, mourned, inarticulable and precari-
ous life that can only be posited after the event of its loss:
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our identification with the active side of our nature is what 
binds us to the moral law. That the moral self is a self nor-
matively conceived, what I call a practical identity, emerges 
nicely when Kant says that ‘even the most malicious villain 
(provided he is otherwise accustomed to using his reason)’—
that is, provided he is reflective—‘imagines himself to be this 
better person when he transfers himself to the standpoint of 
a member of the intelligible world.’ The ‘better person’ here 
functions as an object of aspiration and identification. The 
idea of identifying normatively with a certain conception of 
one’s nature—the conception of oneself as active and ratio-
nal—therefore plays a central role in Kant’s view, just as iden-
tifying normatively with the conception of oneself as human 
does in mine. (Korsgaard 1996, 237-38)
Performativity is thus not a singular ‘act’ , for it is always a 
reiteration of a norm or set of norms, and to the extent that it 
acquires an act-like status in the present, it conceals or dissim-
ulates the conventions of which it is a repetition. Moreover 
this act is not primarily theatrical; indeed, its apparent theat-
ricality is produced to the extent that its historicity remains 
dissimulated (and, conversely, its theatricality gains a certain 
inevitability given the impossibility of a full disclosure of its 
historicity). (Butler 1993, xxi)
Either (as in Korsgaard) the self is tied to normativity insofar as it is 
active and reflects upon itself; or, (as in Butler) the performance of norms 
gives the appearance of one who has acted. Both agree that the self, one 
way or the other is normative. For Korsgaard the norm is, and ought to 
be, properly one’s own (otherwise it would not be a norm). For Butler, 
the norm is precisely not one’s own—therein lies its status as performa-
tive, as that which constitutes an ‘act’ through its dissimulation.
One way of defining the current theoretical landscape is to chart vari-
ous positions according to a war on normativity. These could be parsed 
into three general orientations. First: only normativity can save us. 
Second: normativity needs to be defined against normalization. Third, 
and finally—the question of norms is a false or badly posed problem. 
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These three orientations allow for different attitudes towards the prob-
lem of disciplines. If normativity is the condition for the possibility of a 
future, then we require disciplines as positive and enabling practices. The 
humanities, with its generation of meaning and legitimation procedures, 
would be crucial for ‘our’ ongoing survival. If, however, disciplines have 
been intertwined genealogically with processes of normalization, then 
our normative future would require a radical upheaval of the humani-
ties. This would demand something like a Foucaultian approach, where 
the very modes of knowing from which the humanities have emerged 
would need to be criticized in light of the distribution of powers that 
constituted something like ‘life’ that could function as a transcendental 
ground. Life would be the horizon that enabled the formation of human 
sciences, the division of labor that would yield the humanities, and a rela-
tion among disciplines that would subsequently generate a conversation 
concerning man as a norm-constituting animal. Against these two modes 
of approaching disciplines, both of which would support a defence of the 
humanities—to some extent—and would present interdisciplinarity as a 
prima facie good, I would like to propose a Deleuzian approach. Here, 
one neither appeals to normativity as the definitive human horizon, nor 
aims to disengage normativity from human normalization. Rather, by 
destroying both the positive and critical aspects of disciplines it would 
be possible to achieve modes of thinking that look to a posthuman-
ities future.
Before launching into some of the academic and disciplinary accounts 
of normativity we can begin by considering the unstated war on norma-
tivity that dominates the present. In its naïve form this has been deployed 
by marketing strategists, consciousness-raising forms of identity poli-
tics, and certain unreflective readings of theory. From early forms of lib-
eration feminism and other seemingly radical approaches to politics, the 
word ‘stereotype’ is a clear pejorative. Rather than be defined and deter-
mined by images or cliches, selves should be defined via one equal and 
self-organizing humanity; selves should be pure creativity and self-defi-
nition adopting a critical distance to anything other than their own real 
and authentic individuality. That is, one should either reject stereotypes 
by arguing that beneath color, sexual orientation, gender or religion we 
are all ultimately human, and capable of recognizing each other across 
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manifest divides. Or, one could appeal to the unique and distinct nature 
of each individual. Both of these notions have been common market-
ing and moralizing ploys. In the late 1980s Benetton’s United Colors of 
Benetton campaign featured posters of ethnic diversity—a range of bod-
ies all wearing the varied colors of Benetton. The ‘family of man’ motif 
celebrates difference as apparent and enriching, but beneath which lies 
a friendly and affirmative sameness. This ‘unity in diversity’ notion (that 
was ironized by William Blake’s ‘I am black but O! my soul is white’) has 
continually been expressed in popular song lyrics, including Michael 
Jackson’s ‘Black or White’ of 1991: ‘I’m not going to spend my life being 
a color.’ Even more cloying was the earlier Ebony and Ivory (of 1982 by 
Stevie Wonder): 
We all know that people are the same where ever you go
there is good and bad in everyone
we learn to live when we learn to give each other what we 
need to survive
together alive’
The ‘deep down we are all human’ motif survives happily in cinema 
as well, ranging from Paul Haggis’s Crash of 2004—in which the urban 
conflict and racial violence of interweaving narratives resolve in a final 
moment of cross-racial human recognition—to the more recent Avatar of 
2009, in which the rapacious human species, living in end times, meets a 
different species only to find that these blue humanoids seem to embody 
all the virtues of community, reciprocity, altruism and patriarchal lin-
eage that had (once) defined humanity. One might refer to this knee-jerk 
humanism as the normativity that dare not speak its name: there is no 
norm other than the norm that ‘we’ have no norms. Despite race, creed 
or (in the case of Avatar) species differences ‘we’ are all capable of recog-
nition of each other, for there is no real otherness—no norm that does 
not, in the end, give way to humanity. Religion? Not significant, if we 
just converse and face each other. Race? Nothing more than a color—
akin perhaps to the cohabiting keys on a piano keyboard (‘Ebony and 
Ivory’…). Gender, sexuality? Don’t mention it. (This ultra-humanism 
is—I would suggest—masked by what passes in theory today for many 
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modes of posthumanism: we no longer believe in the exceptional distinc-
tion of privileged white ‘man,’ for everything that lives is an agent—sub-
jected to the one norm of unity, community, communication, reciprocity 
and ecology: deep down we are all human.)
Perhaps more significant, though, is the more explicit counter-nor-
mative resistance to any image or figure that is in any way transcendent 
to the individual’s very own being. The first notion—that deep down, 
despite manifest appearances we are all human—derives from a liberal 
commitment to human self-regulation: I am free to be anything I want, 
to pursue anything I want because I am a member of one human com-
munity that recognizes and tolerates all others of its kind. There is a mini-
mal transcendence here: the only regulation is self-regulation, and this 
occurs by way of acknowledging that one is nothing more than human; 
any other norm (religious, sexual, ethnic, political…) is of one’s choosing 
and cannot impede the broader recognition of humanity in general. The 
second and more stringently counter-normative position both extends 
and reacts against liberalism. Differences between earlier modes of lib-
eralism were that traditional post-Kantian forms relied on a minimal and 
formal normativity: a just society would be one that would be chosen by 
all, regardless of one’s social position. The good self would be one who 
was not defined through any specific norm, but who recognized that some 
normative structure—giving a law to oneself—is constitutive of reason 
and selfhood. Against this liberal commitment to minimal and formal 
normativity, one might define the present as shrilly anti-normative: not 
only should there be no norm imposed on the individual flexibility of my 
own being, I ought not to enslave myself to any overly stringent idea of 
who I ought to be. The self-help industry is largely built on an impera-
tive of self-acceptance—of not judging oneself, of not imposing any fig-
ure or ideal upon the self. (Sometimes these imperatives have a ‘feminist’ 
slant—such that one ought to avoid internalizing media images of ideal 
women; or sometimes the pitch is apparently ecological or anti-capitalist, 
so that one is warned not to be a victim of gimmicks and hype. A recent 
campaign of a popular form of soft drink worked by urging consumers to 
be intelligent enough to realize they were buying a drink, not an image of 
coolness or masculinity.) New forms of branding rely less on the appeal 
to a unified humanity, and more on a rebellious individualism; this can 
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range from Nike’s ‘id’ (or individually designed range) to limited edition 
versions of street-wear. Advertising now draws heavily from counter-
culture, so that environmentalism, anti-corporatism, non-conformism 
and feminism can be branded. The beauty brand ‘Dove’ used the notion 
of ‘real’ women to market its products; Starbucks has been one of many 
companies selling itself through ‘fair’ trade; other brands such as The 
Body Shop or Pret a Manger, despite their vast sales empires trade on 
setting themselves against ‘chain’ branding, beauty hype and fast food. 
Nothing sells like counter-culture; nothing constitutes the uniqueness of 
an individual more than a rebellion against normativity.
In terms of theory it is possible to observe an anti-normativity in at 
least three tendencies. First: ‘immanence’ in one of its popular versions 
sets itself against any image, norm, law or state that does not derive from 
the self-constituting act. In Hardt and Negri’s formulation of it, imma-
nence would be distinguished from liberalism’s seemingly similar ‘free-
dom from imposed tutelage,’ for there is no individual or presumed 
rationality that would guide the formation of the polity. Instead, human-
ity constitutes itself; whatever counts as human is achieved through an 
ongoing and collective becoming. Liberalism’s ultimate value of liberty 
has always impeded collective self-formation, because liberty was lib-
erty of the individual. (We can see this in the way Rawls’s definition of 
freedom imposed a responsibility on the individual to choose in such a 
way that her decision could be universalizable for all.) Against this, Hardt 
and Negri’s collective discourse abandons any already given subject or 
grounding agent, arguing for a self-forming humanity, with the multiple 
nature of the political precluding any settled norm (236). The human 
is neither a norm of reason, nor an underlying ground. Contemporary 
capitalism has already, they argue, abandoned norm-regulated forms of 
behavior in favor of corporate efficiency (178), and so democracy cannot 
take the earlier forms of city-state models but requires global creativity. 
This creativity cannot be calculated by any measure other than itself, not 
capital, and not the free individual: 
‘living labor’ [is] the form-giving fire of our creative capaci-
ties. Living labor is the fundamental human faculty: the abil-
ity to engage the world actively and create social life. Living 
labor can be corralled by capital and pared down to the labor 
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power that is bought and sold and that produces commodities 
and capital, but living labor always exceeds that. Our innova-
tive and creative capacities are always greater than our produc-
tive labor—productive, that is, of capital. At this point we can 
recognize that this biopolitical production is on the one hand 
immeasurable, because it cannot be quantified in fixed units of 
time, and, on the other hand, always excessive with respect to 
the value that capital can extract from it because capital can 
never capture all of life. (Hardt and Negri 2004, 146)
Outside of ‘high’ theory, recent economic crises and corporate corrup-
tion—or the war between Wall Street and Main Street—have prompted 
left-wing calls for individual participation and collective constitution of 
the polity alongside right-wing ‘small government’ imperatives. What 
distinguishes these recent maneuvers from standard liberalism is a rejec-
tion of any norm or model of reason or regulation that is not that of a con-
tinually self-creating and self-inventing becoming. This is also how move-
ments of ‘new’ labor or the third way managed to cast off notions of being 
constrained by leftist ideology: rather than having a revolutionary pro-
gram or privileged norm of the primacy of the working class, the model 
of government was primarily managerial and procedural. It is not sur-
prising, then, that Hardt and Negri’s multitude had to expend quite a bit 
of labor of its own on distinguishing itself from ‘third way’ movements: 
the new collectivity of humanity should not be grounded on appeals to 
global security or war alliance, but should be generated from a creative, 
rather than managed, multitude (Hardt and Negri 2004, 233, 398). 
Second, we might consider the concept of affect. Defined against mind-
centered, Cartesian, cognitive and computational models of conscious-
ness, affect has (in its less critical articulations) enabled a privileging of 
life that is regressively organicist. Rather than the body being seen as a 
part of the world or as a known object, the body and its responsiveness 
is now the horizon from which knowledge emerges. In the beginning is 
the affect or feeling from which systems, relations and terms have their 
genesis. In its relatively popular scientific mode this affective turn—away 
from rigid entities and systems to dynamic relationality—is perhaps most 
clearly expressed by Antonio Damasio, whose work, even more than that 
of Hardt and Negri, crosses from university culture to a broader reading 
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public. The titles of Damasio’s books read like a series of theses: Descartes’ 
Error describes the problem of beginning from the position of the cogni-
tive self, and in that regard expresses a widespread anti-Cartesianism that 
has much resonance with counter-normativity. For what at least one mode 
of anti-Cartesianism expresses is a hyper-subjectivism. The properly rela-
tional, emotive, responsive, affective and living self has been reified into 
some normative ‘ghost’ in a body that has become a machine. Damasio’s 
The Feeling of What Happens argues for the primacy of emotion, which far 
from being a state of mind or mental phenomenon is given or felt after 
its bodily and definitely non-cognitive occurrence. (‘Bodily’ is not quite 
the right word here, for there is no body as object; there is a domain of 
emotive responsive and autopoetic interactive self-regulation, which is 
then felt—and it is from that feeling that a self is formed.) Looking for 
Spinoza enables Damasio to strengthen the philosophical ground of his 
anti-Cartesianism, but his Spinoza is a curious beast. Yes, Spinoza was a 
philosopher of the affections who defined mind not in opposition to the 
body, but as an aspect or perceptive feeling of what occurs affectively. But 
Spinoza was also a philosopher of reason, whose positing of a third kind 
of knowledge, or a capacity to consider substance—or what is—beyond 
the point of view of our own affections, opened up a theology (even if 
pantheistic) that would be distinctly out of tune with any insistence on 
the primacy of the lived body. Damasio’s most recent work focuses on 
what he refers to as ‘biological value,’ which—as described—accounts 
for the genesis of the self not so much from extrinsic, historical or tran-
scendent systems but from minute selections:
in addition to the logic imposed by the unfolding of events 
in the reality external to the brain—a logical arrangement 
that the naturally selected circuitry of our brains foreshadows 
from the very early stages of development—the images in our 
minds are given more or less saliency in the mental stream 
according to their value for the individual. And where does 
that value come from? It comes from the original set of dispo-
sitions that orients our life regulation, as well as from the valu-
ations that all images we have gradually acquired in our expe-
rience have been accorded, based on the original set of value 
dispositions during our past history. In other words, minds 
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are not just about images entering their procession naturally. 
They are about the cinemalike editing choices that our perva-
sive system of biological value has promoted. (Damasio 71)
I would suggest that Damasio’s use of ‘logic’ here—for all its appeal to 
individual bodily immediacy, reveals what Derrida diagnosed as ‘logo-
centrism’: some ground determines systems and relations in advance. 
Here, that ground is ‘life.’
Finally, the concept of performativity—especially as one tracks its 
migration from linguistics to ethico-political accounts of the self—dem-
onstrates the contraction of action away from any consideration that 
would be beyond processes of subjectivity and subjection (as it might 
once have been in its linguistic mode). The force of the concept of the 
performative lay in a capacity of language as action—as doing things with 
words—that would free philosophy from having to deal with odd imma-
terial or mental entities such as ‘meanings.’ The performative, as a con-
cept, was always two-sided: it opened the possibility of forces, actions, 
and acts that are not those of humans beings or lived bodies, but it also—
by focusing on act—tended to reground systems on some will or ‘doing.’ 
Language works, in speech act theory, not because our exchange of 
tokens allows some transfer of some pure sense that would exist outside 
our usage: a term works because of conventions of interaction, exchange, 
use and processes of relative stability. When the concept of the perfor-
mative was translated into the problem of identity it had (again) two 
sides: on the one hand, in Butler’s formulation of the term, it produced 
an affirmative concept of matter, whereby there is no such thing as life 
or matter that lies outside language, for language—like anything that 
could be said to be—exists only in its differential distribution: ‘What I 
would propose in place of these conceptions of construction is a return 
to the notion of matter, not as site or surface, but as a process of material-
ization that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and 
surface we call matter’ (Butler 1993, 9). One might, following this, con-
sider matter to be performative: in this case, Butler’s work would open up 
a new materialism that would pose questions quite distinct from those 
of subjective normativity. This did, indeed, occur but Butler’s own work 
went on to pose questions (of recognition, subjection and what counts as 
grievable) that tended to return processes of performativity to an agent 
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who (admittedly) is not a ‘doer’ so much as one who is given as a subject 
through the exclusion of something extra-discursive: 
Indeed, to ‘refer’ naively or directly to such an extra-discursive 
object will always require the prior delimitation of the extra-
discursive. And insofar as the extra-discursive is delimited, it 
is formed by the very discourse from which it seeks to free 
itself. This delimitation, which is often enacted as an untheo-
rized presupposition in any act of description, marks a bound-
ary that includes and excludes, that decides, as it were, what 
will and will not be the stuff of the object to which we then 
refer. This marking off will have some normative force and, 
indeed, some violence, for it can construct only through eras-
ing: it can bound a thing only through enforcing a certain cri-
terion, a principle of selectivity. (Butler 1993, 11)
Only normativity can save us
Strangely, despite all the incoming evidence regarding a widespread 
human destructiveness—both to man’s own species and his milieu—
there has been a number of appeals, celebrations and defenses of the 
definitively human capacity for normativity. The argument takes two 
general forms—one that appeals to a tradition of human normativity, 
grounded in a faculty of philosophy (such that human beings cannot 
avoid a constitutive relation to ongoing lawfulness), and another that 
addresses a present sense of groundlessness and loss of meaning, and that 
can only be ameliorated through practices of normativity. The first posi-
tion is best expressed by a humanized neo-Kantianism. There is no appeal 
to what lies beyond nature, as might have been suggested by some read-
ings of Kant’s account of the noumenal or supersensible (but necessarily 
presupposed) subject. (This is the subject or non-ground that Heidegger 
[1967] approached when he questioned the ‘source’ of Kant’s various 
faculties.) Rather, there is something quotidian or post-metaphysical 
about the necessity of normativity: 
Outside of human nature, there is no normative point of view 
from which morality can be challenged. But morality can 
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meet the internal challenge that is made from the point of 
view of self-interest, and it also approves of itself. It is human 
nature to be governed by morality, and from every point of 
view, including its own, morality earns its right to govern us. 
We therefore have no reason to reject our nature, and can 
allow it to be a law to us. Human nature, moral government 
included, is therefore normative, and has authority for us. 
(Korsgaard 2004, 66)
It would be a performative contradiction for me at one and the same 
time to use the word ‘I,’ and to affirm some value, and then on another 
occasion affirm the opposite. Without some minimal ongoing norma-
tivity ‘I’ would have no being; this is not because the subject has some 
nature or essence that entails or dictates law, but because in the absence 
of nature and essence ‘I’ am nothing other than a lawfulness that I grant to 
myself. One might say that the governing, or normative, ‘idea of human-
ity’ is that of the pure form of the self-regulating subject: because there 
is no human nature that I can know, or that can provide a ground for my 
actions, I must give a law to myself. ‘I’ am nothing other than this act of 
self-regulation. Inflected somewhat differently, this inescapable norma-
tivity of humanity can take a negative, but no less subjective form. 
We return to Judith Butler: selves are constituted through normativ-
ity and recognition. However, one should not simply celebrate this law-
giving event of constitution. First, the stabilization of the self through a 
repeatable norm, sacrifices or mourns that which is occluded or not taken 
up as worthy of recognition (even though this lost ground is known only 
as lost, only in being other than, or negated by the normative). Second, 
one needs to politicize rather than individualize normativity: just what 
modes of self one will recognize as normative, both for oneself and oth-
ers, are restricted—not least by what Butler referred to as the ‘heterosex-
ual matrix’ or what has been marked more generally as heteronormativity. 
Here a certain normative crisis ensues. On the one hand it 
is important to mark how the field of intelligible and speak-
able sexuality is circumscribed, so that we can see how 
options outside of marriage are becoming foreclosed as the 
unthinkable, and how the terms of thinkability are enforced 
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by the narrow debates over who and what will be included 
in the norm. On the other hand, there is always the possibil-
ity of savoring the status of unthinkability, if it is a status, as 
the most critical, the most radical, the most valuable. As the 
sexually unpresentable, such sexual possibilities can figure the 
sublime within the contemporary field of sexuality, a site of 
pure resistance, a site unco-opted by normativity. But how 
does one think politics from such a site of unrepresentability? 
(Butler 2004, 106-07) 
Without some mode of normativity there would be no selfhood or 
subjectivity. But in both the neo-Kantian affirmation of self-legislation 
and Butler’s more critical idea that the performative structures that 
enable selves are not decided by selves, what would be required is some 
form of discipline as critique. One could not simply have a world of fact-
based natural sciences, nor a social science assumption that one might be 
able to chart and analyze various systems of norms (cultures, languages, 
textual systems, societies, polities). What would be required is a critical 
notion of the humanities: if ‘we’ are always subjected to some norm of 
humanity, whether that be enabling or restricting, then some reflective 
procedure needs to be constantly vigilant of normative figurations of the 
(unavoidably) human.
Normativity versus Normalization
One might say, in response to the idea that humans are norm-producing 
and norm-constitutive animals, that this is a highly normalizing assump-
tion. Here, a certain reading of Foucault would be in order. Consider one 
notion of norm, grounded on a certain motif of man (one that Foucault 
aligns with a specific reading of Kant, and a specific trajectory of the 
human sciences—a trajectory from which he would distinguish what he 
refers to as literature). This notion of norm emerged with man; for man is 
the being who must on the one hand (by nature) give a law unto himself, 
but whose positive content is left blank: ‘Before the end of the eighteenth 
century, man did not exist—any more than the potency of life, the fecun-
dity of labour, or the historical density of language’ (Foucault 336). On 
or around 1700 there emerged a new episteme of life, and from then on 
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no morality was possible, only ethics. Morality would have been just the 
assertion, perhaps grounded on a notion of God, nature or even humans 
in relation to some moral nature, that certain values are worthy. Ethics, 
however, is possible only with the idea of man. Here, I do not assert a 
value because I say that this is how the world is. Rather, it is because man 
is that being who realizes that as a cultural (linguistic, historical, desir-
ing) animal he has no nature other than the nature he gives to himself; 
that he must not simply assert a value, but come up with some formal 
value-generating procedure:
It seems obvious enough that, from the moment when 
man first constituted himself as a positive figure in the field 
of knowledge, the old privilege of reflexive knowledge, of 
thought thinking itself, could not but disappear; but that 
it became possible, by this very fact, for an objective form 
of thought to investigate man in his entirety—at the risk of 
discovering what could never be reached by his reflection 
or even by his consciousness: dim mechanisms, faceless 
determinations, a whole landscape of shadow that has been 
termed, directly or indirectly, the unconscious. […]. Man 
has not been able to describe himself as a configuration in the 
episteme without thought at the same time discovering, both 
in itself and outside itself, at its borders yet also in its very 
warp and woof, an element of darkness, an apparently inert 
destiny in which it is embedded, an unthought which it con-
tains entirely, yet in which it is also caught. 
[…] Superficially, one might say that knowledge of man, 
unlike the sciences of nature, is always linked, even in its vagu-
est form, to ethics or politics; more fundamentally, modern 
thought is advancing towards that region where man’s Other 
must become the Same as himself. (Foucault 2002, 355; 358)
For Foucault, this has concrete consequences for the disciplines. 
Human sciences are only possible if man is at once a being with a certain 
cultural nature; these ‘sciences’ study man as an effect of hidden forces 
of which he can be only dimly aware. There now becomes a possibility 
both of bio-politics—managing man according to his life requirements 
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(the health of populations)—but also a conception of the humanities. 
For now there is ethics: if man cannot know himself as he is in himself, 
then he can at least read his own cultural production as an expression 
of this unthought. (Foucault’s own suggested direction was quite differ-
ent: to tear language away from man would open up a domain of forces 
beyond normalizing life. Deleuze extended this path to life: how might 
we imagine mutations of life not based on the living—such as the gen-
eses enabled by silicon? [Deleuze 2006, 74].) 
Today, with the ‘humanities’ turning to historicism, cognitive archaeol-
ogy, neuroscience, and other interdisciplinary sources, it is presupposed 
that concrete forces can provide the ground for interpretive reading. 
What is assumed is both a notion of man as a being with certain impera-
tives of life (requiring him to speak and labor) and also as a being who 
properly gives himself his own lawful being. This might be Kantian lib-
eralism—act in such a way that your act could be assented to by all. Or 
it might, more insidiously, be what Foucault referred to as ‘biopolitics’; 
whatever ‘we’ do has no value or morality, but is nothing more than the 
effective management and regulation of a population. Added to this 
world of managerial facts would then be the reflective or normative dis-
cussions of the humanities. What has happened is that something like 
‘life’—a concept that explains the emergence and self-maintenance of all 
living beings—destroys any immediate or unreflective morality; instead, 
one sees all moralities as expressions of a human life that is given in vari-
ous languages, cultures, epochs or systems. 
Foucault’s project was at once historical in demonstrating that this 
seemingly anti-foundational maneuver was normalizing: if ‘man’ is that 
animal who has no nature other than the law he gives to himself then we 
at once assert the universal primacy of the liberal, reasoning, self-further-
ing subject of reason and calculation and (more alarmingly) posit some-
thing like ‘life’ that is the manageable ground of this subject. It ‘follows’ 
that polities ought to act in such a way that they maximize this subject’s 
capacity to give himself his own norms: education as the creation of criti-
cal, reasoning subjects; health care reforms that enable the fruition of 
life; intervention in areas that would impede rational activity (protecting 
individuals from drugs, gambling, debt, pornography, poor diets—any-
thing that would corrupt their supreme capacity of choice). Foucault did 
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not, as some have suggested, want to retreat from a managerial and bio-
political modernity to some golden past where (either) one simply acted 
with mastery and fiat to create oneself as a work of art. He did chart a 
genealogy of the self, demonstrating that what we (today) deem to be the 
inescapable horizon of normativity—the liberal subject who gives a law 
to himself in a world of self-regulation—ought to be seen as transcen-
dent rather than transcendental. That is, it is something that we encoun-
ter as opaque and contingent, not the ultimate horizon of ‘our’ being. 
Further—and this is where we can mark a distinction between Foucault’s 
genealogy and Deleuze and Guattari’s geology or stratigraphy—one 
needs to mark a disciplinary distinction. The human sciences are possible 
because of the assumption of normativity as normal: we study cultures, 
languages, epochs, counter-cultures, genders, sexualities, ethnicities or 
societies because we assume that man is an animal who constructs him-
self through enabling normative systems, systems that ought to be the 
object of our (managerial) critique and reflection. Today, as the humani-
ties (especially literature) has become an amalgam of historical positiv-
ism, sociology of knowledge and (worst of all) evolutionary criticism, 
it would be possible to distinguish a different mode of the humanities 
(if one wanted to call it that). Foucault argued that man emerged from 
the complex of life, labour and language: man speaks and works because 
he is the living being whose nature compels him to work and speak in 
common. If we uncoupled language from its grounding in man as the 
being who gives himself self-furthering laws we would have literature. 
Language—considered not as sign of our self-creating being—but as 
something that has its own being (its own density or shining) would give 
us a positive criticism. How do texts form relatively autonomous field of 
problems, and with what other problems do they intersect? How do they 
mutate, and what do they enable?
 Not ‘Beyond Normativity’
Deleuze is not one of those thinkers who defines himself against a ter-
rain. Even, with Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (for all its ‘anti’) has a positive 
condition. It is only possible to have the repressive normative strictures 
of Oedipus—either you submit to the family or you are psychotic!—because 
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of a broader synthesis. The terms that make up a normative domain, 
such as the subject who submits to regulation, or the body that becomes 
sexed, or the thinker who works with a logic, are possible because of what 
we might refer to (but this time differently) as immanence, affect and 
fiat. In his book on Foucault, Deleuze makes two remarks that suggest 
a subtle but important difference from Foucault. First, Deleuze suggests 
that there is a Kantian limit in Foucault’s work: one knows power in its 
differential effects, as a distributive force, but one never crosses the line 
to power itself. (And this is why, by contrast, Deleuze and Guattari will 
choose to write about desire, as something their method seeks to intuit 
itself as productive synthesis, not as produced.) Second, Deleuze suggests 
that it is possible to decouple (or deterritorialize) ‘life’ (and not just lan-
guage) from the normalizing motif of man. I have already suggested that 
immanence, considered in the multiple singular—immanence always as 
‘a’ life—a disturbing force or ‘spark,’ creates a new challenge for the dis-
cipline of thinking. If life is given in these sparks, from which individu-
als emerge but which might also have produced different syntheses of 
individuation, then ‘a’ discipline would be the posing of a problem from 
a differential field. Such a field would not be one view among others on 
the same general terrain, but would encounter other fields, composed 
differently by different problems—different actualizations or individua-
tions of ‘a’ life. One uses the singular ‘a’ life to mark its distinction, but 
desists from granting this ‘life’ a body or individuality. This brings us to 
affect, which would not be emotion, feeling and certainly not responsive-
ness (and certainly not) a vital normativity. Let us consider inertia or wea-
riness or stupid malevolence as ‘an’ affect. This potentiality would insist 
and persist, always there, and capable both of seizing hold of us, and of 
being detached or deterritorialized. 
I am in a debate with my parliamentary colleague, and we are both 
engaging in a discourse about managing the nation’s debts (both its finan-
cial and political debts to the present, and its possibly imagined geologi-
cal debts to its future); there is a potentiality for positive destruction: we 
might talk, gesture and move in such a way that the thought of ‘a’ future 
seizes hold of us, or we might speak and act in such a way that we become 
gripped by the inertia of all the old figures. Who knows what syntheses 
might allow one affect rather than another to take hold? One might want 
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to think of such questions in geological terms, by looking at the strata 
that compose such a scene. (I imagine, writing now, that talks between 
Obama and Boehner regarding the supposed US debt crisis were gripped 
by all sorts of free-floating affects—naïve hope, regressive racism, finan-
cial fear, political expediency, nostalgia for a real America, panic, psy-
chotic incapacity to imagine dire consequences, the lure of smooth 
rhetoric, the strictures of procedural and managerial discourse, the visual 
affects of gentlemanly comportment, visceral anger …..I am not saying 
that Obama or Boehner felt these affects, nor that the Tea-party or ‘left’ 
expressed these feelings. Rather, just as an artist can capture an affect—
such as the litigious torpor that is the affect of Bleak House—one might 
say that no one in the USA in July 2011 was panicking, and yet the affect 
of panic haunted the scene: that there may be panic. This would differ 
markedly from looking at the scene in terms of competing norms—leftist 
welfare liberalism versus competitive small government conservatism—
because the scene would not be motivated by deliberation or cognition 
alone. It would also differ from rabidly anti-normative reactivisms: either 
the individualism that resented systemic government enclosure in party-
political timelines or appeals to one creative, immanent, global and self-
creating humanity. Immanence would not be immanent to a domain that 
would be structured by (or belied by) normativity. Rather, immanence 
would place us—or the questions we pose—among a field and plane of 
problems. It would not be a question of deliberating norms, as though 
there were a field of life to which we must give a law; nor would it be a 
question of negotiating some negated but lost outside beyond normativ-
ity. We would be exposed to all manner of powers: institutions, affects, 
habits, desires, pure predicates, potentialities, order-words, spatial distri-
butions, a general interweaving of multiple and discordant strata. But it 
would not be ‘us’ as self-legislating beings who approached this terrain—
as if we were within this life to which we were immanent. Immanence is 
not our immanence that allows us to eliminate the outside. Finally, we 
might think of the difference between act as performative and act as fiat: 
‘problems are inseparable from a power of decision, a fiat which, when 
we are infused by it, makes us semi-divine beings’ (Deleuze 2004, 247). 
Here, also, I would like to return to the quotation from Deleuze’s essay on 
immanence: ‘for it was only the subject that incarnated it in the midst of 
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things that made it good or bad’ (Deleuze 1991, 28-29). Consider the dif-
ference between the performative, where there is no difference between 
doer and deed, and where the self is an ex post facto effect of an act, an 
act that occurs and is possible because of a normative matrix, even as it 
disturbs that very normativity through a differing repetition.
In this case what is dominant is what Deleuze and Guattari refer to 
as exclusive disjunction: only in submitting to the laws of action do ‘I’ 
become a being or subject at all, and yet at the same time I mourn that 
presupposed but lost real that can only be thought of as other than the 
normative matrix. Either I submit to recognition or fall into the dark 
night of indifference; I am either male or female; either I become a sub-
ject by demanding inclusion in the State or I refuse recognition and flirt 
with psychosis. And this is because without performance—without the 
act that marks out a self within a normative matrix—there is no ‘doer.’ By 
contrast, Deleuze suggests that there are powers as such, possibly incar-
nated and actualized, possibly not. Once something like a stable subject 
is formed, these powers can take on some axiology: ‘only the subject that 
incarnated it in the midst of things that made it good or bad.’ But it is 
possible to think outside this ‘good or bad’ for the subject who is given 
through action and decision. If one were to consider powers beyond 
the purview of the normative subject of ‘good or bad,’ one might open 
a counter-normative plane of inclusive disjunction: ‘I want to recognize 
the values of subjected polities and do away with the very concept of 
‘the’ political’; ‘I want to demand women’s rights and autonomy and say 
that gender is a false problem’; ‘I want to argue for women’s reproductive 
rights and refuse the notion of self-deciding individual rights, along with 
the concepts of reproduction.’ I want to refuse normativity—refuse the 
notion of the constitutive domain or matrix that grants me my subjective 
being: and this, indeed, is what the very notion of ‘becoming-impercep-
tible’ demands. 
As long as I am a subject for whom there is ‘good or bad’ then nor-
mativity is the inevitable and non-negotiable presupposition for being 
an ‘I’: I am nothing other than the subject of my actions, and without 
that ongoing decisive power I would have no subjective ground for rec-
ognition. However, were I to imagine the powers of becoming—‘a’ life—
beyond how they are figured as good or bad for me, then something like a 
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counter-ethics would be possible. Rather than an ethos of my own habits 
and practices, or an ecology where there is one system of interconnected 
life, or ‘the’ political where decisions are examined from the point of view 
of ‘a’ polity, the concepts of ‘becoming-imperceptible’ and ‘“a” life’ enable 
us to pose problems that are adequate to twenty-first century horizons. 
Should we really be asking about normativity, values, identity and self-
maintenance in an era of climate change, when this very self-furtherance 
and myopia threatens not only human existence but life in general? 
Surely now is the time not to ask how ‘we’ decide to maintain who ‘we’ 
are, but whether there might be questions, powers, problems that are 
not of our own choosing, that affect us not as doers or performers but as 
barely adequate witnesses.
Notes
1.  It is correct to say, as Paul Patton does, that Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology 
is normative: that is, their approach to the ways in which we account for the 
formation of the world of beings is tied to decisive values and commitments. 
That is, their theory of ‘being’ is not some neutral, value-free or purely 
scientific theory. This is true so long as one wishes to talk the language of 
normativity, I would argue that one ought not talk this way: normativity has 
no sense, or should have no sense, unless we assume that there are things that 
are not normative (facts? brute matter? chaos?). That is not the case. Anything 
that ‘is,’ or that makes a claim to being occurs through processes of force, 
interaction, inclusion and exclusion; there is no realm of what simply is, and 
then a normative domain that adds value.
Chapter 3
Post-Phenomenology’s Evil  
Cartesian Demon
There is a doctrine about the nature and place of minds which 
is so prevalent among theorists and even among laymen that 
it deserves to be described as the official theory. Most philos-
ophers, psychologists and religious teachers subscribe, with 
minor reservations, to its main articles and, although they 
admit certain theoretical difficulties in it, they tend to assume 
that these can be overcome without serious modifications 
being made to the architecture of the theory. […] the central 
principles of the doctrine are unsound and conflict with the 
whole body of what we know about minds when we are not 
speculating about them.
The official doctrine, which hails chiefly from Descartes, is 
something like this. With the doubtful exception of idiots 
and infants in arms every human being has both a body and a 
mind. (Ryle 2000, 11)
If I am right in thinking that Descartes’ badly argued hunch, 
the one which made him able to see pains and thoughts as 
modes of a single substance, was that indubitability was 
the common factor they shared with nothing physical, then 
we can see him as working his way around toward a view in 
which indubitability is no longer the mark of eternality, but 
rather of something for which the Greeks had no name—con-
sciousness. Whereas previous philosophers had more or less 
followed Plato in thinking that only the eternal was known 
with certainty, Descartes was substituting ‘clear and distinct 
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perception’—that is, the sort of unconfused knowledge gained 
by going through a process of analysis—for ‘indubitability’ as 
a mark of eternal truths. This left indubitability free to serve as 
a criterion of the mental. For although the thought that I am 
in pain does not count as a clear and distinct perception, it 
can no more successfully be doubted than the thought that 
I exist. Whereas Plato and the tradition had made the lines 
between confusion and clarity, dubitability and indubitabil-
ity, and the mind and the body, coincide, Descartes was now 
rearranging them. The result was that from Descartes on we 
have to distinguish between the special metaphysical ground 
for our certainty about our inner states (‘nothing is closer to 
the mind that itself ’ ) and the various epistemological reasons 
which ground our certainties about anything else. (Rorty 
2009, 58-59)
I will begin with the most general and attenuated axis of 
continuity, the one that begins with Plato, winds its way to 
its most lurid expression in Augustine, and finally becomes 
metaphysically solidified and scientized by Descartes. I am 
referring, of course, to our dualistic heritage: the view that 
human existence is bifurcated into two realms or substances: 
the bodily or material, on the one hand; the mental or spiri-
tual, on the other. Despite some fascinating historical varia-
tions which I will not go into here, the basic imagery of dual-
ism has remained fairly constant. Let me briefly describe its 
central features; they will turn out, as we will see, to comprise 
the basic body imagery of the anorectic.
First, the body is experienced as alien, as the not-self, the not-
me. It is ‘fastened and glued’ to me, ‘nailed’ and ‘riveted’ to 
me, as Plato describes it in the Phaedo. For Descartes the body 
is the brute material envelope for the inner and essential self, 
the thinking thing…. (Bordo 2004, 144)
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There has, in philosophy and popular culture, been a turn to ‘mindful-
ness’ that is perhaps best defined by understanding the problem that 
mindfulness has been designed to solve. We suffer from mind, from the 
imprisonment in our own Cartesian theatre (Dennett 1991, 106), or 
what Raymond Tallis refers to as the ‘Cartesian prison’ (Tallis 2004, 49). 
Somehow, somewhere along the line we forgot that mind was a part—
not even a part, a process—of engaged embodiment. We forgot that we 
emerged from an entire ecology of living processes, all of them mindful 
in their own way. We bifurcated, disenchanted and calculated the world 
to the point where there was a great divide between mind and world. In 
addition to the plethora of self-help books on the topic, that claim to 
amalgamate Buddhist mindfulness with Western therapeutic methods, 
the notion has also been consecrated by ‘legitimate’ philosophy and 
theory, most notably the systems theory of Maturana and Varela, and the 
solution to the hard problem of mind put forward by Owen Flanagan:
Eudaimonia (Buddha) = a stable sense of serenity and con-
tent (not the sort of happy-happy-joy-click-your-heels feeling 
state that is widely sought and promoted in the West as the 
best kind of happiness), where the serene and contented state 
is caused or constituted by enlightenment (bodhi)/wisdom 
(prajna) and virtue (sila, karuna) and meditation or mindful-
ness (Samadhi). Wisdom consists of deeply absorbed (intel-
lectually and meditatively) knowledge of impermanence, 
the causal interconnectedness of everything, that everything 
(buildings, plants, animals, stars) lacks immutable essences 
(emptiness), and, what follows from these, that I am a man, 
a passing person, a person who passes, a process or unfold-
ing that is known by a proper name, but that changes at 
every moment, until it passes from the realm of being alto-
gether. (Flanagan 2011, 95)
We somehow thought that there was a blank material nature on the 
one hand that then had to be grasped by a valuing and representing 
mind on the other. This, according to Bruno Latour, was the great proj-
ect of modernity and one in which we are still imprisoned. Even though 
Latour is in line with a great deal of his contemporaries who seek to put 
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mind and world back together, by undoing the great modern separation 
of nature on the one hand and its mental mirror on the other, Latour is 
quite trenchant: we do not need to reunite mind and world. We need to 
see that it is the separation that should appear puzzling. How on earth did 
we come to think that there was this thing—nature—that could be the 
object of science and that would be divorced from some other human, 
moral, political domain?
In suspending the critical gesture, we begin to understand ret-
rospectively the oddness of the definition of nature to which 
critique had been wed. It had two surprising features: the dis-
covery, revelation, unveiling of what lay behind the subjective 
fog of appearances; and what ensured the continuity in space 
and time of all beings in their inner reality. It has long been 
realized by science studies, by feminist theory, and, in a much 
wider way, by all sorts of environmental movements, that this 
era’s character was precisely not the long-awaited taking into 
account of nature, but rather the total dissolution of the vari-
ous notions of nature. (Latour 2010, 466)
Here is the story: at some point in the history of Western thought the 
notion of disembodied and distinct mind took hold of reason. The usual 
culprit for this maneuver is Descartes, the thinker who came and doubted 
and established ‘the subject’ as the one point of certainty, and the point 
from which the rest of the world (as extended rather than thinking sub-
stance) would need to be deduced (Flanagan 2003, 58). The literature 
on mindfulness is clear on this point: ‘Descartes’ infamous Cogito has, 
arguably, been responsible for more philosophical wrong turnings than 
anything else in Western thought’ (Hyland 2011, 19). There are other 
villains in this tale: Plato, who set up a world of separate ideas or truths 
that would leave this world as a pale and second-rate shadow, or—more 
generally—modern science with its disenchantment of the world and 
its striving to establish the world as so much manipulable and calculable 
matter. What would be lost in this Cartesian turn to the subject, certainty, 
extended substance and the world that needs to be known or repre-
sented by mind is the original connectedness from which the subject was 
detached. The concept of mind is an effect—the outcome of a history of 
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calculation, practices of logic and intellectual abstraction—that mistakes 
itself for a cause, seeing itself as the point from which the world unfolds. 
What would be required, today, is to re-narrate the emergence of ‘mind’ 
(as reasoning subject) from a more practical, historical, embodied and 
dynamic life: Cartesian subjectivity, or the impoverished conception of 
‘mind’ would be but one aspect or capacity of a broader domain of life 
and would need to be recognized as partial, dependent and (possibly) 
pernicious. For Bruno Latour, postmodern constructions of reality are 
no less Cartesian than any of the previous elevations of detached mind:
Who can avoid hearing the cry of despair that echoes deep 
down, carefully repressed, meticulously denied, in these 
paradoxical claims for a joyous, jubilant, free construction of 
narratives and stories by people forever in chains? But even 
if there were people who could say such things with a bliss-
ful and light heart (their existence is as uncertain to me as 
that of the Loch Ness monster, or, for that matter, as uncer-
tain as the real world would be to these mythical creatures) 
how could we avoid noticing that we have not moved an inch 
since Descartes? That the mind is still in its vat, excised from 
the rest, disconnected, and contemplating (now with a blind 
gaze) the world (now lost in darkness) from the very same 
bubbling glassware. (Latour 1999, 8)
It would seem that this anti-Cartesian story, told so widely today, 
would be supported by contemporary insights from neuroscience, cogni-
tive archaeology, artificial intelligence and evolutionary theories of mind. 
Andy Clark, the philosopher who has done so much to bring insights 
from artificial intelligence research into theories of mind, approvingly 
quotes (the widely-quoted) John Haugeland:
if we are to understand mind as the locus of intelligence, we 
cannot follow Descartes in regarding it as separable in prin-
ciple from the body and the world[…]. Broader approaches, 
freed of that prejudicial commitment, can look again at per-
ception and action, at skillful involvement with public equip-
ment and social organization, and see not principled separa-
tion but all sorts of close coupling and functional unity[…]. 
54 Chapter 3
Mind, therefore, is not incidentally but intimately embodied 
and intimately embedded in its world. (Haugeland 1998, 
236-37 quoted in Clark 2010)
Perhaps the most significant integration of a pseudo-Buddhist ‘mind-
fulness’ with a diagnosis of the fall into Cartesianism comes from 
Maturana and Varela, whose work on embodied cognition claims to draw 
from philosophy, Eastern thought and contemporary science:
The revolt of the rationalists—Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz—
began from a principle of ‘methodical doubt.’ But they became 
lost in mechanism, dualism and more and more categoriza-
tion; and they ended in denying relation altogether. But rela-
tion is the stuff of system. (Maturana and Varela 1980, 63)
But this story would also seem to have a decent philosophical pedi-
gree, ranging from Nietzsche’s general criticism of the enslavement of a 
once masterful and active life of forces to a miserable reactive slave con-
sciousness, to Foucault’s Nietzschean criticism of an ‘ethics of knowl-
edge,’ and then to the entire phenomenological tradition that sought to 
render the subject transcendental (and not as some distinct substance). 
Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations criticizes Descartes’ process of doubt for 
saving some ‘tag end of the world’; had Descartes doubted more radically 
he would have seen that the psycho-physical subject or individual mind 
presupposes some event or life-world from which the ‘mind’ of man 
is disclosed. 
It must by no means be accepted as a matter of course that, 
with our apodictic pure ego, we have rescued a little tag end of 
the world, as the sole unquestionable part of it for the philoso-
phizing Ego, and that now the problem is to infer the rest of 
the world by rightly conducted arguments, according to prin-
ciples innate in the ego.
Unfortunately, these principles were at work when Descartes 
introduced the apparently insignificant but actually fate-
ful change whereby the ego becomes a substantia cogitans, a 
separate human ‘mens sive animus’ , and the point of departure 
for principles of causality—in short, the change by virtue of 
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which Descartes became the father of transcendental realism, 
an absurd position. (Husserl 1977, 24)
Husserl’s criticism of Cartesian error—of assuming rather than 
accounting for a subject—is intensified with Heidegger, for whom the 
question of epistemology (or how we know the world) can only occur if 
we forget that in order to ask the question of knowledge we must already 
have a world. If phenomenology is anti-Cartesian in its inception then 
it appears to become even more intensely so as the tradition continues 
and starts to embark on self-critique. Was not Husserl, for Heidegger at 
least, still too Cartesian in keeping a transcendental subject as opposed 
to a thought of Being’s disclosure, of which the subject would be noth-
ing more than a site for revealing? And is not deconstruction continuing 
this counter-Cartesian gesture when it insists that Being, too, would act 
as one more presupposed foundation that would necessarily efface the 
dispersed, never present, process of tracing that allowed something to 
appear as present? Perhaps, though, anti-Cartesianism reaches its zenith 
in the work of Gilles Deleuze, for whom the task of philosophy would 
be to reverse Platonism and arrive at thought without an image (Deleuze 
1994, 131). Not surprisingly, there have been those who wish to align 
Deleuze with a neuroscience of distributed cognition, with a nature of 
living systems and with a broader ‘turn’ to naturalism (Lauwereyns 
2010, 159). 
The implications of this counter-Cartesian gesture, along with a cer-
tain self-understanding of a false turn or error taken in philosophy, are 
also significant for whatever is left of aesthetics. If the Cartesian story is 
correct and mind is primarily or properly logical, then mind’s first task is 
knowledge, and it would be from knowledge that something like art (as a 
handmaiden to cognition) would follow. Certainly, this is how one strand 
of thinking about the relation between the brain and art has proceeded. 
Today, continuing this primacy of cognition (with art as extension of 
the survival-oriented brain) various forms of literary Darwinism have 
sought to ground the acknowledged complexity of art in the artwork’s 
capacity to stimulate those problem-solving capacities that are the mark 
of practical knowledge (Ramachandran and Hirstein 1999; Boyd 2009; 
Carroll, 1995). Such approaches are anti-Cartesian in their rejection of 
mind as disembodied and as a separate substance and wish to see mind 
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as emergent; the seemingly ‘Cartesian’ emphasis on aligning art with the 
primacy of cognition is countered by an insistence that cognition is not 
a distinct faculty, but one evolving natural activity among others. But a 
dominant motif has been the dethroning of cognition and logical reason-
ing in favor of a primarily affective and aesthetic comportment. Literary 
Darwinism can begin to indicate the problem of being anti-Cartesian: if 
one rejects the autonomy of the aesthetic, and aims to return art and the 
mind to life, but then does so in favor of survivalist logics, then one is 
both anti- and hyper-Cartesian at one and the same moment. The rejec-
tion of ‘mind’ seems at once to be post-subjective and even posthuman, 
returning all processes to one survivalist logic, and yet the grounding of 
all life on a logic that can be discerned through human reflection on its 
own practices takes on the very structure of the subject, of a single dis-
cernible ground for all emerging systems. 
Heidegger, criticizing the very idea of ‘logic’ as the proper and univer-
sal system through which we know the world, retrieved a more original 
logos—or speaking about—that would still remain discernible in today’s 
poets, for whom poiesis was the bringing into being of an event that was 
not simply the unfolding of a blueprint. (And it is this primacy of a poetic 
bringing into being of the world which is continued by Giorgio Agamben 
for whom we need to rethink ‘the political’ not in terms of a life that can 
be known and managed but in terms of an ‘open’ that is the very possi-
bility of any world at all.) One strand of anti-Cartesianism would seem 
to involve a turn away from mathematical certainty and formal logics in 
favor of a broader and living logos that would emerge first creatively only 
then to be reified into fixed systems. One would then view systems insofar 
as they extend the living, imaginative, social and affective body, not the 
detached and judging ‘mind.’ Much of the anti-Cartesian rhetoric today 
consists of a rejection of a computational model of thinking and instead 
grounds thinking in life, including—as in many supposedly Darwinist 
models—a life oriented toward the organism’s ongoing survival. (The 
problem with that anti-Cartesian counter logic is of course that it is 
possible because of something like the Cartesian gesture: a refusal to 
accept the given as given and instead to question its genesis. And even 
though one might want to think of this question of genesis as philosophi-
cal in general rather than Cartesian, it is possible to note a tendency in 
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Cartesian doubt that prompts many of the anti- and post-Cartesian war 
cries: separation. The Cartesian subject does not just question but also 
doubts and subordinates the world and then finds something like the 
act of thinking that possesses an indubitable certainty and privilege. 
Question: given some of the smug self-certainties of the twenty-first cen-
tury, including the notion that thinking is natural and world-oriented and 
that it would be scandalous not to see ‘us’—we humans—as world-ori-
ented or world-embedded, perhaps some form of Cartesian doubt might 
open us up to the thought that the link between mind and world is not as 
symbiotic as all that. And, further, given some of the dismissive readings 
of what has come to be known as ‘theory’—that theory was too textualist 
to think the material or scientific conditions of the world—it might be 
worthwhile to at least pose the question of just how certain we are about 
connectedness to life. Here one might want to think the double claim of 
the Heideggerian legacy: in addition to being the philosopher of being-
in-the-world, Heidegger also suggested that something like Angst would 
prompt us to question just how it is that we are ‘in’ the world and that this 
question has been closed off too readily.) 
Apart from a general appeal to Heidegger in claiming that the world 
that is given in a primarily creative and conversational—rather than logi-
cal—manner, there is a more general sense that approaching the world 
and life aesthetically is more mindful. Either we think of something like 
‘mind’ that mirrors or pictures its world and then adds creative frills, or 
we think of a general creativity: a world in which aesthesis or sensation, 
feeling or being affected is primary. It would be from that latter intercon-
nected, affective, attuned and mindful comportment that something like 
Cartesian man would be an unfortunate detachment, an error or illusion. 
Not only has there been a widespread ‘affective turn’ where cognition is 
deemed to be either a late and partial add-on to a life that proceeds pri-
marily through sensations and creates its social, embodied and dynamic 
attachments, more specifically Deleuze and post-phenomenology seem 
to privilege the primacy of aesthetic perception. One introduction to 
Deleuze’s thought—despite defining affect as mental activity—sees 
Deleuzian affect as an ‘attack’ on Cartesian subjectivity:
According to Deleuze affects are basic components of men-
tal activity. Now the concept of an affect does not entail the 
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concept of subjective self-awareness. To understand an affect 
is to see it as a force, a particular type of energy and this energy 
does not presuppose self-consciousness[…]. What affects is 
the mind capable of? What thoughts are generated by affects? 
In this philosophical perspective, the mind is a site of thoughts 
rather than a centre of consciousness. These thoughts are 
not defined by the fact that someone can say: they are my 
thoughts. Thoughts, in other words, are not defined as belong-
ing to a subject. Deleuze’s books on Hume, Nietzsche and 
Spinoza each develop a particular aspect of this affect psy-
chology and attack a specific dimension of the concept of the 
subject in its Cartesian or Kantian versions. (Due 2007, 10)1 
This enlistment of Deleuze and affects—against Descartes, the self and 
consciousness—is typical of a broader notion of continental philosophy 
as either properly opposed to Cartesian truth and certainty, or lamenta-
bly irresponsible in retreating from the claims of truth and reason. We do 
not need to follow Richard Rorty’s notion that deconstruction reduced 
philosophy to a ‘kind of writing,’ (Rorty 1986, 90) or Habermas’s less 
charitable but similar account of French thought as having rejected rea-
son in favor of a celebration of literature (Habermas 1987, 102), for there 
is a more tempered and nuanced theorization of thinking after Heidegger 
that would suggest that philosophy (and approaches to mind more gen-
erally) would do well to begin with the processes that are disclosed in art, 
rather than logic. Art, too, seems to have taken up this turn to mindful-
ness, not only in the general advent of installation art that is interactive 
and is oriented less to detached viewing than it is to walking, touching, 
feeling and contributing, but also in a new mode of inter-artistic analogy. 
The artist’s mindfulness might be said to display fidelity to 
phenomenological happening in its originary richness. […] 
we find a recovery of agapeic astonishment before the aes-
thetic equivocity of becoming: this stuns us into mindful-
ness of charged and expressive presence. We may even find a 
rapport with the primal ‘It is good’ which celebrates the giv-
ing of creation. The neutralization of creation into an indif-
ferent, objective ‘It’ is overcome in terms of its originary 
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abundance[…]. This ambiguity is intolerable to the heirs of 
Descartes and modern science who would be the masters and 
possessors of nature. (Desmond 1995, 94-95)
Perhaps everything will approach the condition of music, moving 
towards a non-semantic register, abandoning narrative modes—to the 
degree that such a mode is at all possible. How else could one escape 
the Cartesian prison of logic and self-consciousness other than by way 
of something like a pure affect that does not turn back upon, constitute, 
affect and touch itself? This would seem to be the task of the twenty-first 
century, an annihilation of the self-gathering subject and a becoming-
one-with a broader inhuman ecology.
But here is another story: Heidegger argued that the story of Descartes 
as a philosopher who came and doubted was nothing more than a ‘bad 
novel.’ And it appears—in true postmodern style—that Heidegger has 
become a character in his own bad novel. For many now read Heidegger 
as the philosopher who came to reject man and the subject in order to 
put the world together again. But here is another possible account: 
Heidegger’s point was that Descartes could not be seen as a simple 
lapse or error, and that this seemingly unfortunate Cartesian accident 
had something to do with the very possibility of thinking. Husserl, also, 
thought that taking the figure of mind seriously—asking how and why 
we possess a ‘natural attitude’ in which there appears to be something 
like ‘mind’ or substance as a thing in the world—would require us to be 
more or hyper-Cartesian. The problem was not that Descartes came up 
with this unique substance ‘mind’ and thereby destroyed the lived unity 
of the world: the problem was that this ‘mind’ was still too worldly, still 
too similar to all the other objects with which we live and work (and still 
too close to older concepts of the soul or psyche as privileged or special 
type of thing). The Cartesian error was not some break with an other-
wise unified, enchanted and mindful world. Indeed, the problem with 
Cartesianism is not mathematical separation and disenchantment but 
an excessive commitment to some special magical substance or ‘res cogi-
tans’; there is an insufficiency of calculus, for Descartes still relies on turn-
ing back to some living thing that will explain the separate world; he will 
not begin with separation, even though that is exactly what the Cartesian 
project promises. The world is not given, nor is relation; it is from some 
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presence without any assumed relation whatsoever that Descartes must 
turn back upon himself and establish the one indubitable relation from 
which all other relations would be possible. For Heidegger, this was the 
scandal of Cartesianism—not the subject, but the failure to really account 
for relations by assuming some self-relating special thing. Metaphysical 
philosophy had always had the goal of establishing some ultimate ground, 
hypokeimenon or subjectum. With Descartes that ‘subject’ becomes the 
self. What ought really to have occurred—had Descartes been truly radi-
cal with doubt and beginnings—is not the unfolding of the first relation 
from self back to self, but a realization that the self is an effect of rela-
tion; in the beginning is the relation, a being-in-the-world that precludes 
anything like a ‘pre-relational’ subject. At the same time, that being-in-
the-world is always ‘a’ world for some thrown Da-sein, and so establishing 
the world of relations and projects as first or originary is no better than 
establishing ‘a’ subject. There is no thing that is primordial, only an equi-
primordiality: both sides of the relation have a certain firstness. 
For Heidegger, there had always been a tendency towards subjectivism, 
or the establishing of a single ground that would underlie and explain all 
beings and events. (We might ask, today, whether shifting this underly-
ing ground to ‘life’ really changes things that much, and whether ground-
ing all that we know, do and feel in one affective and interconnected life 
does not partake of a simple Cartesian logic of a unified knowledge at the 
expense of a radical Cartesian detachment of a mind that is its own place.) 
So I would pause at this point to make a minor conclusion: in terms of 
intellectual history it is inaccurate to see a straightforward anti-Cartesian-
ism in the very tradition that is often appealed to, today, to make the case 
for ‘Descartes’ error.’ Even Nietzsche—who would seem to be the phi-
losopher to whom one might wish to appeal in order to get beyond the 
Cartesian prison and think a life of forces—was not so clear in attributing 
the blame to Descartes. Nietzsche even suggested that the modern ‘assas-
sination’ of the soul was actually counter-Cartesian and, for that very rea-
son, utterly pious. Nietzsche saw a religious fervor in modern philoso-
phy’s extirpation of the soul, and a pseudo-Christian self-abnegation in 
a tradition, after Descartes, of ridding the world and life of anything like 
the soul. Not only was it inaccurate, then, to think of Descartes as the 
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father of modern philosophy; there was also something reactive in cer-
tain destructions of the self:
What is the whole of modern philosophy doing at bottom? 
Since Descartes—actually more despite him than because of 
his precedent—all the philosophers seek to assassinate the 
old soul concept, under the guise of a critique of the subject-
and-predicate concept—which means an attempt on the life 
of the basic Christian doctrine. Modern philosophy, being an 
epistemological skepticism, is, covertly or overtly, anti-Chris-
tian—although to say this for the benefit of more refined ears, 
by no means anti-religious. (Nietzsche 1989, 66)
Nietzsche suggests both that there is something religious, or will-
destructive, in the ongoing assassination of the soul, and that this ‘mod-
ern’ gesture is not at all Cartesian but occurs despite Descartes. Noticing 
this inaccuracy is important for philosophical (rather than just histori-
cal) reasons. If Cartesianism occurred what does this tell us about life? 
What is life such that it gives birth to Cartesian man? Most importantly, 
why are we so insistently anti-Cartesian? What are we willing away? Is it 
not the most Cartesian of errors to think that an event might simply be 
dismissed, deemed to be erroneous and separate, with proper life having 
an entirely different nature? One of the arguments of phenomenology is 
that the Cartesian subject—that fragment of the world that takes itself 
to be the representing ground of the world—evidences a transcendental 
capacity, as well as the potentiality of that capacity to fail to actualize itself. 
It is the very nature of life, as relational, to be always oriented towards 
what is not fully present or given: this applies as much to conscious life as 
it does to any living form that is not self-sustaining. Consciousness is not 
only in relation to what is not itself; it has a sense—or anticipation—of 
what is not fully present. 
Consciousness is intentional or related to what is other than itself via 
sense—an anticipatory orientation. I see something as something, hav-
ing—in advance—some mode of relating in a certain way, with the 
expectation of certain outcomes. Because of this I tend to imagine the 
world’s separate and independent existence as a realm of objects with cer-
tain determined features, and from there I also naturally assume that I too 
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am one object, as a mind, among others. When Descartes doubted the 
world, and found the subject, he also assumed that the subject would be 
the most certain substance we could know: he was continuing a tendency 
of thought to find certainty in some privileged thing or substance that 
could be known apodictically. For Husserl and Heidegger the problem 
of Descartes’ positing of the subject was not its specialness, its implied 
human exceptionalism, nor its tendency to separate the world of complex 
materiality from processes of knowing or thinking. On the contrary, the 
problem is Descartes’ residual humanism; the cogito defines subjectiv-
ity as a special type of thing, as a distinct substance. The real, properly 
Cartesian question is how this appearance of something like a subject is 
possible: how did a certain type of living relation, a relation of knowing 
or sensing, come to appear and come to have a sense of itself? 
Descartes’ answer is, for Husserl and Heidegger, not the best path to 
pursue, but his question is the question of philosophy. How does appear-
ance appear, and how is it possible that we started to ask this question? 
How is it possible for life not just to be in relation but to ask questions 
about relations? As long as we assume that there is some thing in the 
world—man or subject—that would be the site from which relations 
unfold then we fail to ask about the relation (or question) that ‘we’ have 
to such a privileged site. It is that question that Descartes started to 
answer when he doubted even this body, here and now, which might (he 
thought) be mere appearing. When Husserl and Heidegger turned back 
to that point what they sought to do was render Cartesian doubt or ques-
tioning more radical: what is appearing, and how does appearing become 
questionable? End of minor conclusion: back to the argument.
It is possible to read post-phenomenology as a rejection of the 
Cartesian remnants in phenomenology: supposedly Husserl wanted a 
truly transcendental subject, not another substance but an absolute ideal 
condition that would be the ground from which time (as the condition 
of substance) would unfold. Heidegger, too, in aiming to think the dis-
closure or presencing of being really repeated a mode of subjectivism, 
establishing an ultimate ground or foundation. Accordingly, Derrida 
would use words like ‘trace,’ ‘écriture,’ ‘text,’ or différance to indicate that 
any supposed site of emergence could only be known after some process 
of presencing, in which a temporality of before and after, and a spatiality 
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of distribution has taken place; more radically, not only is such an origin 
only knowable after difference, the origin is itself differential. This strikes 
to the heart of Cartesianism and to any Heideggerian or phenomeno-
logical attempt to rethink genesis. Not only could there not be a subject 
as some fully self-present substance that subsisted and persisted before 
and beyond all relation, for the very self as identity must refer back to 
(and therefore be different from itself); but also, any supposed ground 
from which relations would unfold must itself be effected from relations. 
Self-presence is always given and achieved through relation, the self that 
recognizes itself as itself, must turn back towards itself through time. 
Identity or sameness, can only maintain itself, through time, by repeating 
itself, reiterating a quality through time, not being the ground of time. In 
the beginning is the rhythm. Deleuze, seemingly different from Derrida 
in his insistence both on the possibility of legitimately undertaking a 
history of the emergence of thought and systems of writing, and on the 
power of intuition to discern the differential forces or tendencies from 
which relations unfold, nevertheless seems to be even more insistently 
anti-Cartesian. Philosophy, despite its beginning in doubt and question-
ing, nevertheless always questions from an assumed ‘image of thought,’—
a figure of good sense and common sense oriented towards that which 
can be recognized, legitimated and established through time as the 
ground of sound thinking. In that respect, philosophy has never truly 
been immanent and has always fallen back upon an already given image 
of thought—which would include Descartes’ cogito, but also Heidegger’s 
Being, the transcendental subject of phenomenology and the seemingly 
post-metaphysical domain of communication. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s claim that relations are external to terms does, 
apparently, insist that the actualized world of constituted terms does not 
exhaust what can be said to be: actuality emerges from virtual tendencies, 
and those tendencies could always create new systems and new terms. But 
that appeal to ‘the virtual’ is not another foundation, despite the full real-
ity of the virtual. Not only do we only know the virtual as it is differenti-
ated into actual relations, it is also the case that the virtual ‘itself,’ unlike a 
supposed pre-existing world of possibilities, is real as a force for differen-
tiation. The unfolding of the virtual is not the choice from among a collec-
tion of possible paths. This is why Deleuze places so much emphasis on 
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the differential calculus: the creation of ever finer differences, producing 
ever more complex relations among differential powers, is infinite. This 
infinitely differential power theorized first in mathematics is nevertheless 
possible because of a broader truth of the differential: there cannot be ‘a’ 
subject or ‘a’ ground from which differences unfold, for difference is not 
a unity that is then disturbed or placed into relations. Unity and relations 
come into being from differential powers or forces—pure quantities or 
potentials to differ—that create points of relative stability. One way, then, 
of reading the tradition of post-phenomenology would be to read think-
ers as diverse as Derrida, Deleuze, Foucault, Irigaray, Kristeva, Agamben 
and even thinkers who seemingly assert the subject such as Alain Badiou 
as united in the anti-Cartesian project: if there is a subject it occurs not as 
substance but as event or act, known only after the event.
I would suggest, though, that it is possible to produce a counter nar-
rative in which post-phenomenology, like phenomenology, revives 
the Cartesian question in the spirit of Descartes. Doubt is more radi-
cal and does not leave subject as substance, but something is created in 
the Cartesian event, or what Derrida refers to as hyperbolic doubt. This 
Cartesian ‘something’ is what Deleuze refers to as ‘sense.’ It is helpful to 
see sense as at least in part Cartesian for two reasons: first, sense occurs 
as separation, when a thought or apprehension of an event detaches itself 
and takes on an autonomous power. Second, sense possesses some of the 
force of Descartes’ evil genius: we experience this world, here and now, 
as our own, as unfolded through our projects, our meanings, our bodily 
comportments, our affects and emotions—and yet it is entirely possible 
for this world of sense to be other than it is, for the world to have been 
different from what it is. To think of sense as akin to the evil genius is 
to see it as not the world itself, as establishing a world for us that may 
well not be what the world or the real exhaustively is. To think of sense 
is to open the possibility of counter-actualization. As we, today, are con-
fronted by more and more of the sense of our utter contingency—that 
there might have been a world without humans and there might soon be 
a world without humans again—perhaps being shrilly anti-Cartesian and 
insisting on the intimate bond between mind and world is a profoundly 
rigid instance of self-important subjectivism.
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In many cases Deleuze will chart his way through philosophical his-
tory siding with other philosophers, such as Kant, Spinoza or Leibniz—
against Descartes, but the issue is usually ontological and will still insist 
on the fracture of the subject, rendered more intense because the subject 
is not just another subject but a temporal torsion that will crack apart any 
notion of being as actualized substance. Deleuze will criticize any equiv-
ocity that posits two substances, for ‘mind’ is another expression of one 
expressive substance that is only in its all plural expressions, without any 
mode acting as ground for any other: MONISM = PLURALISM. And 
yet the incorporeality of sense that is different from states of affairs has 
a full reality and force that, in turn, has implications for what philoso-
phy can do. Post-phenomenology is not anti-Cartesian, but it is post- 
or hyper-Cartesian, enabled by the thought or sense of separation. The 
potentiality of Cartesianism and the genesis of sense offer imperatives for 
divergent faculties. 
Once thinking is considered to be a problem, and a non-natural prob-
lem (if ‘nature’ is taken to be a single domain of self-maintaining life) 
then we are well and truly on Cartesian soil. What if thinking were dis-
cordant with what has taken to be life? To take thought and its capacity 
for separation seriously is at once simply Cartesian, but also demands a 
different thought of life: what is thinking life such that it can diverge from 
causal and efficient modes of reasoning? What is thinking such that it can 
ask the world-destroying question of Descartes’ evil genius, the question 
of the non-being of this world? This divergence of faculties is generally 
attributed to Kant who separated the capacity to think beyond the given 
world from the capacity to know the world as given: if it is possible to 
think what cannot be known or given then even though this ‘not know-
ing’ places limits on theoretical knowledge it nevertheless opens up the 
possibility of acting as if something like pure Ideas were possible. When 
Derrida writes about forgiveness, hospitality, democracy or justice ‘to 
come,’ or follows such concepts with the qualification, ‘if there is such 
a thing,’ he might appear to be taking up a Kantian notion of the Idea. 
When Deleuze and Guattari write in What is Philosophy? of the separate 
powers of science (creating functions), art (creating affects and percepts) 
and philosophy (creating concepts), and when they write of the various 
syntheses of universal human history they would be seem to be indebted 
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to Kant’s contesting faculties and distinct modes of understanding. But I 
would insist on Cartesianism, at the very least in addition to Kantianism, 
as a radical and hyperbolic thought event for two reasons: first, onto-
logically, it is Cartesianism that poses the separation of thought; second, 
tactically, one needs to read all the shrill and repetitive narrations of our 
fall and redemption from Cartesian subjectivity as reaction formations, 
where the insistent denial evidences a failure to recognize the naïve or 
vulgar Cartesianism of the present. If Cartesianism had two tendencies 
or sides, one turned towards a complacent humanism, the other to a 
hyperbolic distance from the actual world, it is the former that seems to 
have taken hold in the anti-Cartesianism of the present. And it is here 
that I would seek to align the modern figure of Cartesianism with a cer-
tain theology of evil. 
If there has been a normative image of life, as creative, fruitful, dynamic, 
relational, self-maintaining while other-directed, then this has marked all 
figures of the good norm of thinking from the Christian God who creates 
otherness from expansive expressiveness to the man of post-Cartesian life 
who is always attuned to his milieu and is nothing other than an ongoing 
receptivity to the sense of the world. Similarly, evil has always been fig-
ured as a refusal of life: as a contingent, inert, destructive, non-relational 
and utterly unbecoming force unto itself. In this respect a certain image of 
Descartes’ cogito stands as the modern equivalent of a radical evil that 
refuses any form of ongoing principle, relatedness and a certain under-
standing of sense (where sense is the capacity to understand, order and 
synthesize one’s world). But there is another understanding of sense, one 
that runs through phenomenology and beyond that embraces this radical 
evil, and is perhaps best described in Derrida’s response to Foucault and 
the defense of hyperbolic doubt. 
Foucault, with more sophistication than marks the usual criticisms of 
Descartes, argued that the Cartesian subject was constituted by doubt-
ing all possible physical experiences (including the body, including even 
the state of wakefulness) while nevertheless dismissing the possibility 
of madness. For Descartes the very act of thinking presupposes some 
organizing self-presence. In this move, according to Foucault, something 
occurs within history: madness had once been considered to be one mode 
of thought among others. In pre-modern distributions of knowledge and 
Post-Phenomenology’s Evil Cartesian Demon  67
its assumed limits madness could grant insight or enigmatic illumination, 
and was deemed to be a different style of thought, for a thought that pos-
sessed a certain density. With Descartes there is no longer a continuity 
between reason and unreason, for thinking is self-presence. Any mad (or 
unworked) thinking would not count as thinking at all. Anything that did 
not present itself to itself, have a sense of itself, would not be a lesser or 
different style of thinking but would not be thought at all. If I am think-
ing then I am thinking myself thinking, gathered and present to myself. 
One way of reading this moment in Foucault is—as Derrida will do—to 
read Foucault as anti-Cartesian. Foucault, Derrida argues, wants to place 
the relation between reason and madness within history, as though one 
might look back at history and see the point at which reason violently 
refused all modes of ‘unworking’ or disordering; and then observe the 
internment of madness into a separate and other space. For Derrida such 
a maneuver is (especially on Foucault’s own account) itself Cartesian. 
Foucault does not accept reason as a given or constituted norm, but 
questions reason by assessing its history. As an aside, Derrida challenges 
Foucault’s reading of Descartes. According to Derrida, Descartes does 
indeed include madness in the process of doubt; for even if he were mad, 
here and now, he would still be thinking and would still (insofar as he is 
thinking) be a self-present subject. But the crucial point is what Derrida 
takes to be the force of Cartesian doubt. The capacity to ask about reason 
in general or ‘hyperbolic doubt’ is neither something Foucault can avoid 
in any genealogy of madness, for the question of madness or problem of 
madness places one in the domain of sense. To ask what madness is, nec-
essarily creates a distance from any constituted definition, or—to shift to 
Deleuze—any extended set. If we do not accept that madness is defined 
by all those bodies designated or collected as mad, and instead ask about 
madness really then we engage (for Derrida) in a problem of sense that 
is at once historical and untimely. It is historical precisely because sense 
is history, or the constitution of a power to designate what would be the 
same for me here now, and for an other not yet present. Sense is a futural 
bet or wager on what Derrida will later refer to as the ‘to come,’ and it is 
Cartesian hyperbolic doubt that detaches itself from sense as given (as 
ostensive or even stipulative definition) and—in a process that is almost 
mad—questions reason as such. If I ask what reason really is then I make 
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a claim to some notion of what reason would be; if I challenge a certain 
‘internment’ of madness as that which thought was once able to encoun-
ter, then I make some trans-historical claim regarding thought and its 
proper or potential sense. I have already detached myself from the simple 
positivity of the present and the given.
I would suggest that when Foucault reads Descartes he is, to some 
extent, doing what Derrida describes: placing Descartes’ reason on trial, 
distancing himself from that enclosed definition of reason as self-pres-
ence, and then suggesting another thought that would not be at odds with 
what Descartes interred as a certain mad unworking. Rather, then, than 
include Foucault in the more general anti-Cartesian axiology of good and 
evil, where the Cartesian subject closes man off from a world of which 
he is properly a dynamic, attuned and affected being, it is possible to see 
Foucault’s creation of madness as ‘absence of work’ as radically Cartesian. 
It is only by reading Descartes in a certain way that Foucault creates a 
genealogy of another thinking, finding in Descartes’ refusal of a mad, dis-
persed, non-self-present delirium a point outside reason as logic. There is 
something radically Cartesian in the tradition of re-opening the Cartesian 
question, at least as that tradition runs from Husserl to Deleuze (but pos-
sibly also back to Kant). And there is something of a Cartesian domesti-
cation at work in the general late twentieth and early twenty-first-century 
counter-Cartesianisms.
If one reads Descartes’ subject in psycho-physical terms, with res cogi-
tans providing a specific ‘tag end of the world’ (as Husserl put it), then one 
could criticize Cartesianism for the following error: one part of the world 
accounts for the world in general. Cartesian doubt both fails to doubt in 
a profound manner and does, indeed, enclose thinking in a way that must 
deny, repress or moralize certain rogue and untamed forces that could 
not be accounted for by separating the world into a simple opposition 
between thinking things and extended things. I want to conclude by con-
sidering a positive Cartesianism of sense that would not only go beyond 
Cartesian dualism, but would also allow us to read today’s ostensibly anti-
Cartesian positions as modes of vulgar Cartesianism. (Following Derrida 
and Deleuze I would also suggest that such a fall or lapse into vulgarity is 
not something that is external to thinking.)
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Derrida: it is not only in his debate with Foucault that Derrida insists 
upon a Cartesian potential in thinking that cannot be reduced to a 
moment within history. In his reading of Husserl, Derrida argues for an 
impossible relation between sense and history. On the one hand sense is 
intra-worldly and historical. In order for a science or language or practice 
to be possible it must constitute some repeatable system that views the 
world here and now as it would be for any subject beyond me. In this 
respect the sense of the world, or viewing the world coherently through 
time, requires not only a perception of the here and now but an antici-
pation of what would be true for something like humanity in general. In 
his reading of Husserl it is the status of that ‘humanity in general’ that 
(I would argue) opens onto a Cartesian hyperbole in Derrida. Husserl 
wants to account for the ‘origin of the world.’ Resisting the psychological 
tendency to locate all meaning within something like ‘man’ as a specific 
substance, Husserl argues for a transcendental subjectivity that could not 
be reduced to physical humanity; humans appear as psycho-physical in 
the world because of sense. It is sense that allows the world and ‘us’ to 
appear as one unified human world continuing through time. History—the 
world as it appears—is possible because of historicity, or a process of syn-
thesis that cannot take place within time. Husserl’s problem is the rela-
tion between humanity as a concrete psycho-physical species, humanity 
as constituted through time in this world, and humanity as an Idea, or 
humanity as a project of sense. In order for this ‘man’ here and now to 
(for example) pose a logical or moral truth he must imagine what would 
be the case for any subject whatever. He must, to some extent, annihilate 
all assumptions, all givenness and ask what remains. That question must 
always take place in the world, and yet posit a sense of the world. What 
makes this movement Cartesian, rather than Kantian, is the strange sta-
tus it grants to the subject and sense. Kant, already criticizing Descartes 
for placing the subject within space and time, argues that the subject to 
whom the world appears must already be the result of a synthesis. The 
problem, for Husserl, Heidegger and Derrida is that, while the worldly 
human subject is thereby no longer seen to be the origin of sense and the 
world, Kantianism does not ask the question of the genesis of the tran-
scendental subject. The origin of sense is left unquestioned. Descartes’ 
doubt begins with what appears, and far from positing a transcendental 
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ground (as Kant will do) insists that all we have is appearing. The move-
ment of doubt then introduces the gap between appearance and the event 
of appearing; insofar as I doubt I establish this relation to appearing. 
It is not surprising that Kantianism has enabled a ‘post-metaphysical’ 
suspension of the subject, and a move towards pure formalism and anti-
foundationalism. For Kant and Kantianism we are always already within 
a world of constituted relations, with the origin or ground of those rela-
tions never in itself being a possible object of knowledge or appearance. 
Politically, this leads to a mode of liberal formalism in which the absence 
of law or foundation requires an ongoing process of deliberation and 
legitimation without any appeal to a ground or substance. It might seem 
that Derrida maintains this Kantian suspension when he insists on var-
ious terms such as ‘justice to come’ or ‘democracy to come’: there can 
never be an absolute experience of justice that can exhaust the process 
and deliberation of justice. It would follow that ‘deconstruction is jus-
tice’ if deconstruction were a commitment to potentialities released by 
the formal structure of experience that were themselves always beyond 
experience. Derrida will adopt certain modes of the Kantian conditional, 
where we can think or act as if there might be justice (or democracy, or 
friendship or forgiveness): how would such ideas open or deconstruct 
the present by indicating that which cannot be reduced to current struc-
tures? And yet I would suggest that the positive dimension of Derrida 
and deconstruction lies in Cartesian hyperbole, where we do not accept 
the formal limits of legitimation and possible consensus. No givenness 
or formal system in the world can silence the question that would ask 
about the genesis or appearing of forms and systems. Appearing cannot 
be reduced to a substance (res cogitans), precisely because substance 
emerges from an unfolding of appearances. Refusing to interrogate, or 
remain open to, what Heidegger referred to as Kant’s ‘hidden source’ can-
not tame the Cartesian question. In many respects Derrida regards this 
Cartesian movement of hyperbolic doubt as not only internal to philoso-
phy, but as operating in any possible experience (except perhaps for lit-
erary experience, or at least operating differently in literary experience). 
Insofar as I experience anything before me as present, as being there, then 
I have already gone beyond the putative pure self-presence of what is 
given; I have already anticipated that this present here and now would 
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also appear in the same way for any subject whatever. This is why Derrida 
locates a structure of mourning in the given (for I am already oriented 
beyond what is given to me towards what would be there beyond my 
existence). How is it that ‘mere appearing’ presents itself as the appearing 
of what would be there for me and for any subject whatever; from where 
does this givenness unfold? What is being, really? If we suspend any sup-
posed ground that would be the source of all appearing, what remains, 
what can be said to be? Philosophy occurs in this question of sense, in this 
movement from what appears as present to what we can assert, say or 
posit as having true being. This is why literary experience as a ‘saying’ that 
is that of text itself freed from any claim to being would be quite different 
in its relation to presence. The movement of doubt is at once negative—
ruling out any presuppositions regarding what we assume true being to 
be—but also positive. What is philosophy such that it can move from the 
world as given and then ask what is truly given and what might truly be? 
I would suggest that Deleuze is a more Cartesian philosopher than 
either Derrida or Heidegger. First, Deleuze and Guattari make a formal 
or essential distinction between the tendencies of art/literature and phi-
losophy. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze re-opens the Heideggerian 
question of what it is to think, and in this respect Deleuze (and later 
with Guattari in What is Philosophy?) takes up Heidegger’s criticism of 
Descartes. The question of thinking is short-circuited if one imagines a 
substance oriented towards a correct picturing of the world; a specific 
being is then assumed to provide a ground for the thinking of being in 
general. Against this error of transcendence (one being as the distinct 
ground for others), or this error of equivocity (one being as a differ-
ent thinking substance in relation to another extended substance), and 
against this error of good sense and common sense (where thinking is 
given as the same for all in relation to a common world), Deleuze poses 
the challenge of thought without an image. In so doing, like Husserl and 
Heidegger, Deleuze takes doubt or the question to a hyperbolic level, 
not content to stop with any supposed being who questions. Indeed, the 
question no longer characterizes the subject but acts as a way of releas-
ing thought from any ground whatever. For it is not only philosophy that 
questions; it is not only the subject, Dasein or man who exists at once in 
relation while also not being exhausted by the relations through which 
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becoming is actualized. Deleuze writes being as ‘?being,’ indicating not 
that we cannot know what being is, but that being exists in a mode of 
relation in which the relations that occur are not determined in advance. 
More positively, this then allows for a way to think about the different 
relational potentials of thinking: art, philosophy and science. If Heidegger 
insisted that truth was not something that thinking may or may not bear 
a relation towards, this was because the relational nature of thinking—
its comportment—is truth. Even the most erroneous or seemingly acci-
dental event expresses something about thought’s possibility. Deleuze, 
too, does not dismiss error, illusion, stupidity or malevolence as distinct 
from thinking: there is one being that gives itself in multiple expressions. 
Deleuze and Guattari distinguish various orientations, tendencies, styles 
or temporal distributions of the question of ?being, and their distinction 
among philosophy, art and science gives us—I would suggest—a posi-
tive Cartesianism. 
In some ways it might seem to make more sense to see the diverse lines 
of thought’s potential as Kantian: there are modes of thinking, such as 
philosophy’s creation of concepts, that indicate an opening of new rela-
tions and temporalities (such as the notion of thinking as such, that 
would be different from the reference to actual thinking individuals). 
But I would stress a certain Cartesian dimension. First, Deleuze stresses 
the significance of both malevolence and stupidity, as though thought’s 
resistance to alignment—its errancy and capacity to detach itself from 
good sense and common sense—does not accord with Kantian notions 
of thought’s conditions as oriented to world-forming and coherent syn-
thesis. In response to Descartes, Kant had insisted that insofar as one 
thinks and doubts, then there is already a form of time and space that 
would enable this doubting by me, and of this world to take place. The 
self who doubts a world beyond itself is already synthesized into a con-
tinuing unity in relation to a spatially distanced world. But it is just this 
already present transcendental and conditioning form that Deleuze 
questions. In Difference and Repetition passive synthesis is not presup-
posed (and not subjective) but opens the possibility that there may be 
various and divergent orientations—not those of a spatial world set over 
and against a subject. Deleuze refers to ‘contemplations’ or ‘perceptions’ 
that are neither human nor organic, and so the world’s syntheses could 
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also be attributed to rocks, waves and particles. In What is Philosophy? 
Deleuze and Guattari argue for philosophy not, as Kant had done, as a 
critical procedure to draw thought to its limits in terms of an experience 
that must be given to a finite subject, but as the creation of potentials and 
tendencies that do not presuppose a subject-object relation. Although it 
is Descartes who is widely accepted to be the author of (not surprisingly) 
‘Descartes’ error,’ or the mistake of separating the subject from the world, 
it is Cartesian doubt—doubting even the body that appears to be mine, 
even that the self I experience and the entire world might be a dream—
that destroys the transcendental form of an already given time and space. 
If there are no transcendental conditions, then it follows that we could 
have philosophy in which concepts might be created that do not refer to 
objects of possible experience (such as time in its pure state), and also 
that we could have art in which the expressiveness of matter appears as 
such, and not as it is for me. 
Even though Deleuze’s thought is quite fairly and accurately deemed to 
be a form of realism in its Bergsonian commitment to intuiting durations 
and rhythms as such, and not as they would be from the point of view of 
the practical subject, there is a strong Cartesian drive in the affirmation 
of thinking as a power to create a realm of sense—a plane of orientations, 
relations, ideas and concepts—that are not reducible to the world’s func-
tions (which have their scientific legitimacy and organize a world that is 
distinct from, but related to, observers). Sense is not the Kantian Idea, 
whereby I recognize that I cannot experience or know the law as such, 
but nevertheless act as if I were a being whose will might be pure law. 
Sense is not the self that wills itself as if it were nothing other than a pure 
form of willing, unimpeded by any desire or motivation other than itself; 
sense is the creation from experience of something like a pure predicate, 
released from subject-object relations, opening the idea of the appear-
ance as such, in itself. Sense is separation, taking the form of what—theo-
logically—has been deemed to be evil: cut off from ecological life, with-
out the assumption of a body or mind to whom the appearance is given, 
sense is a world in which the mind is its own place. 
This, also, is the force of Deleuze and Guattari’s various formations of 
becoming-animal or becoming-imperceptible or even becoming-woman: 
such maneuvers are Cartesian because they do not (like today’s supposed 
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anti-Cartesians) insist on the world as always the world for this or that 
body, existing in history, contexts or in terms of the meaning that the 
world would have for this always oriented body. Instead, these operations 
of becoming, especially becoming-imperceptible, do not assume a body, 
a lived world, a connectedness and certainly not a constituted or even 
constituting time and space. These becomings are movements of sense 
in which what is perceived is not located as an object within time but 
becomes a pure predicate, what it is in the animal that ‘animals.’ It is as 
if we could, indeed, annihilate the world, not accept the given, including 
even my body here and now that seems to be the condition or point from 
which the world unfolds. 
Notes
1.  One might offer a reading of Deleuze that reversed this quick account of 
the subject, psychology and affect. The world is composed of multiple self-
consciousnesses, well beyond the human being and psychology, and well 
beyond thoughts. Indeed, one might say that the world is multiple self-
consciousness or self-enjoyment, plural subjects, beyond thinking and beyond 
psychology. Or in Deleuze’s Leibnizian voice: […] the subjective form is the 
way by which the datum is expressed in the subject, or by which the subject 
actively prehends the datum (emotion, evaluation, project, conscience …). It 
is the form in which the datum is folded in the subject, a ‘feeling’ or manner, 
at least when prehension is positive (Deleuze 2006, 88).
Chapter 4
Queer Aesthetics
Perhaps no notion has been more normative than that of becoming. 
Perhaps because of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, with their con-
cepts of ‘becoming-animal’ or ‘becoming-woman,’ or perhaps because of 
a now-institutionalized poststructuralism that appears to have privileged 
process over stability, creation over system and singularity over universal-
ity, becoming appears at first glance to be the notion that would free us 
at once from moralizing normativity and rigid identity politics. What I 
want to suggest in this chapter is that the contemporary valorization of 
becoming over being repeats rather than destabilizes a highly traditional 
and humanist sentiment of privileging act over inertia, life and creativ-
ity over death and stasis, and pure existence or coming-into-being over 
determination. Indeed, all the forms of anti-essentialism that marked the 
late twentieth-century could only have force because essence—or that 
which is, as such, beyond its actualization—was deemed to be necessar-
ily (or essentially) impeding. Becoming, thought in its opposition to nor-
mativity and essence, has always underpinned standard liberal notions of 
the political, the ethical, and the aesthetic. The political: a good polity 
is a polity that does not merely follow rules and order automatically but 
gives a law to itself freely.1 The ethical: a subject is not a mechanism that 
unfolds in time to realize what he was always going to be, but becomes 
what he ought to be by realizing his self-creative freedom.2 The aesthetic: 
art is the minimal distance or deviation from perfectly clear, accepted, 
and rule-bound communication; art works as art only in disclosing once 
again that the world is not fully seen and said, but is opened through see-
ing and saying.3 
To get a sense of the ways in which this concept of becoming has pre-
sented itself as a self-evident good, we need only ask whether it would be 
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possible to speak against becoming. Would it be possible to assert simply 
that one is: that I am the being who I am and have always been; that I do 
not expect or hope to change? Or, would it be possible—this time not 
referring to oneself—to affirm a world or nature that is fully actualized, 
and that bears neither a potentiality for change nor a tendency to change 
in ways that are not determined in advance by some norm? Does not the 
very insistence on the importance of the political, from Plato and Aristotle 
to the present, presuppose that ‘we’ —the polity—do not accept a closed 
and completed state form but consider human collective life to be cre-
ative of itself? When there is talk of a loss of politics today, this is usually 
a way of referring to widespread passivity and the consumption rather 
than production of images. If one can distinguish a power of mind and 
life from matter and inertia it is to the degree to which the former is active 
and self-creating. Well before Henri Bergson distinguished between mat-
ter and memory by arguing that the former is fully actualized and can 
only vary mechanically through the redistribution or reconfiguration 
of what is already given, while the latter will properly lead to a spiritual 
becoming that will free itself from fixed and rigid units, there had been a 
long history of privileging a living and dynamic becoming over the stasis 
of an unthinking matter that has no potentiality or relation beyond itself. 
Theologically, it is chaos that simply ‘is’ while being is creative, dynamic, 
fruitful, and multiplying. Even if, as Giorgio Agamben notes in Homo 
Sacer, there would be a problem of considering how natural generation 
would be accommodated in a redeemed world, there is a long history of 
justifying a properly divine creativity. Agamben articulates the problem 
this way: if there is a heaven then everything would be complete and 
redeemed, so how would the blessed deal with the problem of such activ-
ities as eating (with the concomitant acts of digestion and waste)? And 
this is the problem that marks Agamben’s project of potentiality today: 
could we imagine a becoming that is not constrained in advance by some 
aspect of already actualized life? Our imaginations of heaven, after all, 
have tended to take human bodies and simply resituate them in an eter-
nal domain, not asking about the potentiality or becoming of those bod-
ies. Agamben recognizes that heaven, traditionally conceived, could not 
accommodate waste, growth, and regeneration; but this opens the prob-
lem of dynamic action. Would a godlike power do anything, would this 
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not impede completeness and perfection? Could there be a divine becom-
ing? Such a problem has haunted theology that at one and the same time 
wants to grant dynamic creativity and life to God, while also recognizing 
that divinity would not need to become. Milton, for example, maintains 
that the angels—like Adam and Eve before them—will be involved in the 
production of hymns of praise. But what makes such production divine 
is that it is unprompted and unnecessary. Like Agamben four centuries 
later, Milton recognizes the problem of human potentiality: a world with-
out becoming would be mere life. Even a redeemed humanity will never 
remain in itself but will create further, expressing itself as nothing more 
than this creating spirit (Schwartz 1998).
We can chart this highly normative anti-normativity of becoming by 
working back, genealogically, from Bergson. Bergson’s attack on dual-
ism was preceded by a series of anti-Cartesian attacks on mind as a thing 
within the world. Cartesianism was targeted from its inception as a dan-
gerously mechanistic reduction of the world and a godless detachment 
of man as substance (Israel 2001). Bergson’s attack on Cartesianism (and 
other representations of mind as a substance within time and space) 
needs to be distinguished from the contemporary appeal to becoming. 
There is a difference between affirming—as Bergson did—that all life 
bears tendencies both towards explosive difference and inertia, and sim-
ply affirming that the subject is nothing other than its pure relation to 
what it is not, a pure becoming. That is, there is a difference between a 
metaphysical objection to positing one substance—such as mind—as 
the point from which time and movement are perceived, and the existen-
tial objection that man or humanity is distinguished by its not having any 
essence other than its capacity to become. Bergson did not treat mind as 
becoming, rather than being, without thoroughly challenging the notion 
of a simple opposition between being (what simply is) and becoming 
(processes of change that those beings undergo). What Bergson radical-
ized in his vitalism was a failure to think the difference between being 
and becoming appropriately. That is, Bergson will not—as later affir-
mations of becoming would do—celebrate ‘life’ or political subjects as 
mobile and self-creating in opposition to a supposed essential or time-
less nature or ‘bare life’; he will remove ‘man’ from his privileged posi-
tion of homo sui faber and describe all life as bearing (at least in part) an 
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explosive capacity to destroy its bounded and self-same identity. In this 
respect, Bergson is at once the queerest of philosophers, regarding all 
life as deviation or disturbance (Grosz 2004), and the most normatively 
humanist of philosophers, placing the power that had always elevated 
man—dynamic becoming—at the heart of all life. But Bergson is not 
alone; his work evinces a more general problem of the relation between 
becoming and man. There has always been an anti-humanist privileging 
of becoming that would set itself against ‘man’ as nothing more than an 
animal with special qualities, such as reason (Derrida 1969).
Kant had insisted that for both ethical and metaphysical reasons one 
could not consider the world as an object in itself that is then pictured by 
the mind. The relation of mind to world is itself the outcome of an active 
synthesis: mind is not that which can be known as a being or substance, 
for transcendental subjectivity is the process of synthesis itself, knowable 
only after the event, in its effects. It follows, ethically, that mind cannot be 
a thing or nature from which one might establish certain norms. Instead—
because it is nothing other than a synthetic power—mind is that which 
gives a norm to itself (Korsgaard 1996).
In some ways, then, one could read Kant as a vitalist; and this was, 
indeed, how Deleuze and Guattari chose to figure Kant—as an active 
vitalist, privileging a subject who is nothing other than pure act. In con-
trast to Kant, they set another tradition of vitalism, running from Leibniz 
to Raymond Ruyer. That second, passive, tradition is not that of a subject 
but of a ‘pure internal awareness’ : ‘Vitalism has always had two possible 
interpretations: that of an idea that acts, but is not—that acts therefore 
only from the point of view of an external cerebral knowledge […] ; or 
that of a force that is but does not act—that is therefore a pure internal 
Awareness […] . If the second interpretation seems to us to be impera-
tive it is because the contraction that preserves is always in a state of 
detachment in relation to action or even to movement and appears as a 
pure contemplation without knowledge’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 
213). In the conclusion of this chapter, I will look at this passive vital-
ism in relation to D. H. Lawrence’s poetry, but for now we can note that 
such a tradition of vitalism would enable us to consider different modes 
of becoming and different modes of aesthetics. Aesthetics does not, of 
course, begin with Kant, as there has always been some conception of 
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art or beauty at the heart of philosophy, with beauty in turn being linked 
to a proper and normative mode of becoming. This occurs most obvi-
ously in Plato’s Symposium, where it is the beauty of the beautiful that 
explains its desirability. Desire should, in its apprehension of the beauti-
ful, move beyond the delighted perception of any beautiful object and 
arrive at the understanding that insofar as there is apprehension—inso-
far as there is perceiving—one ought to direct oneself to that which makes 
apprehension in general possible. This possibility is the form or Idea as 
such. We perceive beautiful things only because they actualize a poten-
tial to be beautiful that is never exhausted in any single being: it is that 
eternal potentiality, or Idea, that knowledge ought to attain. This attain-
ment occurs through becoming: not simply accepting passively what is 
true or good or beautiful, but realizing it for oneself, through dialogue, 
education, and reason. This good becoming is liberation from the passively 
received and an activation of proper potentiality: one sees, through the 
beautiful, the beauty that makes perception possible, and one realizes 
the potentiality of oneself, becoming what one ought to be by activating 
dynamic perception.
We can contrast Platonic perception, desire, and Ideas, where percep-
tion is drawn to that ultimate ground or condition which makes it pos-
sible, to Deleuze’s notion of a desire that bears a potential for Ideas only 
in relation. Desire is the capacity to create relations through encounters, 
relations that are external to the potentialities or differential powers from 
which they emerge. Drawing, among other sources, on the passive vital-
ism of Raymond Ruyer, Deleuze posits that the development of a body 
occurs not just as the unfolding of a form from itself, but as an orientation 
to what Ruyer refers to as ‘transcendental forms’ or what Deleuze refers 
to as Ideas. For Ruyer, the becoming of an embryo is neither self-deter-
mined from the beginning nor caused by the environment; instead, there 
are virtual powers towards which development tends. In the case of cam-
ouflaged animals, becoming makes sense only in relation to a field that 
is beyond the animal’s body-world relation (Ruyer 1958). This passive 
vitalism is one in which ‘life’ is not some force that actualizes itself in sin-
gle bodies, but a ‘field of survey’ that places any body’s becoming in rela-
tion to the forces of its milieu, and never as active self-creation. Becoming-
woman and becoming-animal, for example, are not the becomings of 
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women or animals, which is why, notoriously, in A Thousand Plateaus 
Deleuze and Guattari distinguished becoming-woman from the wom-
en’s movement and also saw becoming-woman as the starting point 
for all becomings. There would no longer be man as subject, the being 
who is nothing more than his own self-becoming, for becoming-woman 
suggests that becoming is oriented, or tends toward, a term beyond the 
process of becoming. Becoming-woman and becoming-animal are also 
tied to writing: for Deleuze and Guattari, writing is rhizomatic insofar 
as it possesses a force and field of its own, beyond the self, mastery, or 
becoming of the writer. There is not a self who affirms its own becoming 
as a woman, nor a self who writes about animals to uncover animality 
as such. For there are no terms or points—no human or animal—out-
side of encounters; and neither term becomes for itself, from itself or with-
out inflection from without. There is no woman as such or animal as such 
toward which one becomes. But there are styles of becoming, such that 
any becoming-woman will both encounter something other than itself, 
and rewrite just what that ‘other’ (or woman) is.
Deleuze’s reversal of Platonism is not an elimination of Ideas but a 
creation of a new concept of the Idea: one does not become toward the 
Idea in order to realize oneself, for Ideas are created attractors that vio-
late thought’s self-sameness and transgress any internal or proper becom-
ing (Deleuze 1994). Plato’s Ideas are transcendent: they are potentials 
towards which thought might direct itself. Deleuze retains this aspect of 
the Idea, while refusing to place the outside of thought beyond life. 
When Kant rejects any notion of Ideas that are transcendent to 
thought, and instead argues that the Ideas toward which thought strives 
are consequences of extending thought’s own potential beyond any given 
object, he liberates becoming from any end outside itself: ‘Against ratio-
nalism, Kant asserts that supreme ends are not only ends of reason, but 
that in positing them reason posits nothing other than itself ’ (Deleuze 
1984, 2). The subject is now elevated to becoming both an ethical being 
who gives a law to himself (because he is pure power of decision and does 
not proceed from any decided norm) and to an aesthetic subject whose 
capacity to perceive form as such allows him to feel his own harmonizing 
and synthesizing activity. 
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Is it surprising, then, that today theory appears to be enlivened by the 
concepts of potentiality, becoming, and the experience of the work of art 
that would be liberated from any norms or figures—any meaning—other 
than that of perception feeling itself perceiving, art feeling itself as art? 
The most explicit exponent of such a potentiality freed from any body, 
norm, or organism other than its own power of the pure act can be found 
in the work of Agamben, who, in Potentialities, explicitly turns back to 
Aristotle to think a potentiality that is not governed by an already given 
end. And, despite his criticism of vitalism in Deleuze, Badiou’s emphasis 
on the subject, as a pure event facing the void, without any prior or deter-
mining body or transcendence, could also be read (as Badiou himself will 
do in Manifesto for Philosophy) as a subjectivism of a specifically Platonic 
mode. The subject is nothing other than an apprehension of a universal 
that it brings into being. This universal for Badiou demands a certain 
fidelity beyond any worldly or already individuated point of view. For all 
their differences, and they are many, both Agamben and Badiou regard 
the work of art as an experience that is irreducible to the cognitive or 
predicative statements of philosophy or science. For Agamben, the work 
of art demonstrates that, before there are subjects who have proper and 
determined ends, there is the opening of the world as such. For Badiou, 
the work of art’s experience of a world is not (as Heidegger would have 
it) the proper mode of thought qua thinking as disclosure; rather, it is 
because a world is unfolded poetically that philosophy can argue that 
there is no world in itself outside its disclosure, no throbbing, pulsating 
‘lived,’ only a void.
The ‘aesthetic,’ then, has—at least since Kant—been a way of returning 
the subject from its captivation with the given and known world to the 
subjective conditions through which any such world is given. In Kant, it 
is in the work of art that one feels, but does not know, the synthesizing 
power of the subject. For Kant, the aesthetic is that mode of presentation 
that does not simply give the world but presents the world in its event of 
presentation.
Kant’s vitalism of a subject who cannot submit to a norm precisely 
because he is the power from which any possible normativity might be 
generated, has its pre-modern and theological precursors. For Aquinas, 
God is not a being who acts according to an essence, for his essence 
82 Chapter 4
is nothing other than that of pure being; God is existence as such, the 
power through which any determined form can be brought into actu-
ality (Gilson 1994). This scholastic definition of God derives from the 
Aristotelian concept of potentiality, which (as I have already suggested) 
forms the focus and basis of much of today’s ‘theory,’ especially as theory 
gives itself the task of finding, from within life, something like a power 
of life transformation that is not that of annihilation or negation For 
Aristotle, a living being has a proper and living potential: a being lives in 
order to actualize what it ought to be. To say that such and such a being is 
good is to say that it realizes what it can be in the fullest way possible. In 
the case of human reason, its highest power (of reason) is the capacity to 
intuit this principle of becoming as such, and then to create itself accord-
ing to its sense of its power of self-determination (Irwin 1988).
When contemporary writers, such as Agamben (who refers explicitly 
to Aristotle) or Judith Butler (who adopts the more general notion of 
performativity), seek to liberate the self from any proper end that would 
govern its becoming, they at once react against the traditional definition 
of human potentiality as teleological, while also repeating the idea that 
the human animal has a peculiarly special end: that of having no end, of 
being oriented to nothing proper.
To say that becoming, today, is normative is to make a twofold claim. 
First, becoming presents itself as a self-evident good, not as one norm 
among others, and not as one good among others, but as the underlying 
or a priori condition that allows for anything like the good. If there were 
no becoming, there would be no decision or value, and nothing could be 
apprehended as what one ought to do, rather than what one simply is. 
Second, if we accept that there is becoming, or that any constituted and 
decided being is the outcome of a dynamic and constituting power, then 
we are impelled to be self-normativizing; if the subject is nothing other 
than the power of its own becoming, then it must take this becoming 
upon itself, liberate itself from all the illusions of a given nature or nor-
mality, and become nothing other than self-becoming. If the subject were 
not to give itself to itself, not affect itself and realize itself, then it would 
have abandoned its proper potentiality to act and become. 
It is in contrast to this normativity of becoming, or becoming as 
normative, that we can place the queerness of Deleuze’s concepts of 
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becoming-animal, becoming-woman, and becoming-imperceptible. 
Here, becoming does not realize and actualize itself, does not flourish 
into presence, but bears a capacity to annihilate itself, to refuse its own-
ness in order to attach, transductively, to becomings whose trajectories 
are external and unmasterable. Thus, if we refer to Deleuze as a vitalist, it 
is not because he insists on the becoming of life as such, in opposition to 
the terms that are effected from an act of becoming. Rather, any becom-
ing is always localized; it is a force of a particular quantity, in relation 
to another quantity, producing a point of relative stability, or a field. In 
terms of ‘the aesthetic,’ it is not a question, then, of art practice returning 
the subject or creative potentiality to the sense of its own forming power. 
Rather, the art object would be the result of a collision not intended or 
reducible to any single life.
Another mode of vitalism, running from Ruyer to Leibniz, entails 
also another mode of aesthetics, one that does not rely on the work of 
art as a condition in general that would bring the subject back to its acts 
of perception that constitute its world. As Deleuze suggests in The Fold, 
this form of vitalism does not see life as a constituting power that flows 
forth and recognizes itself after the event of creation. It is a vitalism of 
divergent series in which every power to perceive creates its own opening 
to the infinite, its own series of perceptions passing from finitude to an 
open whole. For Leibniz, there are not selves who perceive, nor subjec-
tive powers that synthesize the given; for the harmony of the universe 
follows from the fact that there is only one universe, perceived differently 
by every one of its components. The universe is not some single object 
that is then perceived or synthesized; there are events of perception, each 
of which is an unfolding of an infinite series. There is no conflict in these 
series precisely because there is no outside as such, or life as such, beyond 
all the points of view that compose the harmonious whole. This doesn’t 
mean that truth is relativized, that we don’t get to the truth because of 
perspectives; rather, truth is composed of relative series, not located 
in ‘a’ point, but effected from an open whole of converging and diverg-
ing points. Life just is this quantity of divergent worlds. As a more mod-
ern form of this line of thinking, Ruyer’s vitalism simultaneously entails 
a resistance to mechanism—to the idea that one might determine in 
advance the various lines of becoming that compose the universe—and a 
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radical passivity, as in his concept of ‘absolute survey.’ As Ruyer argues in 
Neo-finalisme, every perception is a feeling of the whole of being, a sense 
or orientation that is productive of a located viewpoint, a viewpoint that 
can be located only because it bears its own sense of a whole or relation 
of which it is also an effect (Ruyer 1952). 
Thus, the concept of becoming, far from being a radically new turn in 
a twenty-first century vitalism that has broken with normalizing meta-
physics, is the normalizing concept par excellence. It has always been the 
case that anything resistant to dynamism, fruition, creation, and a flow-
ing forth of open and productive life has been demonized as a death or 
inertia that tarnishes life from the outside. A subject must be nothing 
other than the event of its own performance, acting, or unfolding. If, fol-
lowing Butler, we recognize that performance is enabled by prior norms 
(for one must always perform as this or that specified being), we never-
theless take heart in the power to perform that will introduce a certain 
nonbeing or undecidability into the rigidity of the very identity upon 
which we must unfortunately rely. Butler’s success as a theorist lies in her 
capacity to maintain a tradition of theory as theoria: as a looking or per-
ceiving that activates itself in a resistance to that which would be merely 
given and immune to the becoming one takes upon oneself as an ethical 
subject. Against this Butlerian retrieval of a relation between norm and 
performance, one might suggest that, rather than rely on something like 
becoming in general, a power of creativity or dynamism that is different 
and distant from any norm, one could always see becoming as having a 
relation to what is not itself. Becoming-animal, for Deleuze and Guattari, 
is not the becoming of the animal, just as becoming-woman does not pro-
ceed from women as a group (even a group formed for the purposes of 
action alone in some decision of strategic essentialism). Indeed, becom-
ing occurs not as a retrieval of the life, dynamism, or vitality that has 
fallen into reification and substantivism, but as an encounter between 
‘a’ life—always this power of difference—with another. Deleuze and 
Guattari insist that ‘pluralism is monism’ because if there are a thousand 
tiny becomings or awarenesses, there is no transcendental ground or sub-
ject—no life in general, and therefore no one ground that would be sub-
stantially different from the grounded. Deleuze and Guattari’s celebrated 
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monism is of one power of difference expressed multiply and not a single 
life that differs.
Vitalist Aesthetics
In order to make this more explicit I want to contrast two modes of vital-
ism and aesthetics, the first from Ezra Pound and the second from D. H. 
Lawrence. An aesthetics tied to active vitalism privileges impersonality 
(as distance from personae), defamiliarization, and negation. Usually, 
such an aesthetics presents itself as a strictly formalist endeavor. It mat-
ters less what one says in a work of art, than the disjunction one man-
ages to achieve between represented content and the forming power 
that synthesizes materials. In general, then, the modernist techniques 
of fragmentation, disembodied voices, allusion and parataxis preclude a 
subject being presented and instead intimate a power of presentation that 
is never given as such. Consider Ezra Pound’s modernism, which began 
with the presentation of personae as personae, but which developed into 
the epic venture of the Cantos, a work that quoted Western culture from 
Sappho to the present as so much dead, circulating, passively repeated 
and atomized content devoid of animation. Pound’s relatively early 
‘Hugh Selwyn Mauberley’ presents a voice that answers, in a passively 
craven manner, both to the markets of consumption (‘the age demanded 
an image’ ) and to the desire for a synthesis of the past in the present 
(‘the classics in paraphrase!’ ) (Pound 2003, 549-50). Pound began with 
translations of the Chinese poetry of Li Po and fragments of the Western 
poetic tradition before the latter fell into what Pound saw as a weak and 
flabby dependence on the propulsions of rhyme and meter. Often, what 
Pound borrowed, though in another voice, was quoted in such a way as 
to create a disjunction with the present, so that the voice of the past is 
reanimated to speak as if from the point of view Pound himself would 
have sought. So the opening of ‘The Seafarer’ that Pound ‘translated’ from 
early Anglo Saxon presents the distanced singing voice, detached from its 
own culture:
May I for my own self song’s truth reckon, 
Journey’s jargon, how I in harsh days
Hardship endured oft. (236)
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Pound’s use of the past, here in his drawing upon Anglo Saxon sources, 
and elsewhere in his use of Sappho, Greek epic, Dante and even (as in 
‘Hugh Selwyn Mauberly’) earlier phases of his own work, despite its 
seeming passivity enables a mode of active vitalism typical of high mod-
ernism. By taking up already given fragments and voices of the past the 
implied modernist artist is (to quote Joyce after Flaubert), ‘like the God 
of the creation, remain[ing] within or behind or beyond or above his 
handiwork, invisible, refined out of existence, indifferent, paring his fin-
gernails’ ( Joyce 1922, 252). It is because the artist remains indifferent 
that he is never determined by any specific or finite position within the 
world, remaining as pure creation liberated from any of the points of view 
that he adopts. Pound’s use of fragments, personae, translations, voices 
and historical periods—for all its implied absence of authorial interven-
tion—enables a position of pure act or creative force, untainted by the 
substance or finitude of an action or creation. The mode of quotation 
is crucial: the author is at once not speaking, not present, and yet able 
to summon materials that speak about a world in which speaking is no 
longer possible or at least distanced and difficult. The present has been 
rendered so passive as to preclude the possibility of speaking authenti-
cally. One can only repeat the fragments of the past, yet never be at one 
with that lost past. In Pound’s translation of Li Po, the poetic voice is not 
that of Romantic interiority or self-expression, but perception reduced 
to its relation to the world, a simple ‘I’ that is nothing other than its pres-
ent: ‘While my hair was still cut straight across my forehead / I played 
about the front gate, pulling flowers’ (‘River-Merchant’s Wife’ 251). 
In his imagist phase, Pound also tries to present language as an object, 
standing alone, presenting an imaging as such. This ‘making new’ of lan-
guage is directed towards reviving the force and energy of language and 
also—and Pound was explicit about this—reviving the imagination that 
would no longer be enslaved by conventions and ’ easy’ listening, nor by 
bourgeois ‘taste.’ 
Pound’s poetics was one of anti-commodification, where commodi-
fication is counter-vital both in its mass-production of things (rather 
than created works) and in its tendency to produce lulled and passive 
consumption that could only be broken by the difficulty of modernist 
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poetics. This governing intention later led him to criticize his own imag-
ism for producing yet one more fashionable and easily digested vogue:
The age demanded an image
Of its accelerated grimace,
Something for the modern stage,
Not, at any rate, an Attic grace (‘Hugh Selwyn Mauberley’ 549)
Yet, it was his final project, the Cantos, that yielded an aesthetics that 
was far more explicitly vitalist, sexually normative, and fascist. Vitalist: 
through processes of fragmentation, cutting, juxtaposition, parataxis, 
and the insertion of untranslated elements, culture could be presented 
as lacking any already given synthesis, forcing the reader—and culture 
in general—to confront the machinic, atomized, lackluster, and inco-
herent nature of modern life. Sexually normative: not only did Pound 
present figures of a fallen sexuality that were variously diagnosed as 
homosexual, promiscuous, effeminate, and (therefore) infertile, he also 
created a direct association between sexuality and artistic production. 
Modernity suffers from a compulsion towards a restricted economy: in 
its corrupted and fallen mode, life, like art, must be measured through 
capital. What is lost is expenditure that has not determined its productive 
end in advance. At a formal level, this meant that Pound aligned proper 
artistic experimentation with a fertile, productive, and living expenditure 
that would produce ends that were not already determined. At the level 
of content, Pound placed journalists, homosexuals, Jews, and bankers in 
an excremental hell: journalists merely allowed language to circulate for 
profit, rather than generating genuine poetic creation; homosexuals were 
guilty of a same-same sexuality that could know no genuine fertility or 
life; bankers (and, by extension for Pound, Jews) were responsible for the 
institutions of usury which would direct all money into the creation of 
further money, precluding any excessive expenditure that might allow for 
genuine artistic excess:
The stench of wet coal, politicians
… … … e and … . . n, their wrists bound to
 their ankles,
Standing bare bum,
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Faces smeared on their rumps,
 wide eye on flat buttock,
Bush hanging for beard,
 Addressing crowds through their arse-holes,
Addressing the multitudes in the ooze,
 newts, water-slugs, water-maggots,
And with them… … . r,
a scrupulously clean table-napkin
Tucked under his penis,
 and … … … . . m
Who disliked colloquial language,
Stiff-starched, but soiled, collars
circumscribing his legs,
The pimply and hairy skin
pushing over the collar’s edge,
Profiteers drinking blood sweetened with sh-t,
And behind them … … f and the financiers
lashing them with steel wires.
And the betrayers of language
… … n and the press gang
And those who had lied for hire;
the perverts, the perverters of language,
the perverts, who have set money-lust
Before the pleasures of the senses (Pound 1956, 61)
Pound associated proper, fruitful, excessive, and creative spending 
with a pre-modern form of patronage, where art was not yet subjected to 
markets, commodified language, effete styles of pleasure, or the homog-
enizing blandness of democracy.
Finally, Pound’s effort turns fascist: by emphasizing art as a decisive 
break with the circulation and system of production, for the sake of a 
higher, productive, and creative end beyond already actualized life, Pound 
justified a violence of the present for the sake of a future that would 
return life to its proper, active, and expansive creative potential. Indeed, 
it is just in this respect that one might consider fascism to be tied to a 
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certain privilege of becoming. Radically futural, fascism acts for the sake of 
a singularly violent decision and act over the meandering and undirected 
or unfruitful pleasures and affects of the present. Fascism, at least in its 
modernist form, was tied to a horror of static, inert, reifying and lifeless 
infertility of twentieth-century democracy, or—more specifically—a dif-
fuse, inhuman (because animal-like) dispersion of a people who would 
be devoid of decision, self-identity, striving and vigorous assertion. 
Pound’s work is complex, and its tendencies to fascism—to the privi-
lege of the single decision and productive force of the future—cannot be 
unequivocally separated from a revolutionary impulse that would not be 
enslaved to an axiomatic of production and directed force. One needs to 
consider the ways in which an active vitalism of self-constituting life that 
produces itself from itself is distinguished ever so subtly from a passive 
vitalism that enables life to be thought of from divergent, dispersed and 
infinitely divisible points of difference. That is, whereas Pound’s response 
to the horrors of modern democracy—its rendering equivalent of all 
forces, its general tendency towards a reduction of intensity and distinc-
tion to vague uniformity and single quantities—was to assert the life and 
force of art as decision, another passive vitalist potential opened thought 
to vibrations of life and thought beyond act and decision. 
When Deleuze and Guattari consider the tendency of the Body 
Without Organs to develop a cancerous or fascist mode they confront 
two of the major problems of modernist aesthetics and its relation to 
politics. First, the vital productive forces of life cannot be deemed to be 
good in opposition to the evils of undecided, animalistic, machinic and 
squandering forces of death. For this moral opposition between produc-
tive, bounded, formed and self-asserting life and a diffuse and squander-
ing dispersal of forces is a moralism of the organism, where bounded 
living forms are opposed to the dissolution of death. Second, fascism is 
an internal possibility of the vital order, not an accident that befalls an 
otherwise good life from without. Pound’s work is worthy of attention 
precisely because it gathers revolutionary forces that would break with 
bourgeois humanism and normalizing stasis and yet reterritorializes 
those same forces on a normative image of life, life as pure becoming 
that encounters no event other than itself and its own production. If, as 
Pound did, one fragments the syntax that normally allows the reader to 
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pass from one term to another, if one places usually opposed and con-
trasted terms alongside one another without connectives, then the reader 
is forced to compose an order that is not given, or at least confront a dis-
order that would foreground the arbitrariness of any system. Reading is 
not consumption but production. We do not, in everyday and efficient 
language, recognize language and syntax as the connective and normal-
izing systems they are. By removing connectives, we are forced to relive 
order in its ordering. Perhaps not surprisingly Pound will associate the 
passivity of imagery—the lack of vitality in thinking—with the loss of a 
fertile ground of artistic production outside the system of capital. 
By contrast, we can think of the ways Deleuze and Guattari do not 
want to break with capitalism’s tendency to take the movements of 
bodies into inorganic flows and systems, but want to release that move-
ment from capital. Their immanent and passive vitalism would not be a 
return to a force before capitalism and syntax, but a move within capital 
and relations: not a grounding of syntax, relation, and systems on some 
anterior life force or spirit above and beyond systems, but an intuition 
of the powers of relation and proliferation within, between, and among 
bodies. Pound’s reference back to a force that would not be submitted to 
the system of circulation—the references in the Hell section of Cantos 
to Renaissance patronage of excess and a spending without calculation 
of return—reveals a (sexually) normative image of life at the heart of 
active vitalism. Opposed to the fruitful, and expansive relation between 
productive force and a production that can be released into the open, 
Pound’s banker-Jew-journalist-homosexual-necrophiliac closes produc-
tion in upon himself (as redundant language, dead money, or nonactual-
izing flows of putrid bodily fluids):
skin-flakes, repetitions, erosions,
endless rain from the arse-hairs,
as the earth moves, the centre
 passes over all parts in succession,
a continual bum-belch
distributing its productions. (Pound 1956, 65)
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Desire is caught up in itself, bearing no distance from itself. Pound’s 
aesthetics valorized the distances between terms and sounds without 
an overarching unity or reason. The productive excess of terms with-
out subordination to a recognizable, consumable, or syntactical sense 
demands that the reader work in relation to the poem: rather than fol-
low some natural order of sense, he has to reawaken the creation of order 
before the efficient, reified, systematized, and jejune order of commod-
ity production.
Pound’s form of vitalism is anticapitalist in its opposition to a world 
reduced to so much already formed circulating content: art should 
always be other than the ready-made. This entails either taking the ready-
made and presenting it as already formed (through quotation and repeti-
tion out of context and order) or cutting into the ready-made with radi-
cally external, alien, and unreadable matters. As the Cantos proceeds, the 
typeface takes over the voice (with the intrusion of dollar signs, Chinese 
characters, ancient Greek, diacritical marks, numerical calculations); the 
poet, as grand absent artist, is not one whose voice extends itself into 
speech and content, but can only be assumed (after the event) as that 
which would be other than any of the presented fragments. 
We can contrast Pound’s active vitalism with Deleuze and Guattari’s 
notion of the art of the ready-made, which has two features. First, art is 
inhuman. In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari describe a bird’s 
selection of materials for its territory as the beginning of art in the form 
of the ready-made. This is not a process of defamiliarization, or decon-
textualization but a selection of a matter that has a quality or ‘thisness’ 
that allows a body to form a territory, to create relations, and to produce 
a body-world coupling (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 184). Second, the 
ready-made does not refer back to the gesture or selection of an absent 
artist, for there is no self who selects; from selection and relations, 
or the encounter of forces, something like a body or milieu is formed. 
This is art as the house or dwelling, a certain detachment or ‘standing 
alone’ of matters.
The passivity of Deleuze and Guattari’s vitalism has been associated 
(often critically and negatively) with capitalism. If Pound’s vitalism (and 
active vitalism more generally) always threatens to fall into a mode of 
fascism in its elevation of a decision or force outside social circulation, 
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Deleuze and Guattari are wary of the microfascisms and the ‘cancerous 
Body without Organs’ that would follow from an insufficiently rigorous 
political movement of deterrirorialization. That is, if the taking up of 
movements, potentialities, and forces from within capitalism liberates 
itself from the capitalist axiomatic only to proliferate by turning back in 
upon the self—the affirmation of one’s own especially queer becoming, 
or the simple affirmation of becoming as such, liberated from all rela-
tions—then one has left the grand system of capital without creating a 
positive line of flight. Queerness defined negatively—as other than any 
given syntax or system, or as the negation of the ready-made—would be 
insufficiently vital, if one takes vitalism in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense 
as the creation of ‘a’ body without organs. The imperative is, then, not a 
return, retrieval, or revitalization of the already existing synthetic force 
that has become alienated or reified: vitality occurs with a line of flight, a 
becoming, or an event that is not the expression or extension of an already 
existing force but the outcome of a genuine and positive encounter.
Here we can link Leibniz’s passive vitalism to Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept of becoming-animal. For Leibniz, the body’s being or individu-
ation is not a consequence of it being synthesized or recognized as this 
determined being; what something is is not defined by the way in which 
it is recognized, nor by the way in which the being affirms itself. A being 
is not the being it is because it is recognized as this or that type. A being 
is individuated by all the relations it bears to other relations; a monad is 
absolutely unique in its occupation of a point in time and space, as well as 
the way it perceives and is affected by all the other relations and affections 
of time and space. Identity does not refer back to a subject who is per-
ceived only through the world it constitutes. On the contrary, Leibniz’s 
world is composed of affections, which expand inward infinitely. A body 
is its susceptibility to relations, and ‘I’ am nothing other than the percep-
tions, events, encounters, and vibrations that produce a certain feeling of 
oneself or ‘self-enjoyment.’ For Deleuze, following Leibniz, it is possible 
to intuit the singularity and difference of the tiny souls of which we are 
composed, which surround us, and which constitute our individuation: I 
am those souls I feel as my own (so that we can say that the soul that feels 
the other souls—the mind that contemplates—exists at a different level) 
while the feeling I have of the souls that compose me enter into relation 
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with souls from without. I can feel hunger, fatigue, confusion—all work-
ing divergently: I am tired, but need to eat, but puzzled as to whether eat-
ing will stop me from sleeping; my body is composed of these souls that 
I can observe, but that can be observed in turn. All this confusion, fatigue 
and hunger is felt by the body next to me, whose sadness I can only dimly 
feel so caught am I in my own contemplations. And yet, I can feel anoth-
er’s sadness as their sadness, affecting me in my own being, while not per-
ceiving their world and their duration. One does not become ‘oneself ’ 
by living as this or that normative being imposed from without but from 
which one always differs. Identity is not difference from, nor a negative 
becoming in which one destabilizes or subverts a given norm. Rather, 
identity is distinct but unclear; each being is distinctly individuated by 
being composed of only its own encounters and affections, and yet one 
feels certain of those affections clearly (my own sadness) and others 
dimly (your sadness).
This, in turn, has consequences for the politics of images and its prob-
lems. It is not a question of either creating images that would be less 
stringent in their production of norms, or of producing an active, criti-
cal, and negative relation to images. On the contrary, micropolitics and 
schizoanalysis regard any image as ensouled, composed of thousands 
of affections. Every normative image—such as the ‘mommy-daddy-me’ 
of Anti-Oedipus—is not imposed upon an otherwise radically open or 
undifferentiated life in general. The image does not impose difference on 
disorder, but covers over distinction with generality. The Oedipal ‘daddy’ 
is made up of racial, historical, sexual, and political desires. And it is here 
we can discern another mode of passive vitalism, one in which forces 
not of the subject are not taken up and reactivated, but contemplated in 
their power to destroy subjective syntheses and coherent, as opposed to 
articulated, identity. We recognize the force of the Oedipal triangle—
still, today, with repeated emphases on family values. Rather than negate 
the image we open up its souls and contemplations—how the figure of 
the good work-at-home mother is possible because of a series of mid-
twentieth-century technologies creating the modern household, and 
because of civil rights battles granting women identity and one universal 
gender regardless of race. The twenty-first century television series Mad 
Men at once presents perfectly Oedipalized individuals, but does not 
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posit some rebellious ‘becoming’ against the images of familial life but 
instead displays life as a war of images, as a field in which bodies create 
and are created by perceptions of other bodies. Such twenty-first century 
works would seem to be post- or counter-modern in their refusal of the 
grand gesture of modernist refusal. Art is not the distanced negation and 
fragmentation of images but the proliferation of images, showing that 
social fields are not stereotyped or negated by mass-produced images, 
but emerge from images. There is not a self above and beyond the fixity 
of the image, for the self is a thousand tiny images. But there is one way 
in which Mad Men continues a modernism of passive vitalism, in which 
the image industry is not countered by a more active and willing life, but 
opens out onto more and more images. Of course, one way of reading 
Mad Men is to see gender and sexuality as performed; the series would 
denaturalize the Oedipal family and capitalist individual by demonstrat-
ing all the ways in which the self does not have an identity prior to perfor-
mance. The central character—Don Draper—takes on his proper name 
and identity after being mistaken for another individual during the war, 
and he goes on to live his life as Draper by performing the role of father, 
husband and wage-earner. But the series’ setting of advertising agencies 
and the emergent tele-visual culture marks a subtle difference: selves do 
not occur through subjection to images from which they posit them-
selves as having been. Selves are warring images: the battle on the televi-
sion screen to establish a brand or mark as desired is coupled with selves 
as images at war, including the war between older models of familial gen-
der, and emergent images of gender as allure, as resistance, as becoming. 
Advertising deploys the images of freedom, choice, self-fashioning and 
unique identity in order to create territories of viewers. This way of read-
ing contemporary image production allows us to look back at modern-
ism and read its texts in terms of passive vitalism: selves are relations to 
images, perceptions, and temporal intervals between desire and desired, 
and this would be different from performativity, where the self is always 
at odds with the various voices and roles that she takes up.
D.H. Lawrence’s prose, often criticized for privatizing or mystifying 
class politics by presenting social relations in terms of sexuality, can be 
seen as the creation of just such a sociopolitical field. The Oedipal tri-
angle, in Sons and Lovers for example, opens out onto a social field. The 
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mother turns her affections to the son precisely because she is disen-
chanted with the limited education, worn spirit, alcoholism, and resent-
ment of her miner husband. The son, in turn, perceives other women 
through the figure of his mother, but again in a broadly political field: 
the cramped and restricted world of his first lover, Miriam, emerges from 
a desperately declining rural mining milieu, where marriage is the only 
form of possible social expansion (and where the son sees his mother as 
similarly folded into a field of historical, social, and class restrictions); the 
more educated and expansive world of the son’s other lover, Clara, is tied 
to a bourgeois marriage market. But Lawrence is more than a sociologi-
cal writer who ties the personal and sexual to the political; he also trans-
forms the very style and syntax of literary point of view to create a mode 
of perception that is neither sexual (in some private and personal psy-
chological sense) nor political (where self-sufficient bodies relate to each 
other in some community or polis). 
Similarly, in Lawrence’s poem ‘Snake,’ the observing voice is all too 
human, feeling himself invaded or overtaken by desires to destroy or 
master the animal; but alongside the affects of the human, there are also 
counter-affects that allow the snake to be viewed as noble, stately, more 
alive than the body of speech and reason. The poem presents a composi-
tion of competing perceiving selves in the one speaking body; this frac-
ture is not a negation of the self, but its expansion. Directly thematizing 
the relation between human and animal, ‘Snake’ relies not on the frag-
mented and juxtaposed quotations and allusions of Pound’s modernism, 
but on an encounter between two temporalities or durations expressed at 
the level of form and content. 
If active vitalism presents a field of parataxis that must presuppose 
some absent cause that, as Deleuze and Guattari observe, ‘acts but is 
not’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 213), Lawrence maintains an ‘I’ view-
point that is a localization of received impressions and affects. But the ‘I’ 
is not only contrasted in terms of content with the snake, it also yields 
to stylistic poetic variations. According to Deleuze and Guattari, we can 
distinguish between form of content and form of expression. Not only 
does this allow us to think about the relations of bodies and the relations 
of language; it also gives Deleuze and Guattari a way of describing the 
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‘higher deterritorialization,’ which occurs when a work of art renders the 
relation between form of content and form of expression undecidable.
Lawrence’s poem begins with propositions that describe the snake as a 
subject completing actions: ‘A snake came to my water-trough.’ The snake 
is contrasted with the I as observing subject: ‘I came down the steps with 
my pitcher / And must wait, must stand and wait, for there he was at the 
trough before me’ (217). The ‘before me’ that concludes that lengthy line 
of verse (a line that itself ‘waits’) gives two senses to ‘before.’ The snake is 
‘before me’ temporally: its presence imposes a sense of another duration. 
The snake is also ‘before’ the ‘I’ spatially. We are given a spatial proximity 
of two bodies, with an intense temporal distance. The snake is described 
with adverbs and adverbial phrases: ‘softly,’ ‘silently,’ ‘vaguely,’ ‘dreamily,’ 
‘slowly.’ The ‘And’ that frequently begins the poem’s lines ties the form of 
expression to the form of content. Because the observing ‘I’ increasingly 
finds himself captivated by the snake’s movement, desire, duration, and 
milieu, his waiting is expressed not in a syntax of subordinate clauses and 
consequences, but simple connectives: ‘And I like a second comer, wait-
ing.’ Giving us a ‘second coming’ of the ‘I’ that is radically counter-mes-
sianic (for the second coming here is one of being late, redundant and 
without revelation), the poem begins to open up the field of the human: 
to be this highest point of evolution, progress, and rational develop-
ment is to come second, to be without any existential priority; it is to be 
belated. Thus, instead of regarding the human—with its expansive point 
of view, instrumental command of nature, and subjective self-awareness 
as a point of culmination towards which life is directed—‘Snake’ moves 
in the opposite direction. The snake is ‘one of the lords / Of life’ (219) 
whose earth is ‘secret’ (218); the animal opens onto a time and sense well 
beyond the ‘I.’ The poem describes a waiting where the ‘I’ arrives at ‘my’ 
water trough, only to be dispossessed by an intrusion which is perceived 
in a double sense. On the one hand, the human milieu regards this animal 
as an interfering body to be eliminated. Education, action (described as 
‘paltry’ [219]), human voices (that are ‘pett[y]’ [219]), myth, and even 
masculinity pull the ‘I’ towards command and destruction: ‘And voices 
in me said, If you were a man / You would take a stick and break him 
now, and finish him off ’ (218). At the same time, and on the other hand, 
another aspect of the ‘I’ is drawn away from itself towards a fascination 
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with or perception of, not the self-awareness and active mastery of the 
human, but the snake’s divinity that lies in a not seeing, in a godliness of 
being ‘adream’:
He drank enough
And lifted his head, dreamily, as one who has drunken,
And flickered his tongue like a forked night on the air, so black,
Seeming to lick his lips,
And looked around like a god, unseeing, into the air,
And slowly turned his head,
And slowly, very slowly, as if thrice adream,
Proceeded to draw his slow length curving round
And climb again the broken bank of my wall-face. 
And as he put his head into that dreadful hole,
And as he slowly drew up, snake-easing his shoulders, and 
entered farther, 
A sort of horror, a sort of protest against his withdrawing into that 
horrid black hole,
Deliberately going into the blackness, and slowly drawing himself after,
Overcame me now his back was turned. (218-19)
It is the snake who becomes one of the ‘lords / Of life,’ who is ‘like a 
king, / Like a king in exile, uncrowned in the underworld.’ The descrip-
tion of the snake as ‘like’ a king, or as one who ‘seemed’ like a king, 
draws attention to the event of encounter as perception: another dura-
tion appears, yet remains—like the snake writhing back into the earth—
always hidden, secret. At the level of form of content, the poem takes two 
bodies—snake and human—with the snake presenting itself as secret, 
hidden, unselfconscious, and vital precisely because of its radical passiv-
ity, its distinction from the ‘I’ viewpoint’s ‘horror’ at that which cannot be 
brought beneath its own command. At the level of form of expression, the 
poem oscillates between a poetic voice of a reflective ‘I’ that recognizes 
itself as a fragment of a history and humanity of domination—‘I despised 
myself and the voices of my accursed human education’—and another 
that in its fascination can follow movements, allowing an affect (‘horror’) 
to become the grammatical subject:
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A sort of horror, a sort of protest against his withdrawing into that 
horrid black hole,
Deliberately going into the blackness, and slowly drawing himself after,
Overcame me now his back was turned. (219)
Both at the level of expression, where the grammatical ‘I’ recognizes its 
own limits precisely insofar as it is self-aware and human, and at the level 
of content, where the poem describes the encounter between the time of 
human history, burdened with myth and education, and the duration of a 
snake that forces us to wait, Lawrence’s poem expresses a passive vitalism 
that is also positively queer. It is not the critical negation of man but the 
intuition of other durations that can open up a genuine event of encoun-
ter. (Queerness is neither the anti-normative, simply different from the 
dominant, nor is queerness the reiteration of the norm to achieve desta-
bilization: queerness occurs in the encounter between two disjunct tem-
poralities.) This is neither an event of recognition, nor of defamiliariza-
tion. The inhuman, or the powers of time and movement that do not 
serve recognition and command, are expressed here as a certain capacity 
to live the earth not as one’s own. The snake’s earth is a ‘dark secret’: not 
a matter or ground that we synthesize in order to recognize ourselves as 
subjects of truth, nor is it a milieu or world that is given in terms of some 
meaningful horizon of projects. The ‘I’ finds itself to be a second coming 
in a negative sense, as one who can only perceive from afar what it might 
be to live without a commanding and educated past, without the impera-
tives of recognition: how might one live if one could free oneself from the 
conditional: ‘If you were a man’? Such a question is answered positively 
by a perception of the animal as another style of perception and duration 
and one of the lords of life in its liberation from mastery. 
Notes
1.  When Giorgio Agamben writes of the need to ‘return thought to its practical 
calling’ as part of the project to retrieve the political, he at once betrays the 
thoroughly proper notion of politics as emerging from creative action; at 
the same time he also laments a present in which the becoming of politics 
through speech and praxis becomes attenuated in managerial systems of 
biopolitics that will regard life as being nothing more than mere matter for 
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political proceduralism. Agamben’s (1993) ‘coming community,’ which would 
break with present states of bureaucratic management, retrieves the active 
praxis of becoming and potentiality that had always been (rightly, he argues) 
foregrounded in premodern political theories, but that have been occluded 
with the modern attention to mere life; such potentiality, he continues in 
Homo Sacer, might (finally) be freed from all taints of becoming oriented to 
some proper actuality, some orienting end.
2.  In his Ethics, Alain Badiou contrasts the act of the subject over culturally 
relativist claims to identity. Badiou is highly critical of a world in which 
‘ethics,’ rather than affirming the capacity of subjects to seize events that are 
not already calculated within modern procedures, appears to do nothing 
more than save human beings from becoming victims. While he presents 
his work as at once a radical break with metaphysical affirmations of an 
ultimate ground or ‘One,’ he also ties his thought to what he deems to be 
a philosophical tradition of truth and universalism, which can neither be 
reduced to facts, nor decided once and for all, nor located in any domain other 
than that of the act. Whatever else it is, ethics cannot be that which follows 
from nature: from Plato to Kant and Badiou, the good is not an object from 
which action follows. Rather action can be ethical only if it decides the good 
from itself.
3.  One of the ways in which modern art has been defined and celebrated has 
been in its radicalization, renewal, or destruction of convention; but this 
‘making new’ is linked closely with ethical and political celebrations of 
difference and becoming. If scientific and technological procedures reduce 
the world to so many already quantified, lifeless, circulating, and mechanistic 
units, it is the task of art to reawaken the subject to the world not as so much 
mere matter but as that which is given to the subject through syntheses that 
art will reanimate. According to a lazy received reading of Plato’s expulsion 
of the poets from the republic, the philosopher rejects the secondary and 
mimetic qualities of art in favour of the originary ideas of reason; even here, 
though, there is a privilege of all the features that will mark art and the 
aesthetic. It is art, in its proper mode, that yields form in its original, creative 
mode of becoming; it is scientific language that is passively received and 
manipulated for efficiency. The valorization of art as the active bringing into 
being of form goes back at least as far as Plato, for it is the sophists who merely 
manipulate terms in contrast to Socrates, who will form himself as an active 
character through dialogue (see Nehamas). When art is devalued—as that 
which is passively received—it is always in favor of an art of active creation, 
dialogue, and becoming.
Chapter 5
Queer Vitalism
This essay is about vitalism and the apparent ethical urgency of returning 
to the problem of life. This urgency of the turn to life, I will argue, far from 
being a recent, radical and necessarily transgressive gesture, has always 
underpinned (and presupposed) highly normative gestures in philoso-
phy, literature and cultural understanding. Indeed, the very notion and 
possibility of the normative, or the idea that one can proceed from what 
is (life) to what ought to be (ways of living) has always taken the form of 
vitalism. For the purposes of this essay, then, I will define vitalism as the 
imperative of grounding, defending or deriving principles and systems 
from life as it really is. (This is why many posthuman or anti-biopolitical 
models can be vitalist: it is life beyond humans, or life beyond the bour-
geois subject of production, that is often appealed to in order to open a 
new horizon.) From this it follows that there will be two forms of vital-
ism, for there are two ways of understanding this notion of ‘life as it really 
is.’ For the most part ‘life as it really is’ is defined through actual life: here, 
vitalism begins from living bodies (usually human, usually heterosexual, 
usually familial) and then asks what it means to live well. We could refer 
to this, following Deleuze and Guattari, as an active vitalism because it 
assumes that ‘life’ refers to acting and well-organized bodies. However, 
there is another way of understanding ‘life as it really is,’ and this is to 
align the real with the virtual. For Deleuze and Guattari this leads to a 
passive vitalism, where ‘life’ is a pre-individual plane of forces that does 
not act by a process of decision and self-maintenance but through chance 
encounters. 
By understanding life as virtual we no longer begin with the image 
of a living body, and are therefore able to consider forces of composi-
tion that differ from those of man and the productive organism. Those 
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queer theories that account for the self as it is formed in the social unit 
of the family (with the self taking on either male or female norms) fail to 
account for the emergence of the self and the genesis of the family; in so 
doing they remain at the level of the actual and of active human agents. 
Passive vitalism is queer, by contrast, in its difference and distance from 
already constituted images of life as necessarily fruitful, generative, orga-
nized and human. It is not just different or distortive of those images, but 
comprises a power of imaging that is not oriented to the eye of recogni-
tion, the eye that views the world according to its own already organized 
desires. For this reason such a vitalism would also have implications for 
aesthetics, especially if aesthetics is understood as a consideration of sen-
sations. Indeed, it would reverse the relation between perceiving body 
and synthesized sensations. On an active vitalist account the subject 
synthesizes a world according to its own point of view, and then is able 
to reflect upon that synthesizing activity when artworks draw attention 
back to the world-forming power. A passive vitalism would be queer in 
its transformation of how we understand the work of art, perhaps less 
as work—as that which would expose the subject’s formative capaci-
ties—and more as monument. On a passive vitalist account there would 
be qualities or powers to be sensed from which something lie a body that 
senses would emerge, a body being formed through the sensual forces 
it encounters.
For Kant, the work of art is to be judged only in its capacity to enliven 
the subject’s capacity to give order and synthesis to the world. Beauty is 
the experience of intuited material as perfectly harmonious with the sub-
ject’s conceptualizing or forming powers, while the sublime refers to an 
experience that allows the subject to feel its own striving for form and 
order. The work of art returns us to the subjective and constituting power 
from which the lived world unfolds. This emphasis on art as disclosing 
the active power that originally forms the world as this meaningful world 
for ‘us’ is maintained in all forms of post-Kantian aesthetics that take us 
back to the structure, language or matrix that gives sense to ‘our’ world. 
This would include queer theories of performance or defamiliarization 
that seek to present the performance of gender as performance, allowing 
the active body to appear as that which becomes through its own self-
forming actions.
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(At Least) Two Vitalisms, Two Histories, Two Philosophies
In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari argue for a tradition of pas-
sive vitalism (beginning with Leibniz and extending to Ruyer) which 
counters the dominant tradition of vitalism, which runs from Kant to 
Claude Bernard: 
Vitalism has always had two possible interpretations: that of 
an idea that acts, but is not—that acts therefore only from the 
point of view of an external cerebral knowledge ... or that of a 
force that is but does not act—that is therefore a pure inter-
nal awareness ... If the second interpretation seems to us to 
be imperative it is because the contraction that preserves is 
always in a state of detachment in relation to action or even 
to movement and appears as a pure contemplation without 
knowledge. (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 213)
Before looking in detail at what the aesthetics of such a passive vital-
ism might be, and how such an aesthetic might open a way of thinking 
beyond modernist norms of art, we would do well to define the domi-
nant vitalism mentioned in the above quotation that ‘acts but is not.’ 
Deleuze and Guattari suggest that this vitalism begins with Kant. This 
would already make it different from the vitalism or normative figuration 
of life that has always been Western philosophy’s spontaneous gesture. 
We can discern a vitalist normativity in the very ethic of philosophy’s def-
inition of itself against sophistry, dogma and opinion. Philosophy refuses 
to accept the ready-made and received judgments of gossip and chatter 
and instead strives to legitimate truth by tracing its genesis, whether that 
be from Platonic ideas clearly intuited, categories of universal reason, or 
by reflecting upon the subjectively constituted structure of the world. If 
language circulates without justification, or is repeated without an ani-
mating and intuiting intent that would ground what is said in an ongo-
ing and truth-oriented experience, then language falls into an automatic, 
inhuman and merely technical repetition. The doctrine of Platonic Ideas 
is, after all, an ethical and political maneuver that would aim to ground 
assertions, identities and claims in an originating and animating force: 
the Idea which grants each being its proper form allows us to decide 
what any being is, and the ways in which it ought to become, according 
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to its preceding and governing essence.1 Not surprisingly, Neo-Platonism 
will render the vitalist potential in Platonic ideas more explicit. Neo-
Platonism regards every being in this world as an emanation of the One, 
and in so doing neither detaches a world of matter from a divine tran-
scendence, nor denies any being a full participation in holiness. In con-
trast with a strict Platonism, Neo-Platonism tends to suggest that the 
One is not above and beyond its emanations, but is given only through 
each of its expressions. Thus vitalism in its most general sense would be a 
commitment to the animation or spirituality of everything that lives, and 
would be contrasted both with forms of atomist materialism that reduced 
matter to that which operates only through mechanical and external rela-
tions rather than its own immanent force, and with Cartesianism, which 
separates mind from body, regarding the latter as devoid of any inner life.
Both of these modes of vitalism—an anti-atomism and an anti-Car-
tesianism—were prevalent in the seventeenth century, and could often 
take on a quite revolutionary strain (Rogers 1996). Rather than seeing 
order as necessarily imposed from above on an otherwise chaotic and 
unruly world, vitalism granted each aspect of the world its own striving 
potential directed to order and relations. Against Cartesianism and the 
disenchantment of the world, modern vitalism drew on Neo-Platonism 
to argue for each being’s tendency towards the expression and fulfill-
ment of the divine. It is possibly requisite to correct, then, one notion 
which dominates the history of ideas: that modernity is governed by a 
Cartesianism which places mind and matter as distinct worldly sub-
stances, seeing matter as operating mechanically and mind as being a 
power to represent and organize the relations of the rationalized mat-
ter. Instead, there is an (at least) equally prevalent continuation of an 
emphasis on the world’s immanent spirit, its striving towards the good, 
and the contribution of every living being in its difference and specificity 
towards the efflorescence of the whole. It is this expressivist tradition that 
Deleuze draws upon throughout his diverse corpus in his references to 
Leibniz and Spinoza. However, Leibniz and Spinoza stress a univocity—
or one life—that expresses itself in both mind and body, rejecting any 
Cartesian substance that would be simply, distinctly or merely mechani-
cal. For that expressivist tradition the world of distinct and separate enti-
ties flows from the one expressive life which becomes what it is only in 
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its production of diverse and emanating bodies, all of which have their 
origin or true being only as expressions of a prior animating One. For 
Deleuze, though, this ultimately expressive virtual life does not provide 
a grounding unity, substrate or single substance but a power for differ-
entiation. It is Nietzsche, according to Deleuze, who will radicalize the 
expressivism and univocity opened by Spinoza and Leibniz. The latter 
philosophers refused to posit any substantial distinction between ema-
nating life and its dazzling array of expressions, but it was Nietzsche who 
regarded the emanating life as a plane of forces effecting itself through 
styles and dramas.
We can make a first note towards the distinct contribution of Leibniz’s 
passive vitalism in contrast with the general doctrine of Platonic and 
Neo-Platonic emanation. Leibniz, like Deleuze after him, will not posit 
two distinct substances. For Leibniz, the reasoning, perceptive and ‘sing-
ing’ monad is what it is only in the passions, affections, and perceptions 
that it expresses. Reason, mind or spirit are not the same as matter, but 
the relations of material bodies are like the ground bass upon which 
each monad unfolds its own melody, each of which contributes to the 
overall harmonious symphony of the world. The world I perceive is the 
same world that you perceive, but our different perceptions unfold a dif-
ferent line of the infinite, each perception having its own zone of clarity. 
Whereas Neo-Platonic emanation posits each individual being as deriv-
ing from and expressing a One, Deleuze (like Leibniz) refuses to posit a 
unity that would be other than each perceiving and affected point of view; 
the world is just this multiplicity of viewpoints, each of which composes 
a truth of a whole that is nothing other than this expressive multiplicity. 
To refer to Deleuze as a Platonist in a de-realizing or unworldly sense—
as a philosopher who wishes to overcome the gritty actuality of this 
world in favour of some mystical unity (Badiou 2000)—is to fail to take 
into account what I will refer to as the queer nature of Deleuze’s vitalism. 
Every body in this world is possible as an individual because it gives some 
form and specificity in time and space to a potential that always threatens 
to destabilize or de-actualize its being. This is what Deleuze refers to as 
real conditions of existence and allows us to think of his philosophy as 
offering a positive sense of queer being, or what Deleuze also refers to 
as ‘?being’ (Deleuze 1994). That is, in addition to the actual bodies that 
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populate this world in time and space there is also the virtual plane that is 
thoroughly real and that is infinitely different; it exists in each body as its 
potential for variation, a potential that is actualized (but not exhausted) 
not by the decisions that body makes but by the encounters it undergoes.
In concrete terms, to see what difference this might make for thinking 
about this world, we might begin by thinking of gender. Active vitalism, 
at least in the form that Deleuze and Guattari trace back to Kant, regards 
all concepts and categories as originally imposed by the subject upon an 
otherwise meaningless life. Active vitalism might regard gender as one of 
the ways in which life or the social ‘constructs’ categories that differenti-
ate an otherwise general or undifferentiated humanity: the criticism of 
stereotypes (as clichés or rigid forms imposed upon life) would lead to 
an overthrow of rigid categories in favor of what we really are (as unique 
individuals) or would expose that there are no such things as individuals, 
only effects of gender as it is represented or performed. Genders and kinds 
are known in the vague and general opposition between male and female, 
distinctions that are imposed upon life and that need to be reactivated 
by being traced back to their social and familial origins. By contrast, for 
Deleuze and Guattari’s passive vitalism, genders, kinds and stereotypes 
are not categories imposed upon life that might be overcome or criticized 
in the name of a universal and self-aware humanity; instead, it is life as a 
multiple and differentiating field of powers that expresses itself in various 
manners. Differentiation is not a false distinction imposed on an other-
wise universal humanity. On the contrary, every female is an individuated 
actualization of a genetic potential for sexual differentiation, and every 
aspect of that female body—ranging from chromosomal and hormonal 
composition to the stylization of dress and comportment—is one highly 
individuated way of actualizing a potentiality. Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept of ‘becoming-woman’ could be read as a residual humanism in 
their work, as their attempt to keep some form of sexual identity in an 
otherwise posthuman corpus: but if they say that ‘becoming-woman’ is 
the key to all becomings, and is a ‘key’ insofar as it opens out towards 
becoming-imperceptible, then this indicates that gender is a difference 
that needs to be more rather than less differentiated, moving towards 
a ‘thousand tiny sexes’ (Grosz 1993). Every woman is an actualization 
of a potentiality to be female, while the difference between straight and 
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gay gives further specification or distinction, and this would continue on 
and on to the smallest of differences, marking out not only each body, 
but also all the events, souls and affections within bodies. There is, then, 
no opposition between sexual difference and queerness. And it is not the 
case that one would see a contradiction between affirming sexual differ-
ence, and also acknowledging that difference goes well beyond its human 
form. (Elizabeth Grosz’s position is perhaps the clearest form of this, at 
first puzzling, account of difference: it is at one and the same time legiti-
mate to affirm the distinction of two sexes, and to argue for a sexual dif-
ference beyond humans and beyond binaries [Grosz 2011]). It is not the 
case that causes, such as feminism that would aim to affirm the possibility 
of women’s becoming would—as gender differentiated—be opposed to 
movements of queerness that would strive to liberate bodies from gen-
der norms. The key to Deleuze’s passive vitalism and the aesthetics that 
it mobilizes lies in thinking difference beyond the kinds and generaliza-
tions of a politics of active vitalism. Whereas active vitalism would seek 
to return political processes to the will, intent and agency of individuals 
or subjects, passive vitalism is micro-political: it attends to those differ-
ences that we neither intend, nor perceive, nor command.
Again, to return to a seeming tension between queer politics and gen-
der politics, we might consider movements of trans-sexualism, cross-
dressing and the politics of sexualities. On an active vitalist model the 
very identification of oneself as, say, ‘woman’ or ‘queer’ would be inter-
nally contradictory (even if politically radical or strategic). In order to 
achieve political recognition I must at once be recognized as this or that 
being participating in some movement of identifiable collective will, but 
I must also realize that the demand for recognition by way of the nor-
mative matrix compromises my claim as a subject. The vital, on this 
model, is the spirit or subjective act that is always belied or compromised 
by actuality. It follows, then, that there would be a conflict between the 
vitality of political claims and the intrinsic compromise of political actu-
ality. It also follows that those selves who would embrace certain kinds 
or distinctions—men who want to be regarded as naturally homosexual, 
women who want to be recognized as masculine, and bodies who regard 
their individuation as possible only outside or beyond gay, lesbian or 
gendered kinds—would have competing and exclusive political agendas. 
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What is presupposed is a distinction between the active enunciating self 
of politics—the active subject whose claims must be heard in opposition 
to normativity—and the enunciated or represented individual defined 
by sex, gender, sexuality or other terms such as race, ethnicity or belief. 
Such an opposition is captured in what Gayatri Spivak refers to as strate-
gic essentialism: on the one hand we acknowledge that politics requires 
kinds or essences, but we also see such terms as the effect of strategies, or 
activist decisions made for the sake of political efficacy. Such a term cre-
ates an ongoing problem and contradiction for any political movement 
that undertakes an overthrow or revolution in terms of transgression, for 
acting in the name of a subordinated term must begin from the already 
determined and subordinated field of positions. Catherine Malabou has 
recently stated this problem in the following form: ‘the feminine’ pro-
vides a thought of difference beyond the simple generalizing logic of man 
and generic humanity, and yet—because of this—one would not want to 
align ‘the feminine’ exclusively or exhaustively to actual biological women 
(Malabou 2009). But what if there were a virtual and fully real feminin-
ity that expressed or actualized itself in woman, and that accounted for 
the biological and actual difference between men and women, but was 
not exhausted by that binary, allowing all the mutations, variations, dif-
ferences and becomings among (and beyond) women? The thought of 
passive vitalism, or a vitality that exceeds bodies and their actions means 
that we can at once recognize difference among the actual entities of this 
world, acknowledging that these terms organize a broader potentiality 
that could also positively have yielded a different (but not just any) plane.
The same problems and tensions apply to the tired dialectic between 
philosophies of rights on the one hand, and multicultural and racial polit-
ical claims of difference on the other. That is: there are those who would 
defend a ‘subject,’ universalism or radicalism opposed to all constituted 
identities (and would therefore reject any multiculturalisms or relativism 
that merely allowed competing bodies to exist alongside each other). At 
the same time there are those who oppose any such appeal to the subject, 
philosophy or critique as such insisting that one only knows the subject 
as this or that specified, individuated and socially determined form. In 
the first mode of critique that opposes actualized terms to the subject’s 
constituting decision we could place Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, 
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both of whom insist that there is no intuitable domain of life in itself, for 
being is just that void that is given only in its disappearance. But for every 
insistence on the subject as an absent power (known ex post facto) that 
must be inferred as that which gives birth to the decision there are also 
a range of political debunkers who regard such appeals to an originating 
act as one more ideological obfuscation or mysticism: all we have is an 
actual political field of determined bodies, always already given in terms 
of race, sex and gender. It is no surprise, perhaps, that today a series of 
‘philosophers’ berate the ways in which multiculturalism (or the claim 
for difference) precludes an ethics of decision and the subject. For Alain 
Badiou subject events occur not through processes of inclusion and the 
allowance of any lifestyle whatever, but through acts that decide—with 
no prior justification in actuality—that a new situation has occurred; 
subjects are nothing other than such decisions (Badiou 2001). The entire 
possibility of ethics is not grounded on life and actuality, but on a subjec-
tive decision or break. Badiou’s ethics of the subject is ostensibly an anti-
vitalism, insistently opposed to the grounding of political claims on some 
already existing actualization of being or life. But it is just the vibrancy of 
the subject’s difference from the world as already actualized, the radical 
distinction of the subject as negation of an already lived order that places 
Badiou in stark contrast both with the undifferentiated and generalizing 
inclusiveness of a weak multiculturalism that would seemingly appeal to 
differences among individuals, and the passive vitalism of Deleuze and 
Guattari who would regard the subject of identity politics and activism as 
not yet fully individuated. Far from seeing the subjective event as occur-
ring in a break with the world of differences, as Badiou would do, and in 
a manner that is quite distinct from regarding the profusion of different 
cultures and bodies as the very force of life, Deleuze and Guattari put for-
ward a vitalism that is neither that of the decision nor of the differenti-
ated body. Their vitalism is passive in its attention to the barely discerned, 
confused and queer differences that compose bodies.
Deleuze and Guattari’s insistence that there is an active vitalism that 
one can discern in Kant alerts us to a long-running privileging of the deci-
sion and the re-awakening of the subjective act in the face of a fall into 
everyday normality and normalization. Active vitalism strives to over-
come the imposed norms that reduce an individual’s autonomy, but also 
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takes into account the vitality of traditions, cultures and practices that 
constitute bodies as individuals and agents in the first place; and form 
of theory that operates as a constructivism—whether it is art, language, 
society or culture (or Kant’s categories) that gives form to the world has 
the same problems as active vitalism. Life, for any form of active vitalism, 
is equivocal: there is the forming power on one hand, and that which is 
formed on the other. Because of this equivocity we are granted an imme-
diate ethics or moralism: that which is formed ought not overtake the 
properly forming power; we should resist any passifying captivation or 
enslavement to what is not ourselves, and if we do grant life and worth 
to what is not ourselves (others, animals, ecology) it is only to the extent 
that these ‘others’ are granted the same vivifying power. A passive vital-
ism, by contrast, is one of re-singularization or counter-actualization: 
every differentiated political claim, whether that be in the name of the 
human, a sexualized or gendered individual, or a racial minority may 
begin with a molar politics, but has the potential to become minoritar-
ian, and it is this potentiality of queering that is ‘properly’ vital. This is to 
say that the ‘property’ that marks queer vitality is an impropriety; what 
something is resides in its magnitude of deviation. We might say that 
becoming-woman is a queer predicate because it would be the capac-
ity of what counts as ‘woman’ to enter into variation: it makes sense to 
have a category such as ‘becoming-woman’ because in addition to all the 
actual instances of women, one can imagine more and more difference 
and mutation. Marilyn Monroe was a successful icon, not because there 
could be Marilyn Monroe impersonators but because there could be a 
Madonna or a Lady Ga Ga (who repeated the Marilyn-effect, the power 
to make a difference in a style of becoming).
Individuation
Both vitality and queerness are crucial to Deleuze’s philosophy of indi-
viduation. First, vitality: a body is identifiable or individuated not 
because it takes the undifferentiated potentiality of life and then subjects 
itself to a norm. It is not the case, as Judith Butler would have it, that in 
the beginning is a radically undifferentiated becoming that can become 
an autonomous being only by being recognized as this or that generality 
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in some social matrix (Butler 2005). Butler’s notion of the performative 
self is directly opposed to a simple active vitalism: there is no ground-
ing and pre-social ‘sex’ which is then represented in language or significa-
tion. There is no subject or proper self who then acts and speaks; instead, 
in the beginning is the act or performance from which we conclude or 
posit that there must have been a pre-linguistic subject. Sex, then, is not 
some materiality or ground that issues in or is belied by gender; for it 
is only through gender that we can conclude that there must have been 
some instituting act. Further, and more importantly for Butler, genders 
or social norms cannot simply be removed or destroyed in order to reveal 
the true and real subject; a subject exists and has being only insofar as it is 
performed as a relatively stable and recognized social kind. And if the self 
is constituted as recognized then it requires some reference to the hetero-
sexual matrix of normativity, even if it marks its own being as a negation, 
mourning or refusal of that matrix. For Butler, then, social differences are 
at once the means through which subjects are constituted as recognizable 
performing, speaking and acting selves; at the same time as the subject is 
also a potentiality for destabilization or unsure repetition of the norma-
tivity that is its founding condition. Queerness then lies in the difference 
between performance and performed; the social differences we recog-
nize would be stabilizations or reifications of a performative power that is 
nothing other than the capacity to destabilize differentiated kinds: 
In this sense, if vulnerability is one precondition for human-
ization, and humanization takes place differently through 
variable norms of recognition, then it follows that vulnerabil-
ity is fundamentally dependent on existing norms of recogni-
tion if it is to be attributed to any human subject.
So when we say that every infant is surely vulnerable, that is 
clearly true, in part, precisely because our utterance enacts the 
very recognition of vulnerability and so shows the importance 
of recognition itself for sustaining vulnerability. We perform 
the recognition by making the claim, and that is surely a very 
good reason to make the claim. We make the claim, however, 
precisely because it is not taken for granted, precisely because 
it is not, in every instance, honored. Vulnerability takes on 
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another meaning at the moment it is recognized, and recogni-
tion wields the power to reconstitute vulnerability. We cannot 
posit this vulnerability prior to recognition without perform-
ing the very thesis that we oppose (our positing is itself a form 
of recognition and so manifests the constitutive power of the 
discourse). This framework, by which norms of recognition 
are essential to the constitution of vulnerability as a precon-
dition of the ‘human,’ is important precisely for this reason, 
namely, that we need and want those norms to be in place, 
that we struggle for their establishment, and we value their 
continuing and expanded operation. (Butler 2006, 43)
Difference, then, is negative (Butler 2004A, 198): both the difference 
between kinds, and the difference from social kinds; but there is no dif-
ference in itself as some intuitable power.
When Deleuze argues for a mode of passive vitalism he insists that life 
tends towards difference, creating further and further distinctions. This is 
so much the case that he follows Leibniz in seeing the world as composed 
of souls that descend infinitely. My body is a soul or monad because it is 
capable of perceiving and being affected in an absolutely singular man-
ner: no other body has the same unfolding of time and space, the same 
perceptions and affections as mine. And within this body are a thousand 
other souls: a heart that will beat according to all the hormonal, nutri-
tional, climactic and nervous perceptions it endures (and so on with 
every organ, and so on with every organ’s cells, and so on with every 
microbiological event). Far from a body being individuated through sub-
jection to norms, a body is absolutely individuated above and beyond (or 
before) any of the generalizing norms that the laziness of common sense 
applies. This vitality is therefore essentially queer. The task of thinking 
is not to see bodies in their general recognizable form, as this or that 
ongoing and unified entity, but to approach the world as the unfolding of 
events. Take an encounter between two bodies: you, a straight man, con-
sider your sexuality to be properly vital, contributing as it does to hetero-
sexual reproduction. I, however, as a lesbian female regard my sexuality as 
properly vital: not subjected to rigidifying norms of biological reproduc-
tion, I am capable of creating myself in ways far more imaginative and 
varied than any social norm might dictate. The dispute between two such 
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bodies would concern a proper image of life (as biologically reproductive, 
or imaginatively productive) and would be disjunctive: either I answer to 
the norms of social reproduction as they exist, or I create other norms and 
ideals. And one could go on adding other bodies to this terrain: I might 
be a gay man, assured that my homosexuality is genetically determined, 
or a trans-gendered individual considering myself to be capable of living 
a gender while maintaining a sex. One could see such a dispute as devolv-
ing upon just how we determined the relation between life and norms: 
either we regard life as having a genetic reality that would determine sex 
regardless of social performance, or would see social performance as the 
determining and decisive force that makes possible any individual body. 
Determining sexual political disputes in this way—as rejecting the norm 
of the heterosexual nuclear family but doing so in favor of some more 
radical determining force—merely substitutes one normative image of 
life (familial, productive) for another (genetic, socially constructed, per-
formatively constituted). Either life is and ought to be oriented to repro-
duction, or life is capable of variation, or there are genetic determinants 
that preclude a realm of pure decision.
What such a way of thinking depends upon is what Deleuze and 
Guattari (1983) diagnosed as an exclusive use of the disjunctive synthe-
sis: either one subjects one’s desire to social norms or one falls back into 
the dark night of the undifferentiated. They opposed this transcendent, 
exclusive and illegitimate use to their own immanent, inclusive and vitalist 
disjunctive synthesis. Here the relations between terms are neither exclu-
sive (either male or female, either social/political or genetic, either real 
or constructed) nor transcendent (where such terms organize and differ-
entiate life, and do so on the basis of some grounding value, whether that 
be genetics, reproduction, liberty or the human). That is to say, we could 
argue that queer politics in one of its dominant forms remains commit-
ted to a transcendent and disjunctive use of the synthesis and is therefore 
profoundly Oedipal: either you recognize yourself as a being within the 
familial order of male-female or you risk falling into psychosis. It is the 
family as the basic unit that also relies on an active vitalism: in order to 
become individuated ‘we’ must recognize ourselves as part of a symbolic 
order, for we have no self or being outside the human and self-governing 
world of father-mother-child, and political action must proceed from a 
Queer Vitalism 113
desire that begins, initially, from a relation between self and other that 
can then open onto a broader political field of historical, racial and social 
forces. Judith Butler, for example, reads Antigone’s rebellion against the 
State as at once familial, negative and activist: the very possibility of mak-
ing a claim, of speaking and being heard, requires that Antigone be situ-
ated as a sister and daughter, but it is just that positioning that is rendered 
negative, impossible and activist by Antigone’s speaking for the claims of 
her brother. She at once speaks as a familial subject, dutifully promising 
to bury her brother, while also negating or perverting that subjectivity, 
by speaking against her father who would refuse her that sibling bond: ‘If 
kinship is the precondition of the human, then Antigone is the occasion 
for a new field of the human, achieved through political catachresis, the 
one that happens when the less than human speaks as human, when gen-
der is displaced, and kinship founders on its own founding laws’ (Butler 
2000, 82). One could extrapolate from here, as Butler does, to the struc-
ture of political speech in general: in order to speak and be recognized I 
must be situated in a social body, but ‘I’ have being only in my negation 
or queering of that recognized normativity. The subject is active when it 
takes up, and then destabilizes or negates, a norm that is at once its condi-
tion for being and its condition for not being. To be is to be disobedient, 
acting and speaking only within the frame of a presupposed obedience 
against which one is defined:
The claiming becomes an act that reiterates the act it affirms, 
extending the act of insubordination by performing its avowal 
in language. This avowal, paradoxically, requires a sacrifice of 
autonomy at the very moment in which it is performed: she 
asserts herself through appropriating the voice of the other, 
the one to whom she is opposed; thus her autonomy is gained 
through the appropriation of the authoritative voice of the 
one she resists, an appropriation that has within it traces of 
a simultaneous refusal and assimilation of that very author-
ity. (Butler 2000, 11)
Like Freud, Butler’s conditioning matrix of obedience or subjection 
is familial (even though she uses the ambivalence of one’s familial rela-
tions to argue for a necessary mourning and melancholia in one’s object 
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choice); to take on a gendered body as one’s object choice both creates 
one’s own sexuality in relation to an other, and entails a renunciation of 
other gendered and sexual potentials.
For Butler the socio-political world extends from the initial coordi-
nates of the family. Deleuze and Guattari reverse this order; the Oedipal 
family is not the frame from which the self moves out into the political 
world, and the political world is not sexualized on the basis of the fam-
ily (the king or president is not a father figure). Rather, there is an ini-
tial collectively sexual field, a group investment in a body—such as the 
despot who terrorizes the social field through public displays of sexual 
excess and consumption—and from that broad sexual field there is a 
gradual contraction to the modern nuclear family, the father coming to 
stand in for the larger historical figures of history. The gender binary, 
considered in terms of the young child either lining up on the male or 
female side of the divide, is not a differentiation of a pre-Oedipal indif-
ference, but the diminution of far more complex differences: how did all 
the complex figures of race, history, myth, spectacle and politics come to 
be contracted onto the either/or of the male father or female mother? 
Deleuze and Guattari insist on a schizoanalysis that sees the family as a 
stimulus for historical political coordinates, and sees the ‘global persons’ 
of the family as possible only through a process of historical, political and 
racial contraction. The father is not the basis from which the political fig-
ure of the king, the despot or the dictator is extrapolated; on the contrary, 
it is only possible for us today to understand ourselves as individuated 
through our relations to our mothers and fathers because an entire his-
tory of domination has increasingly displaced its complex, political and 
collective desires onto private familial images.
Micropolitics
For Deleuze and Guattari, schizoanalysis reverses this process: we 
need to see the ways in which our seemingly familial and Oedipal con-
ditions—the child constituted as a gendered individual in a family 
dynamic—is a compression of historical and political forces. In practice 
this would require opening any relation among bodies to the historical, 
political, ‘micro’ and vital (or infinitely small) potentials from which they 
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are composed. The attention shifts from persons and norms, to the thou-
sands of souls from which we are effected. So, the heterosexual man who 
defends his being on the basis of reproductive norms only lives and feels 
this normativity because his body is composed of passions, affections and 
orientations which it is the task of Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘schizoanalysis’ 
to break into its various components. We would need to analyze the com-
position of each of ‘man’s’ defining souls: images of the nuclear family, 
which have a figurative (Christian, bourgeois, popular science) dimen-
sion; notions of life which are also inflected by theology (‘be fruitful and 
multiply’); political discourses (the family as economic unit); and racial 
notions of man as the rational, democratic and white individual towards 
which all human civilization is ‘progressing.’ In order to form some 
notion of ‘the human’ one needs to take all the capacities for genetic vari-
ation and assume some underlying unity. This ‘man in general,’ accord-
ing to Deleuze and Guattari is achieved historically and politically by 
unifying complex differences into some single figure. The same applies 
to ‘woman,’ ‘lesbian,’ ‘trans-sexual’ or—in some cases—‘queer.’ If the lat-
ter term denotes a group of bodies who seek recognition on the basis 
of their relation to, or difference from, other bodies then ‘queer’ forms 
a majoritarian mode of politics: a political force that reduces difference 
for the sake of creating a political subject group. If, however, ‘queer’ were 
to operate vitally it would aim to signal the positive potentialities from 
which groups were formed: there could only be lesbian women because 
certain differences are possible (such as sexual difference, and difference 
in orientation), but that would then lead to further and further differ-
ence, not only to each individual but within each individual.
Minoritarian politics moves in the opposite direction from recogni-
tion and aims to maximize the circumstances for the proliferation and 
pulverization of differences. In terms of policy and representation this 
would have concrete consequences: one would not strive to attain a rep-
resentative polity—include more women and gays in parliament—but 
would see politics not as representation (of women’s issues, gay rights, 
minority values), but as mobilization. What processes could operate in 
the absence of any ideal image, figure or grouping of human normativity?
As a concrete example, we might look at reproductive rights, and the 
question of whether same sex couples should be allowed access to IVF or 
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other forms of assisted reproduction technologies. One way of approach-
ing this would be through rights, access and—perhaps—broadening 
notions of what counts as a family. Such an approach could also take 
into account pragmatic considerations about distribution of resources, 
the quality of life for children of same-sex couples given the prevailing 
norms, and might also have to deal with the competing rights of religious 
and ethnic groups. ‘Queer’ in this context would count as one variable 
among others, and questions of life would be considered in terms of rela-
tions among persons: how do we compare and negotiate the competing 
demands for, and quality of, various notions of what counts as a good 
life? How do we balance the claims of one group—those bodies who 
affirm their right to be queer—with another, such as those Christian 
agencies who have requested exemption from equal opportunity law 
when it comes to dealing with adoption by gay couples? How do spiri-
tual rights compete with sexual rights? Such questions and problems 
negotiate interests, already constituted political positions that mark out 
and, according to Butler, enable political agency. By contrast, a Deleuzo-
Guattarian approach would consider life beyond the concept of the per-
son, and would therefore define its vitalism as queer, as having to do 
with all those potential differences that exceed and infinitely divide each 
body. Desire, Deleuze and Guattari insist, is both pre-personal and neces-
sarily revolutionary; so one would take any political interest such as the 
demand by a gay couple for a child, and then look at its multiple con-
stituting desires. These may be in part revolutionary—a destruction of 
the family unit as the sole site for reproduction, a refusal of the norms 
of social recognition, and even an affirmation of life beyond one’s own 
body—but also in part reactionary, in the desire for inclusion in the 
social field as it currently is, in the maintenance of the family, now as a 
sexually diverse unit of social production, and in the racial commitment 
to one’s own kind. Desire is essentially revolutionary precisely because 
it is the force from which social relations emerge; even if all social forms 
emerge from desire, desire also exceeds the systems that it has gener-
ated. We may have a fascist body politic because desire has been capti-
vated by the body of the leader, but those same desires—as desiring—
are not exhausted by the body they have invested. Even when desires 
are reactionary—such as the racial deliriums that underpin the manifest 
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political interest of having a child of one’s own—they are nevertheless 
distinct from the social machine that takes up those desires into its own 
workings. To say, as Deleuze and Guattari do, that we are composed of a 
thousand tiny sexes is to place race, politics, history and sexuality within, 
not between or among, individuals. Any body’s desire, and therefore its 
relation to other bodies’ desires, is composed of multiple and divergent 
series. My relation to other sexes may have familial determining points; 
one might relate to something like ‘masculinity’ through the image one 
has of one’s father. But every father, in turn, presents a certain racial, eco-
nomic, political and sexual complex. The father who comes home com-
plaining about all the migrants who have taken away his employment, 
all the single mothers who are destroying the welfare system, who then 
treats his successful upwardly mobile son with resentment, while fearing 
his daughter’s relation with her black schoolmate gives the child an entire 
racial-cultural-economic field through which sexuality is negotiated.
There is no such thing as ‘a’ life, or if there is it is sub-individual for we 
are composed of many lives; and a vitalist queer politics is a micro-poli-
tics that negotiates the multiple affections and attachments that compose 
any field. We would have to add to any consideration of same-sex couples 
and reproductive rights a critical approach to family as such: questioning 
the prima facie value of a child of one’s own, of family units, of reproduc-
tive medicine as a form of bio-capital. The same would apply to any issue 
of queer politics, which ought not be considered as a negotiation among 
competing political groupings, nor as a ‘pragmatic’ relation between the 
necessary accession to norms and the desire for autonomy.
Micropolitics is a form of pragmatism insofar as it focuses on life, but 
this is a life of passive vitalism where we attend to all the minor, less than 
human, not yet personalized desires that enter any field of social rela-
tions. Desire is not, as it is in the Kantian tradition, the capacity for an 
individual to bring what is not already actual into being; desire is pre-
individual. It is because there are desires—pre-human desires, such as 
the genetic, political, social, biological, metabolic and fantasmatic forces 
that enter into relation—that individuals are formed (and this includes 
individual humans, as well as individual social systems.) A post-Kantian 
form of pragmatism would negotiate the social field accord to competing 
desires and interests of individuals: on the one hand we recognize social 
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groups by granting rights (such as marriage or reproductive rights to 
same-sex couples); but on the other hand, we negotiate the contingency 
and force of the rights tradition, or the ways in which Western concep-
tions of rights enable political and colonial hegemony. If pragmatism 
refers questions of truth and right back to the life that is maximized and 
enabled, the pragmatism of micro-politics considers the lives of which we 
are composed. This different passive form of pragmatism would not refer 
claims back to competing interests but would de-compose claims, look-
ing at the forces from which they are composed: how is desiring a child or 
a marriage possible, what social, political, sexual, fictional, genetic, insti-
tutional forces do marriage and reproduction entail. We would need to 
take something as general and majoritarian as the right to reproduction 
and look at the desires from which it is composed, some of which would 
be ‘sad’ or reactive (my desire to be like every other normal family, and 
which diminish my power by referring my body to what it is not yet and 
may never be); but other components would be joyful (if I imagined an 
other life as creating potentialities beyond my own imagination, perhaps 
also compelling me to feel different affects beyond those of autonomy 
and self-management). Every body is queer, not because there is no body 
that actually attains the ideal embodied in any norm (say, where there 
is no woman who fulfills the figure of ‘woman’); rather the queerness is 
positive. No body fully knows its own powers, and can only become joy-
ful (or live) not by attaining the ideal it has of itself—being who I really 
am—but by maximizing those potentialities in ourselves which exceed 
the majoritarian, or which are not yet actualized. Counter-actualization 
or re-singularization takes bodies as they are, with their identifying and 
determining features, and then asks how the potentials that enabled 
those features might be expanded. If I identify myself as having a certain 
gender or sexuality then I can either regard this (in active vitalism) as a 
form of strategic essentialism, where I decide to adopt an identity for the 
sake of political efficacy while remaining aware that who I am as a subject 
is radically different from any identifying term; or (as in passive vitalism) 
I would recognize that gender, sex and other defining features emanate 
from histories, passions and relations that I have not lived but which 
might be retrieved:
Queer Vitalism 119
For if every individual is distinguished from all others by 
its primary singularities, the latter fall short of extending 
themselves as far as the primary singularities of other indi-
viduals, according to a spatiotemporal order that makes the 
‘subdivision’ of an individual be continued into the nearest 
subdivision and then into the subdivision following that, all 
the way up to infinity. The comparative extension and inten-
sity of these subdivisions—favored zones that belong to each 
monad—even allow species of monads or souls to be divided 
into vegetal, animal, human or angelic traits, ‘an infinity of 
degrees in the monads’ in continuity. (Deleuze 75)
From the position of passive vitalism one would need to look at the 
composition of bodies as themselves encounters. Deleuze’s book on 
Leibniz cites a seemingly politically and sexually neutral example:
I hesitate between staying home or going out to a nightclub: 
these are not two separable objects, but two orientations, each 
of which carries a sum of possible or even hallucinatory per-
ceptions (not only of drinking but the noise and smoke of the 
bar; not only of working but the hum of the word processor 
and the surrounding silence…). And if we return to motives 
in order to study them for a second time, they have not stayed 
the same. Like the weight on as scale, they have gone up or 
down. The scale has changed according to the amplitude of 
the pendulum. The voluntary act is free because the free act is 
what expresses the entire soul at a given moment of its dura-
tion. (Deleuze 2006, 79)
A body at a desk is at once composed of inclinations towards a drink 
in a club (anticipating the hum of the surrounds, the coolness of the 
drink, the conviviality of the atmosphere) competing with the desire 
to continue writing (the anticipated sense of a job done, the interest in 
solving a problem). What is required in such a situation is a ‘differential 
calculus’ for it will always be the smallest imperceptible inclinations that 
lead to a decision one way or the other. The same idea can be extended 
politically. Our sympathies, affects, desires and acceptances as social and 
political beings are composed of micro-perceptions that barely come to 
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awareness. It is true that for the most part our desires follow the paths of 
least resistance, perhaps accepting what has always been deemed to be 
acceptable; but at some point the souls rise up: cortisol and seratonin 
levels rise and suddenly Rosa Parks refuses to sit at the back of the bus. 
What had been actual and what had been ‘our’ world is no longer all that 
one perceives or is affected by. One of the key ways in which Deleuze and 
Guattari see such counter-actualization coming into being is through art.
The Aesthetics of Vitalism
In many ways the link between art, vitalism and political renewal is rather 
tired and seems to run directly against everything that might be revolu-
tionary in Deleuze and Guattari’s political theory. Particularly dominant 
in the broad understanding of Romanticism and modernism, vitalism 
appealed to a life force that would be capable of destroying or enlivening 
the reified categories of the understanding. Vitalism, in its Romantic and 
modernist modes was also an appeal to various forms of defamiliariza-
tion and impersonality. That is to say, for the purposes of everyday effi-
ciency and action we cannot afford to live the intensity and complexity of 
life, and so we create concepts and languages to manage and diminish the 
forceful chaos of existence. Art, however, by using language or figures in 
unfamiliar or unworkable combinations can reawaken us to the creative 
force from which such systems emerged. In its Romantic form vitalism 
was active and subjective: whereas everyday understanding reduces us to 
being so many socio-political and atomized individuals, the work of art 
intimates a creative power or genius that is given only after the effect, inti-
mating the subject who must have been the author of a synthesis. This was 
how Kant described beauty in nature, where the delight in form prompts 
us to posit some notion of design, even if that creating power is felt reflec-
tively, rather than known. The work’s harmonious order enables me to 
feel the concord between me as peceiving subject, and world perceived; 
reflecting on that feeling of order I recognize myself as one who does 
not merely (or passively) receive the world. I also feel myself as a world-
forming power. This self that I feel is not my worldly bodily or identified 
self; it is the subject though whom all worldly forms are given. In mod-
ernism, the vital power that was reawakened by art was achieved through 
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impersonality, with the work of art suggesting a creative spirit behind the 
created form—a spirit given only in its not appearing. Modernist uses of 
language, for example, broke with standard and easily consumed modes 
of syntax, and by the breaking of forms forced art consumers to create 
and order the received material, once again experiencing language and 
art as created rather than simply given. Such high modernist or Romantic 
modes of defamiliarization and renewal that would reawaken the creative 
force from which our lived world has been synthesized are essentially 
normalizing insofar as they refer back to the subjective or grounding con-
ditions from which works must have emerged. These conditions can be 
retrieved, recognized and re-lived as our own. The human in general, or 
the transcendental subject, is just that spirit or power that must be felt, 
but not known, above and beyond any work of genius.
By contrast, Deleuze insists on real and immanent conditions, and 
also on the virtual or vital, not as an active underlying ground but as a 
‘swarm’ or chaos that, far from grounding or returning life to its animat-
ing power, deterritorializes life beyond any of the seemingly proper forms 
that we know. What I hope to demonstrate is that vitalism in its active 
form has dominated general concepts of the aesthetic at least since Kant. 
This active form of vitalism, which refers systems and identities back to a 
constituting power, is also highly normative: life has a proper trajectory 
towards fruition and the realization of its proper form; art is the process 
whereby deviations, failures or corruptions of the vital power may be 
retrieved and re-lived. Deleuze and Guattari’s passive vitalism, by con-
trast, challenges the idea of a single, unifying, productive and fertile life 
force whose proper trajectory is fruition, expansion and revelation. In a 
number of contexts Deleuze describes the deterritorializing vitality of life 
as ‘sterile,’ ‘divergent,’ ‘self-enjoying,’ and ‘surveying.’ That is, the vital is 
not that which springs forth from itself to synthesize, unify and produce 
its world; it is receptive in its feeling of that which is not itself, often yield-
ing nothing more than the isolated or punctuated affect of encounter.
To summarize so far: there are two ways in which we might think about 
vitalism and personality, both of which involve dissolution. First, in the 
tradition of active vitalism personality is that which remains the same 
through time, allows us to be recognized as this or that individual being 
and which also (as socially enabling) is existentially or virtually disabling. 
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I become human by subjecting myself to the system of recognition, but 
that same system belies my unique individuality. Personality, or recog-
nizing oneself as human, is required and enabled by seeing oneself as an 
instance of humanity in general, but this requires a certain sacrifice or 
even mourning for one’s singularity or specificity. Kant insists that one 
must have a sense of one’s phenomenal personality but must also recog-
nize a free noumenal, supersensible and moral personality that we can-
not know or perceive but can only think after the event of decision. In 
contemporary discourses of the subject, such as Judith Butler’s, there is a 
similar ‘ex post facto’ logic of the subject—it is, as Deleuze and Guattari 
define active vitalism, a subject that acts but ‘is not.’ For Butler, one must 
subject oneself to enabling and recognizable norms. To be recognized by, 
and with, others requires some determined personality. But those neces-
sary norms and figures of personhood are at odds with the act, perfor-
mance or event that brings them into being. On this account, personhood 
comes into being through moments or decisions that are perceived only 
after the event as the outcome of a performance that must be posited as 
having been. We do not see, live or intuit performativity itself, only its 
effects. A politics and revitalizing imperative follows: do not be seduced 
by normativity. Recognize that the self who is performed and recognized 
is at odds with the less stable—one might say ‘queer’—vital self who acts 
(who ‘acts but is not’).
I would suggest that this form of active vitalism, as critique and nega-
tion of norm, image, figure or stereotype is not only the dominant in the-
ory, but also characterizes most of the approaches to selfhood in popular 
culture and public policy. That is, there is today a widespread suspicion 
regarding the passive reception or incorporation of images; indeed, we 
might even say that capitalism is just a continuous production of ‘images,’ 
a constant destruction of any definitive, transcendent or external qual-
ity in favor of an incessant process of newly consumable images. One 
is always defined, on the one hand, as either male or female, while also 
experiencing oneself as that consuming subject who is neither male, nor 
female: a unique subject as point of consumption. Against that negation 
of the image we could posit Deleuze and Guattari’s positive use of the 
conjunctive synthesis: I am girl and woman and lesbian and masculine 
and effeminate and ...; here the self is not some radical alterity before and 
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beyond images but a potentiality to include, transform and vary all the 
races, sexes and peoples of history.
In its active vitalist form the self is always, ideally, a purely formal prin-
ciple of decision irreducible to any image. The good citizen is not seduced 
by rigid norms, does not passively allow himself to be imprinted by pre-
given figures, and relates to social and representational systems critically. 
In policy, for example, governments increasingly express concern regard-
ing negative and pernicious images, whether these concern the represen-
tation of the acceptability of certain practices—binge drinking, smoking, 
the sexualization of children—or the direct war on life-impeding images, 
or the image as life-impeding per se. In the UK, the Body Image Summit 
of 2000 sought to police the overly stringent body ideals imposed upon 
girls and women; this summit led to later campaigns to ban the prom-
ulgation of overly thin or ‘size zero’ models. The assumption that an 
image or model is a norm, or an image of what the viewer ought to be, 
is unquestioned; such an assumption relies upon a definition of the self 
as at one and the same time determined by the consumption of images, 
while properly being other than the generality of the image. Only if the 
representational and normative sphere is achievable by the bodies it orga-
nizes will we have a healthy body politic. If the model, ideal or imaged 
persona is radically at odds with actual bodies then individuals either 
diminish their own being through submission and subjection or are not 
recognized as subjects at all.
What has been lost is the fictive, virtual or incorporeal power of the 
image: is it not possible to see a body of ‘heroin chic,’ of androgynous 
subtlety, or even childlike frailty not as an ideal self, but as ideals that 
float freely from actual bodies, varying the imaginative range of what 
counts as human. Would the problem then be not that body-images 
are insufficiently normal—not like real women—but are insufficiently 
queer, too close to actuality? One might imagine a higher degree of inclu-
sion and disjunction, with more bodies that are increasingly less realistic, 
yielding more of a sense of the model or image as image/model, not as 
some active representation of a life that must know and recognize itself 
and always remain in command of the production of affects. The war on 
reified and passively-ingested images leads to, and presupposes, a vitalist 
ethical imperative that would aim to re-awaken the sense of the produced 
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status of the image: one ought not regard any actuality—be that the het-
erosexual matrix or humanity in general—as a final or essential form. 
(Indeed there are no essences, only existence.) The true self is not the 
subject who is recognized so much as the act, performance, decision or 
‘lived’ that is other than (although only known through and after) the 
norms which give it being.
If this form of active vitalism demands a becoming-impersonal it does 
so only in recognizing that while we may require personality to live and 
speak socially and politically, we are always irreducible to (and other 
than) such ideals. This mode of active vitalism has specific consequences 
for activist politics, and results in a certain style of problem: where there 
is always an ‘on the one hand / on the other hand’ structure. The very 
notion of ‘queer’ is always a queering of some norm: on the one hand I 
say ‘no’ to normativity, while on the other hand I demand recognition 
from the very matrix of recognition whose system allows me to speak. 
This structure of compromise (or negation and recognition) also plays 
out in concrete issues: are demands for civil partnership (for example) 
ways of enlivening social bonds, or are such appeals for inclusion nega-
tions of one’s non-heterosexual status? Do movements of sexual or gen-
der re-orientation inject an instability or performativity into the norms 
of male and female, or are we not seduced too easily into already defined 
gender roles? Such problems concern the degree of act in relation to the 
image: is our relation to the norm properly productive (introducing or 
exposing a potential deviation or queerness) or are we not, in remain-
ing activist at the level of sex/gender/sexuality passively obedient to 
already constituted categories? Such a structure is theorized by Butler 
as a necessary acceptance of recognition and submission, alongside an 
instability or excitability internal to those very normalizing procedures. 
But such structures are not unique to queer theory (a fact which should 
give us pause for thought: for Alain Badiou a subject is just this decision 
or event who breaks from an enumerated scene to institute a new mode 
of numeration. For Slavoj Žižek the subject is an impossible, barred, 
excluded and negative remainder that occurs in the failure of any image 
or object to capture desire.) By contrast, as I have already suggested, the 
Deleuzo-Guattarian approach differs in its very style of problem, which is 
not to interrogate the relation between body and norm according to the 
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appropriate degree of its vitality (whether the relation really issues from 
a proper force of decision or is not further subjection). Instead of seeing 
the self in relation to perceived norms (a self which is defined as other 
than any of its perceptions), Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari make two 
key interventions.
First, for Deleuze there are not bodies, selves or subjects who perceive, 
for the self is composed of perceptions, each of which is its imaging of 
other perceiving souls: the heart has its life by responding to the hor-
mones, rhythms, flows and movements that create it as a point of view, 
while the body is at once a perception of all those barely perceived dura-
tions within, and the affectations that it encounters without. Instead of 
subject-norm relations, we deal with multiplicities and singular points: 
networks of perception and imagination that create points of view, and 
that can—at singular points—produce entirely different relations and 
configurations. Second, once bodies—all bodies—are no longer bod-
ies with organs (the eye that sees in order to negotiate a world mastered 
by the hand, relating to other subjects through the voice of reason), we 
can take the image beyond organic and centered thinking to look at the 
power of micro-perceptions: not just the domain of body-images and 
imposed norms, but all those barely discerned perceptions that compose 
all images, and that exist and insist beyond the human.
Notes
1. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze argues that there is a radical potential 
in Platonism—where Ideas are pure potentialities from which differentiated 
beings are actualized—that is lost in Aristotle’s criticism of Platonism. For 
Aristotle, rather than Ideas, it is categories which define each being; and 
these categories are referred back to a (human or at least subject’s) good 
sense and common sense that identifies common and repeatable features 
(Deleuze 1994). 
Chapter 6
Difference, Time and Organic Extinction
How, today, might the question of time and sexual difference be articu-
lated? It might appear, at first, as though the mode of this question has 
always been sexual (or at least gendered) and that this engendering of 
the question of time has impeded any fruitful understanding: time has 
been regarded either as the time taken for forms to come into being 
and pass away (a pre-modern Aristotelian notion) or time is the neu-
tral abstract ‘container’ within which changes occur (modern Cartesian 
time) (Deleuze, 2005, 4). In both cases, one could argue that time has 
been conceived organically and anthropomorphically. Either the world is 
composed of proper forms that will take time to unfold: the earth would 
be one bounded whole, reaching fulfillment through time, with time as a 
delay in the realization of an end, while ‘man’ would be that being blessed 
with reason capable of intuiting the forms of time. Man is not only a his-
torical animal; he also forms himself through time, becoming the being 
who he is by having a conception of his life as a whole, as a self-formed 
narrative. Or, on the modern conception of time, there is one general 
substance in extended space, and time measures the movement from any 
one point to another. Time is the series of equivalent ‘nows’ and man, no 
longer analogous to (or a lesser form of) a God who sees the reason of 
the world, charts movements from a point of view that is purely calcula-
tive. This is the modern, formal, linear time of equivalence.
Such a modern understanding of time as the abstract container within 
which movement takes place, where time is a general substrate that is not 
man’s own, marks a certain understanding of human sexuality and sexu-
ality as human. ‘Man’ is a being whose sense is determined by a general 
temporality of life: because he is a historical animal, going through the 
time of evolution, cultural developments and linguistic formations, his 
Difference, Time and Organic Extinction 127
being in the present bears a density that is not immediately transparent 
to his own intentionality (Foucault, 2002, 139). It is this conception of 
a general time of life that enables the modern motif of sexuality, where 
my present sense of self emerges both from the evolution of human sexu-
ality in general, and then the formation and self-narration of ourselves 
as familial; on one conception at least, contemporary time is therapeu-
tic. Only if I understand the sense of my emergence will I be able to take 
command of my future. For psychoanalysis, this meant that there would 
be the sense of a lost (maternal) plenitude that the subject would be able 
to read within himself. All our objects of desire would be substitutes for 
a constitutive loss that follows from being human, from being thrown 
into a life, history, language and Oedipal scene that is never one’s own. 
Woman would figure as the lost pre-linguistic origin, an origin that can 
only be fantasized, ex post facto, as that which must have been abandoned 
in order for man to enter a communal, rational history (Brennan 1993). 
Even if we no longer hold to such psychoanalytic mythographies, it is 
possible to discern this gendered figuration of time today in various criti-
cal reactions to man’s own modernity: in the Gaia hypothesis of James 
Lovelock, for example, the Cartesian notion of the world as extended and 
external matter is corrected in favor of the figure of a single organism of 
life (Lovelock 1988). Supposedly we should overcome a modern techno-
cratic and disenchanted conception of time, in which there will always be 
more earth as usable resource, and instead we should understand human 
life—especially creative and productive human life—as having emerged 
from and being in symbiotic relation with one earth conceived as ‘Gaia.’ 
Man is no longer an active (historical, temporal) subject set over against 
a passive and lifeless matter; there is one web of life, with all beings 
connected through a non-linear temporality. Time is no longer a series 
unfolded from some theological (humanoid) origin, nor a series mapped 
by man, but the real condition in which life generates life. Such an under-
standing of time has, for all its claims of breaking with human chauvinism, 
reinforced rather than annihilated the traditional humanization of time. 
Supposedly, if ‘we’ wish to live on, we need to become aware of a time—
ecological, geological—beyond our own, paying our due to an existence 
that we failed to recognize as our own. In no movement is this more 
apparent than in eco-feminism. Queer theory may have remained within 
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the Oedipal and human axes of recognition (albeit critically, with Butler 
(2004A, 161) arguing for self-constitution and mourning processes 
devolving on the face), but eco-feminism has sought to retrieve a time 
and spirit beyond man and calculation, beyond the human reproductive 
cycle of time, towards a time of a broader organic and spiritual whole-
ness (Warren 2000). But is extending the figure of organic time beyond 
human bounds—to the point where life in general becomes one unified, 
self-creating, auto-poetic and fruitful whole—the most thoughtful way 
of approaching what, with further thought, we might consider to be the 
question of the present? How might we, today, confront the increasingly 
insistent though increasingly foreclosed question of the temporal short-
circuit of man’s existence? In the most literal terms, the more overwhelm-
ing the evidence that human life has shortened the time of the planet, 
the greater the degree of denial: climate change appears to be irreversible 
and catastrophic, but as its seriousness increases so does its repression. 
More generally, as temporality discloses itself as less and less human, and 
less and less gendered—not following the model of man’s imposition of 
temporal mapping on a passive nature (in the manner of subject/object, 
active/passive, male/female)—figures of the organic and human nature 
of time appear to be resurgent. One may cite here not only the already 
mentioned redemptive figures of life as Gaia (a goddess whose being 
man may now recognize for the sake of his living on), and not only the 
rhetoric of climate change policy that supposedly deals with the anthro-
pogenic shortening of time by asking questions of ‘sustainability,’ for this 
rhetoric only addresses man’s living on through time by adapting and mit-
igating his own being. In addition to these reaction formations, where the 
increasing sense of the inhumanity of time is reconfigured in terms of our 
climate, our ecology and the saving of our earth, the concept of time and 
becoming in its supposedly radical forms has worked to save the most 
anthropocentric of figures: man as the being who gives himself his own 
time through self-formation in which the self is nothing outside its own 
becoming. There has been a broad imaginary re-humanization of time in 
contemporary theory, concerned increasingly with the sense that any life 
or world we have must be considered only from the point of view of the 
reproductive and self-productive organism. (This retrieval of time is dis-
cerned in the return to living systems and in the emphases—following 
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Agamben and others—on the redemption of the political, via acts of 
historical memory, precisely when the polity is not the site in which 
conflicts take place so much as that which precludes us from thinking 
the very conflict of a time that takes place beyond human and organic 
frames.) That is, we imagine that temporal analyses will disclose to us the 
meaning and genesis of something like ‘the political’ or ‘the world’ as it is 
for us, and that historical genealogy will in turn place us once again in an 
active position of mastery and meaning. What needs to be considered, I 
would suggest, is a sexual time, where sexuality is taken in its non-organic 
and truly sexual sense, as that which drives beyond the organism’s needs 
and figurations, and as that which opens thought beyond its own com-
mand and measure. Such a time might be engendered, opened from all 
the modes of life (organic and non-organic) that produce distinct and 
interconnected rhythms, but would not be gendered, could not be figured 
within the norms of man or his others. Time is essentially sexual, and sex-
uality is essentially temporal. Yet these two intertwined essences subvert 
and preclude any proper thought or thought of propriety.
The Temporality of Sexuality
What makes an event or movement sexual? The answer cannot lie in 
reproduction, precisely because there are non-sexual modes of reproduc-
tion (in the non-human, non-mammalian world), and human reproduc-
tive futures that may well take place outside of sexual difference (including 
sperm production from stem cells, cloning and the possible extinction of 
the Y-chromosome) (Bainbridge 2003; Sykes 2003). One of the answers 
to this question is Oedipal, or at least has to do with human sexuality and 
a mediated relation to biological reproduction. The subject occurs as a 
gap between organic need and a desire that is tied to the signifier or lan-
guage. The attachment between infant mouth and maternal breast meets 
the fulfillment of organic need, or at least maintains the relative stability 
of biological being. The organism begins in a state of coupling, with its 
organic integrity assured by that which lies beyond its own bounds. It is 
this figure of the organism before desire, language and difference that, I 
will argue, already ruptures the coherence of time and sexuality, and is 
an effect of sexuality’s retroactive time. What happens, though, when the 
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action or connection through which organic sustenance is made breaks 
with, or slips away from, the aim of meeting metabolic needs? That is, 
the mouth attaches to the breast for organic needs, but then continues 
to enjoy the feel of sucking, imagining or fantasizing an object; sexuality 
is just this slippage from organic need (Laplanche 1976). A macro (or 
schizoanalytic) version of such slippage may be evidenced in the life of 
humanity. Man is coupled with the earth for his own survival. He never-
theless intensifies the processes of this coupling (processes of consump-
tion, production, resource depletion and capitalization) to the point 
where the process itself becomes the aim: capital generation for its own 
sake, consumption for its own sake, production so excessive that one 
requires advertising to manufacture needs and gaps.
This inherently sexual nature of slippage from organic need was already 
theorized by Freud in his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905). 
The sucking of the breast becomes sensual sucking—the mouth enjoy-
ing its own material dynamism, feeling itself feel, establishing a relation 
not to alimentary goals that fulfill an economic imperative of meeting a 
need that can be determined quantitatively (input of fuel for so much 
expended energy). Sensibility occurs for its ‘own’ sake, even if the very 
possibility of ‘ownness,’ the self or ‘mineness,’ occurs only with this sen-
suality. The mouth that feels itself feeling can then mark itself as locus of 
desire, as a zone to be felt for its own sake. It is at that moment of slippage 
from (or propping onto) organic need that something like temporality 
emerges. Strangely, it is in the uncoupling of organisms that a relation to 
a virtual otherness opens: mouth and breast are not connected as two 
parts in a single process, for each organ’s connection opens its own line 
of pleasure. In desiring what is not actually before me or present I open 
towards a future, anticipating. There are always three terms, at least, in 
any sexual relation, for part relates to part through an anticipation that 
exceeds determinable quantities (Lacan 1985). What occurs in the rup-
ture of alterity, where relations are no longer determined intrinsically (by 
the meeting of a metabolic deficit calculable in advance) but extrinsically, 
is that relations become external to terms: the production of desire and 
events can no longer be grounded in an originating event, or proper rela-
tion. But also, the potentiality for relations is not exhausted by the actual 
relation that has occurred. The organism cannot master or determine 
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those forces it encounters, or the forces by which it is transformed. There 
is no longer a simple unfolding of possibilities from what an organism is 
(as though time were grounded in natural becoming). A non-presence, 
or what the organism can feel but not know and command, now marks all 
anticipation, all futures.
This non-presence that seems to disturb the linear time of metabolic 
quantities—where a deficit can be restored by the input of quantities, 
returning to constancy—does not arrive from without, accidentally. 
Freud’s notion of the organism desiring a return to quiescence is the 
myth of the organism’s own world; the figure of the organism ‘dying in 
its own way,’ finding its own path back to plenitude is actually a futural 
and desiring creation. The organism’s supposed origin is the effect of a 
body becoming bounded in time, and then imagining that an overcom-
ing of that binding would be some sort of return. Instead, the syncopa-
tion that enables time—the pulsation that marks out a space and distri-
bution—exposes the illusory status of the organism. The notion of the 
bounded body that maintains itself by meeting its needs, going through 
a time that is nothing more than the time taken to restore quantities to 
their natural and proper equilibrium: this is a myth, the sexual-Oedipal 
myth of the organism. It is only after the emergence of desire, whereby 
the mouth effects a relation to what is not present (the feel of the breast, 
lips, fluid, sucking) that something like a before and after, or here and 
there, inner and outer, self and other, can be established. There is a pro-
duction of the temporal, of anticipation, retention and maintenance, only 
through the sexual: it is not with elements that are fully given, actualized 
and existing with complete internal relations, that one is given time. If 
a being or entity is sufficient to itself, and if its relation to what it is not 
is also already fully given, then there is nothing to be played out. One 
can think here of a certain notion of God, for whom all future events are 
foreknown. And it is from the possibility of a God to whom all things 
are immediately and fully present that one can also consider Leibniz’s 
monad. A monad’s individuation is constituted by all predicates being 
fully explicated; we know what a being is if we know all the events that 
have befallen and will befall it, and all the relations it bears to every other 
monad. I am who I am because of all the encounters that make up my life, 
including all the events that precede and follow me. This logic of internal 
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relations is given more specifically in the familial and Oedipal figure of 
the organism. The organism—as in organicist aesthetics—is a bounded 
whole in which each part possesses the identity it does because of its par-
ticipation in a living whole, and in which the whole is not a collection of 
disparate atomic parts but the dynamic result of interconnected, mutually 
self-constituting and autopoietic relations. The whole is not composed of 
parts, for it is nothing more than the consequence of relations that are 
given only in the productive activity of each part’s relation to every other. 
The child is therefore perhaps the perfect figure of organicist aesthet-
ics: what Freud referred to as ‘His Majesty the Baby’ (Freud 1959, 49). 
Gazed upon by the parent as an image of utter integrity and self-enclosed 
completeness, the child is a world unto himself, a bounded whole—not 
yet corrupted, self-conscious or seduced by a world of surmise and sus-
picion. One always imagines and mourns this child that one must have 
been prior to the repressions and anticipations of adult subjection, prior 
to the alienation, prohibition and otherness of a world of external rela-
tions (Leclaire, 1998). This figure of the child as pure presence unto itself 
is crucial in the imaginary of time and sexuality. (One might also say the 
same about a certain figure of woman, or a certain figure of the animal: a 
bounded un-self-conscious whole, not yet subjected to a world of contes-
tation, not yet exposed to an outside that is anything other than its own.)
Sexuality occurs as a slippage, gap or intrusion in organic self-presence. 
The child’s autopoeitic and organic self-maintenance is possible only 
through a relation to otherness that precludes any linear temporality or 
economy of self-regulating equilibrium. The relation to what is not the 
organism’s own becomes sexual through a time of disturbance and non-
presence. The mouth that sucks sensually is oriented not to the aim of 
restoring a need, returning to quiescence, but to a contact and touch 
displaced from the order of organic sustainability. The look towards the 
other who will meet my needs becomes one of sexual desire when the 
other’s world is neither given nor readable (Laplanche 1999). When 
the organism is oriented beyond itself to the signifier—or towards that 
which is not determined from an internal relation of the organism’s own 
system—then temporality is truly generated as sexual. For time is not 
the existence of a series, but the potentiality of relations not given in, and 
not unfolded from, the present. The organism is timeless, determining 
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relations from itself. Sexuality is time, the exposure to the non-present, 
the anticipated, the deviation and potentiality of an open.
Time Is Sexuality
So far, this chapter has negotiated sexuality as a deflection from organic 
need and plenitude, and has considered time as a radically passive syn-
thesis of relations determined neither by the will, nor intentionality nor 
a sense of the living body. But can this time of sexuality, and the sexuality 
of time, be approached less anthropically, less Oedipally? So much would 
already be implied from within the Oedipal figure of the self-contained 
pre-linguistic infant. The fantasy of a pure presence to self in which a 
being goes through time (a time of its own) is generated ex post facto 
from the position of submission to a time of desire in which neither the 
anticipated future nor the retained past is present, owned or lived. That 
is, the timelessness of the self-contained ego can be given only after dis-
persed syntheses have constituted a point of relative stability. The origi-
nal, pre-Oedipal plentitude of the pre-linguistic infant is the effect, not 
the ground, of temporal distribution. Time in general, or what we might 
begin to imagine as ‘time in its pure state,’ can be imagined only through 
sexuality. But sexuality, in its radically temporal mode, can only begin to 
be approached beyond the human and the organic.
The time of the organism, so we are constantly reminded today, is 
homeostatic and autopoietic: the world is always a lived world, and the 
lived world is the organism’s own. The living body’s ‘outside’ is given only 
as the disturbance of equilibrium; its range of anticipation and retention 
is enabled only by the degree to which the body’s needs entail projection 
into a future and maintenance of a past. The organism itself is the effect of 
syntheses that are neither centered (on life) nor oriented towards main-
tenance. The organism is, after all, the effect of multiple series of irrevers-
ible annihilations. Literally, carbon-based life only emerges from a radi-
cal disturbance of earlier milieux in which oxygen was toxic. At the level 
of thought and life, the organism’s bounded unity occurs at the expense 
of a once pre-human openness to inorganic and inhuman rhythms. Such 
pulsations would be sexual. Life and time beyond ‘conscious’ bodies 
pay no heed to organic demands and identities; such an inhuman time 
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operates through a profound erotics, if eros can be thought of as a style 
of coupling of potentialities that may pass through the striving of organ-
isms but necessarily pulses beyond the organism’s interests. Time must 
be inhuman—a rhythm irreducible to the syntheses enabled by ‘our’ sen-
sory-motor apparatus. And this inhumanity must be sexual, creative (or 
creatively destructive) and productive of encounters whose forces and 
relations cannot be determined in advance, either by the intentionality of 
needs or the figures—organic, human, Oedipal, communal—that render 
time and desire perceptible.
Sexuality and Extinction
From the foregoing it would be possible to attribute an essentially sexual 
quality to extinction, and an extinguishing tendency to sexuality: sexual-
ity occurs as deflection or deviation from replicating production, the pro-
ductions of sexuality are not only discontinuous with the organisms from 
which they emerge but open onto the non-organic in general. Consider, 
in this respect, the sexuality of consumption: beyond organic needs, or 
even within the organism’s (illusory) figuration of its needs, there exists a 
persistent and insistent process of ingestion that is blind to the (suppos-
edly) proper and organizing limits of the living body. This is especially so 
if we consider the original proper living organism to be not the located 
finite human individual, but life as a whole, the organism of Gaia. The very 
processes that originated from the striving of organic maintenance—eat-
ing, reproducing, producing—have pushed the organism to (self-)anni-
hilation. One should not be too quick to attribute this to a distinct death 
drive that would have split itself off from sexually creative processes—
where the forward and progressive creativity of sexual time would be 
deflected towards a return to quiescence. If we are prepared to admit that 
sexual time is creative time—opening out beyond organic normativity—
then this proliferating temporality is creative and destructive at once: 
creative precisely in its destruction of bounded identities and normative 
wholes. Gender would also have this creative and destructive ambiva-
lence. Genders act as ideals, norms or figures that are never attuned to 
the individuations of bodies. The ideality of ‘man’ and ‘woman’ can be 
understood both as deflecting life from its organic normality, creating a 
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disjunction between immediate existence and a received notion, and also 
as productive of destructive modes of consumption: the libidinal invest-
ments in the figure of man as homo faber have alone been responsible 
for ecological havoc, but so too has been the figure of woman as earth 
mother, carer, redemptive other or attuned body. Are not human organ-
isms and their modes of consumption tied to rhythms and motifs that 
are not that of their own survival? Do not the very existence and weary 
persistence of genders testify to a rigid death in life, or archaism, that at 
once precludes a pure future, yet also inserts a perverse unpredictability?
How, then, does this barely witnessed time that is not that of the body, 
organism or life—but that is still creative—come to intrude on our all 
too organic present? We live in an era of intensely organic self-mainte-
nance, with individuals enclosing ever more around the privacy of con-
sumption—private video screens, personal digital music players, ‘radio’ 
stations tailored to individual play-lists, fast foods designed to meal times 
outside communal ritual dining and cooking, personal trainers, phones 
that use GPS to monitor distances that we have walked, flexible work-
time and technologies no longer demanding common work spaces and 
rhythms and, most importantly, a dissolution of any seeming distinction 
between consumption and production. Our ‘private’ consumption of 
television, amusement services, sexuality and leisure—even the gender-
critical industries of popular feminism, identity politics, activist move-
ments and theory—is already a market organized around the desexu-
alization of time. Time is ever more reterritorialized not so much on a 
quantifiable clock time, but on a displayed media time: nearly everything 
we do, consume, read and purchase can be tracked and displayed by 
Facebook, or other applications such as ‘Goodreads,’ ‘Yelp’ or ‘Map my 
run’, all of which broadcast our private consumptions and searches onto 
social media. But this re-territorialization of time onto the recognizable 
and generalizable individual is not confined to popular culture and mar-
keting. Theory has, after all, been one of the industries to maintain the 
humanism and forward movement of time, a time of emancipation, of a 
maintained left, of a ‘we’ who will recognize justice in a time to-come. 
Time is rendered not profligate but profitable, not dilatory but capital-
izable. This increasingly privatized, localized and autopoietic time (engi-
neered to the body’s rhythms of self-maintenance) at once intensifies a 
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broader rhythm of creative annihilation—a dissolution of humanity 
to make way for what is unknown—yet isolates the organism from the 
intensity of inorganic life. That is, these very same privatizing technolo-
gies that fold time and consumption around the individual’s bounded 
body, are the same technologies of individual annihilation: the brain, we 
are told, is becoming atrophied because of the intense and private use of 
screen culture (from games to reality television), just as our social net-
working skills—some claim—lose traction when overtaken by social 
media applications. It is the increasing organicism and desexualization 
of time—the enclosure of human perceptive life into its private bubble 
geared entirely to self-maintenance without profligate squandering—
that will lead to the end of organic time and life.
If, however, one could think about the sexuality of time in its capac-
ity to create syntheses and productions beyond those of organic striving, 
two events might follow. First, even if the organism were not to alter its 
spatial extensive trajectory (for it may now be too late to halt the destruc-
tion of habitable earth within an already predictable time period), there 
might be an intensive opening to a counter-ethics. No longer focused on 
an ethos of abode—a morality grounded upon where we dwell—and 
certainly not a logic of sustaining or rendering ourselves viable, we might 
ask (finally) what life is, what life might do, beyond organic self-enclo-
sure. This would be an intensive and sexual question: intensive, because 
it would not take life as it actually exists and seek to extend its range 
(by rendering animals more human, by hoping that humans might live 
longer), for it would take those aspects of life that are not fully actual-
ized—problems, questions, disturbances—and seek to maximize their 
force. This problem would also be sexual: not grounded upon the organ-
ism’s self-recognition but extending its powers of mutation (especially 
those mutations that occur through unintended encounters). Second, if 
we alter the logic of living on, of sustaining, extending, adapting, miti-
gating or justifying the human as it currently is, then something like a 
sexual life—a life open to the forces of its own destruction—might be 
given a chance.
Chapter 7
Ethics of Extinction
Here is the problem: faced with extinction the human species might, 
finally, be presented with a genuine ethics, with a sense of what it owes 
to place (ethos) and to those beyond its own organic life (the future). 
Alternatively, it is perhaps the possibility of annihilation that once and 
for all destroys ethics. Certainly, if ethics is a question of how one ought to 
live, of one’s sympathy for others, of an art of the self, or the creation of 
a virtual community, then ethics would seem to be the least appropriate 
and perhaps least viable of projects for today. If we consider ethics to be 
the problem of forming oneself then it could be argued that the arts of 
self-formation are reaching their limit, and that it was precisely this con-
ception of the ethical—as self-production, self-maintenance, ongoing 
self-recognition—that precluded concern for the milieu within which 
that self-production was sustained. Three ethical models here, in the 
Anthropocene era, would require questioning, if not complete disposal. 
It may be the case that we could apply our philosophical models to the 
new problems of the twenty-first century, and that these models—like all 
else—would need to adapt in order to be sustainable. It may also be that 
the new ethical problems ‘we’ face (including the viability and justifica-
tion of who ‘we’ are) would require new forms of questioning. The new 
form of content would require a new form of expression (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004, 158). Ethical theories that presented themselves as for-
mal might really operate only with the form of a human life, while ethical 
forms of naturalism would be limited to a certain conception of nature 
that would no longer be sustainable. 
First, a contemporary form of Kantianism insists that insofar as I am a 
self I am also intrinsically structured by normativity: to act without prin-
ciple would be a form of contradictory and impossible suicide. Not only 
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can I not will to extinguish myself—for any decision I take regarding 
self-annihilation is already bound up with a world of others and there-
fore with an essential respect for the human—I can also not act without 
ongoing norms. Christine Korsgaard has insisted, following the refuta-
tion of the possibility of a private language, that normativity is intrinsic 
to language: ‘The private language argument does not show that I could 
not have my own personal language. But it shows that I could not have a 
language which is in principle incommunicable to anybody else. When 
I make a language, I make its meanings normative for me’ (Korsgaard 
1996A, 138). An even stronger Kantian account of an essential nor-
mativity lies in the argument against suicide (Korsgaard 1996B, 17): 
destroying my own being would demonstrate a disregard for humanity 
as such, and would be contradictory insofar as one reasons to do away 
with reason. I am always already a member of the human community, 
and therefore cannot choose to end my life without extending that desire 
for extinction to all other humans. As human and capable of a free act I 
cannot make an exception of myself; insofar as I decide I can do so only 
as a being not determined by contingency, as a being who may act law-
fully, deciding for oneself. And this necessary maintenance of oneself, as 
human and therefore free to will, but not free to will the end of willing, 
extends to the relation I bear to others and my own acts. To act now in 
one way and now in another—to have no sense of myself as a continuous 
identity—is to end oneself, is to destroy the being that I am. 
Now that the human species faces its own annihilation, and does so 
precisely because it has remained committed absolutely to its own sur-
vival as uniquely human and blessed with a duty to live that distinguishes 
it from other species, quite different questions from that of self-main-
tenance, normative consistency and the necessity of living on need to 
be addressed.
Alternatively, if ethics is taken to be tied inextricably to ethos or habi-
tus, then this would seem to be just the sort of ethical turn required today. 
If we accept, following the Aristotelian tradition, that asking how one 
ought to live can only make sense in relation to the others through whom 
we define ourselves, and through the traditions that grant those relations 
meaning and complexity, then the confrontation with the possible loss 
of all narrative continuity might at once be the Aristotelian question par 
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excellence, but also a question that destroys the possibility of the ethi-
cal. On the one hand, it might be argued that what we need today is a 
retrieval of communal narratives, along with an awareness that the world 
is never mere standing resource of manipulable matter but always a world 
for this or that intentional organism. The sense of place that is so crucial 
to Aristotelian ethics is a place of meaning: any world, any person, any 
event to which I am exposed is always given to me in terms of my own 
sense of personhood. And this is so even if the event is of such a nature 
as to disturb or refigure what counts as a person. There has recently been 
a widespread return, beyond neo-Aristotelian ethics, to a phenomeno-
logical argument that there is no world in general, only a world as it exists 
for this or that bounded form of life. There is no milieu other than the 
surrounding range of perturbation that prompts a body to respond and 
adapt. This notion of the inescapable bounds of sense is articulated in 
three forms: traditional Aristotelian ethics, theories of living systems or 
embodied mind and various forms of Gaia hypothesis or life as a global 
brain. In response to a widespread sense of disaffection and disenchant-
ment, philosophy, senses of community, or religion are now proffered as 
practical means that enable us to give order and sense to life; they are not 
exercises in truth or ways of transcending one’s locus. One can consider 
here popularizing uses of philosophy, such as Alain de Botton (2000) 
and A.C. Grayling (2001) and more academic reactions against a philos-
ophy and society diagnosed as overly technocratic. Martha Nussbaum’s 
philosophy as therapy (Nussbaum 1994), or contemporary Western 
philosophy’s recent embrace of eastern traditions of meditative thought 
(Flanagan 2011), answer the present potential loss of the world with a 
return to a more connected relation to one’s milieu. So, whether it is the 
return to some sense of self-creating community in Aristotelianism, an 
insistence on the embodied mind’s coupling with its milieu, or the recog-
nition of the interconnectedness of all life in one global brain, this wide-
spread attention to the human organism’s thorough worldliness suffers 
from one over-riding problem of blindness: the world in which we will be 
extinct, the world that ‘we’ have extinguished and the world that increas-
ingly takes on forms of distinction that we cannot directly perceive is not 
the world that has had meaning for ‘us.’ 
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Indeed, insofar as ethics relies upon something like a subject of enun-
ciation we might say that an ethics of extinction would have to be a coun-
ter-ethics or possibly an anti-ethics (working against ethos, or the sense 
of locatedness of self.) It was Kant who insisted that without the possibil-
ity of attributing actions to a subject whom we would hold responsible—
a subject who must be free—morality would have no sense. Freedom is a 
practical requirement, even if it cannot be known or intuited. And similar 
requirements of coherence and personification characterize other ethi-
cal models: one of the neo-Aristotelian laments, against Kantianism, is 
that ethics is not formal but has to do with forms of life, sympathy, and 
the imagination of others’ worlds (MacIntyre 1984); recent work on 
cognitive science and the embodiment of mind has, more than any other 
paradigm, stressed the locatedness and concreteness of human decisions 
(Churchland 2011). There is, in all these emphases upon the ethical and 
its requirements of personhood, narration and practical engagement with 
the world, a reaction against theory, against the perniciously distanced, 
impersonal and disembodied observer. Ethics is not a question of cal-
culation and formalization but of what to do, here, in this locale, in this 
world with others. Ethics is praxis, not logos. But do the problems that 
face ‘us’ today have that type of practical requirement? 
Is the situation of extinction a problem of praxis, response and sym-
pathy? Is it not, rather, an occasion for a mode of calculation that insists 
neither on the freedom and openness of a radical future irreducible to 
the material world nor on the communicative horizon within which all 
action, as some form of proto-speech, would take place? It is not only the 
global climactic crisis that demands forms of thinking that take account 
of forces beyond those of human intentionality, the same could also be 
said for milieux as (seemingly) human as global terror and global finance. 
It is not only the case that such threats posed to human existence have 
no single, locatable agent to whom ‘we’ might address certain ethical 
demands for justice; it is also becoming increasingly clear that there has 
been a catastrophic attribution of subjectivity and mastery to processes 
that are without located agency. Consider the recent and widespread 
financial crises, ranging from the global financial crisis of 2008, emanat-
ing from something as seemingly humble as a series of home mortgages, 
to the precipice of collapse of the European Union in 2012. On the one 
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hand, as capitalism hurtles towards its seemingly inevitable demise, there 
appears to be no shortage of guilty persons: those in government who 
failed to regulate, those liberated from regulation who failed to exercise 
foresight, prudence or concern, those who blindly consumed, spent and 
borrowed without a sense of time or consequence and, when the crisis 
became all too apparent, those who maintained all the old privileges of 
bonuses and conspicuous spending precisely when these practices were 
deemed to be responsible for the widespread chaos. The same follows 
for climate change, worsened by large corporations answerable only to 
shareholders, and by governments incapable of looking beyond electoral 
terms. Terrorism, too, for all its figuration through certain faces and types 
of crowds, becomes upon examination a diffuse toxin that is exacerbated 
by anti-terror legislation, xenophobia, resentment caused by constant 
surveillance, fear of terror and the panic it causes, and the fear of the 
panic that the fear of terror causes. How would one respond to this ethi-
cally? Is there a ‘one’ who, in the traditional terms of ethics is called upon 
to respond? One might say that we are given a hyperbolic ethical situa-
tion: it is precisely because we are at a point of extinction with the stakes 
not being this or that act within the political but the survival of any pos-
sible polity, that we are impelled finally to decide. But if there were any 
possible response to this situation par excellence would it not be, at least 
in part, to imagine that there is no ‘we,’ no agent to whom this hyper-
bolic demand is addressed: would it not require the annihilation of the 
imagination? 
Early in the twentieth-century the two great philosophers of life, 
Edmund Husserl and Henri Bergson, conducted two different but 
equally provocative thought experiments. Husserl asked us to imagine 
the world’s annihilation (and by world he was not referring to the material 
object planet earth but to the experienced horizon of that planet as lived, 
the lived planet as world that so many phenomenologists today regard as 
the sine qua non of all life):
The existence of a world is the correlate of certain multiplici-
ties of experience distinguished by certain essential forma-
tions. But it cannot be seen that actual experiences can flow 
only in such concatenated form.. It is instead quite conceiv-
able that experience, because of conflict, might dissolve into 
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illusion not only in detail, and that it might not be the case, as 
it is de facto, that every illusion manifests a deeper conflict..  in 
our experiencing it is conceivable that there might be a host of 
irreconcilable conflicts not just for us but in themselves, that 
experience might suddenly show itself to be refractory to the 
demand that it carry on its positings of physical things harmo-
niously, that its context might lose its fixed regular organiza-
tions of adumbrations, apprehensions, and appearances—in 
short that there might no longer be any world[…].
Now let us add the results reached at the end of the last chap-
ter; let us recall the possibility of the non-being of everything 
physically transcendent: it then becomes evident that while 
the being of consciousness, of any stream of mental processes 
whatever, would indeed be necessarily modified by an annihila-
tion of the world of physical things its own existence would not be 
touched. Modified, to be sure. For an annihilation of the world 
means, correlatively, nothing else but that in each stream of 
mental processes certain ordered concatenations of experi-
ence and therefore certain complexes of theorizing reason 
oriented according to those concatenations of experience, 
would be excluded. But that does not mean that other mental 
processes and concatenations of mental processes would be 
excluded. (Husserl 1983, 110)
Bergson asked us to consider the speeding up of cosmic time. For 
Husserl the thought of the natural world’s non-existence would compel 
us to imagine human subjectivity as radically altered but nevertheless 
remaining. Bergson asked us to imagine the speeding up of cosmic time, 
with all the natural material events of the globe occurring twice as fast:
Outside ourselves we should find only space, and conse-
quently nothing but simultaneities, of which we could not 
even say that they are objectively successive, since succession 
can only be thought through comparing the present with the 
past.—That account by science is proved by the fact that, if 
all the motions of the universe took place twice or thrice as 
quickly, there would be nothing to alter either in our formulae 
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or in the figures which are to be found in them. Consciousness 
would have an indefinable and as it were qualitative impres-
sion of the change, but the change would not make itself felt 
outside consciousness, since the same number of simultanei-
ties would go on taking place in space. (Bergson 1913, 116)
For Husserl the lived or ‘natural’ world’s annihilation would not alter 
transcendental subjectivity in its essence as pure potentiality for the syn-
thesis of time. For Bergson, not quite in opposition, a speeding up of the 
world would not change its nature; consciousness, though, would be fun-
damentally different if it took place at a different speed. Consciousness 
endures, so that it is not just a series of events placed next to each other; 
each event is what it is because of all the past events, and if the rate of 
events were sped up then the nature of events themselves would alter 
essentially. Quite simply, if I were to slow down the viewing of a film I 
would experience a play of light, a series of small movements, and the 
flicker of an emotion that would not be perceived were that film played 
at the standard speed or sped up. I would not experience more or less of 
the film but would have a different experience entirely, and in turn would 
have a different experience of all else in my life precisely because ‘I’ am 
nothing other than my singular duration, altered perpetually by what is 
perceived and its speed or slowness of affect: ‘duration properly so called 
has no moments which are identical or external to one another, being 
essentially heterogeneous, continuous and with no analogy to num-
ber’ (Bergson 1913, 120). At first Husserl and Bergson seem to present 
opposite cases: for Husserl transcendental subjectivity is not bound to 
the world of natural time, and would even exist (though radically altered) 
without the world altogether; for Bergson consciousness is its flow of 
the world, and while matter is what it is and can be sped up in its rate of 
change and still remain matter, the speed of conscious events determines 
what consciousness will be, what it will endure.
Bear in mind before we consider these experiments any further that 
both these philosophers were concerned with the extinction of philos-
ophy. For Husserl certain philosophical forms, such as historicism and 
psychologism, had accounted for the origin of truth and logic by plac-
ing these possibilities of thinking within human and material time: logic, 
mathematics and geometry were deemed to be grounded on actual 
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human subjects who had lived in concrete time and who had either 
founded (in the case of historicism) or reflected upon (in the case of 
psychologism) truth procedures. Such explicating maneuvers were 
responses to scientific criteria for rigor but in their capitulation to such 
standards reduced philosophy to one more worldly act of observation 
that threatened philosophy’s very life. Philosophy could only survive if it 
were to release itself from the grip of such already constituted modes of 
judgment and instead question the possibility of judgment as such:
To be human at all is essentially to be a human being in a 
socially and generatively united civilization; and if man is a 
rational being (animal rationale), it is only insofar as his whole 
civilization is a rational civilization, that is, one with a latent 
orientation toward reason or one openly oriented toward 
the entelechy which has come to itself, become manifest to 
itself, and which now of necessity consciously directs human 
becoming. Philosophy and science would accordingly be the 
historical movement through which universal reason, ‘inborn’ 
in humanity as such, is revealed.
This would be the case if the as yet unconcluded movement 
[of modern philosophy] had proved to be the entelechy, prop-
erly stated on the way to pure realization, or if reason had 
in fact become manifest, fully conscious of itself in its own 
essential form, i.e. the form of a universal philosophy which 
grows through consistent apodictic insight and supplies its 
own norms through an apodictic method. Only then could it 
be decided whether European humanity bears within itself an 
absolute idea, rather than being merely an empirical anthro-
pological type like ‘China’ or ‘India’ ; it could be decided 
whether the spectacle of the Europeanization of all other civi-
lizations bears witness to the rule of an absolute meaning, one 
which is proper to the sense, rather than to a historical non-
sense, of the world.
We are now certain that the rationalism of the eighteenth cen-
tury, the manner in which it sought to secure the necessary 
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roots of European humanity, was naïve. But in giving up this 
naïve and (if carefully thought through) even absurd ratio-
nalism, is it necessary to sacrifice the genuine sense of ratio-
nalism? And what of the serious clarification of that naivete, 
of that absurdity? And what of the rationality of that irratio-
nalism which is so much vaunted and expected of us? Does 
it not have to convince us, if we are expected to listen to it, 
with rational considerations and reasons? Is its rationality not 
finally rather a narrow-minded and bad rationality, worse than 
that of the old rationalism? Is it not rather the rationality of 
‘lay reason,’ [Vorgegebenheiten] and the goals and directions 
which they alone can rationally and truthfully prescribe? 
(Husserl 1970, 16)
 For Husserl, saving philosophy from itself would also be a redemp-
tion of human life: the human subject, in its rigid or ‘naïve’ scientism, 
is extinguishing itself. But Husserl saw this self-extermination as a sign 
of possible renewal; it is in the nature of consciousness, as a synthesis of 
the external world, to mistake itself for one already existing object. The 
positing of the subject as one more concrete thing within the world is no 
unfortunate error. It is precisely because we live in a world of things that 
are ready and present that we also take ourselves to be similarly natural 
objects. Such a ‘natural attitude’ works perfectly well for the sciences but 
will not only lead to the crisis and death of a properly scientific or rigor-
ous philosophy, it will also mark an end to responsibility. As long as we 
accept logic, mathematics or the sciences as self-evidently true systems 
we will fail to recognize the genesis of those systems and will, in turn, 
fail to recognize the power of subjectivity—not as some given term upon 
which truth can be founded, but as that which gives itself foundation. 
Bergson also thought that the intellect’s capacity to manage the world 
efficiently was responsible for taking mind and its experiences as simi-
larly manageable data. He, too, thought that only by annihilating man as 
a rational animal within the world would there be some future for a spirit 
or consciousness liberated from natural calculations—a spirit that did 
not yet exist: 
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Our freedom, in the very movements by which it is affirmed, 
creates the growing habits that will stifle it if it fails to renew 
itself by a constant effort: it is dogged by automatism. The 
most living thought becomes frigid in the formula that 
expresses it. The word turns against the idea[…]. Like eddies 
of dust raised by the wind as it passes, the living turn upon 
themselves, borne up by the great blast of life. They are there-
fore relatively stable, and counterfeit immobility so well that 
we treat each of them as a thing rather than as a progress, for-
getting that the very permanence of their form is only the 
outline of a movement. At times, however, in a fleeting vision, 
the invisible breath that bears them is materialized before our 
eyes. We have this sudden illumination before certain forms 
of maternal love, so striking, and in most animals so touch-
ing, observable even in the solicitude of the plant for its seed. 
This love, in which some have seen the great mystery of life, 
may possibly deliver us life’s secret. It shows us each genera-
tion leaning over the generation that shall follow. It allows us 
a glimpse of the fact that the living being is above all a thor-
oughfare, and that the essence of life is in the movement by 
which life is transmitted. (Bergson 1911, 127-28)
So if Husserl appears to dismiss the constitutive role the world’s or 
earth’s own duration plays in consciousness, and if Bergson refuses a sub-
ject in general that would be a pure potential for logic outside any specific 
duration, both philosophers nevertheless thought that the way of dealing 
with the human capacity to extinguish itself—to imagine itself as nothing 
more than a mere thing among things—was not to appeal to the imagina-
tion of a common humanity. Rather, Husserl’s world annihilation experi-
ment suggested that a destruction of all that has come under the name of 
humanity, including the archive of constituted disciplines, would at least 
disclose some power of humanity that might begin to think of itself as 
something not already given. And Bergson’s speeding up of cosmic time 
also tries to distinguish between a cosmos whose speeds are not its own, 
for the cosmos would not lament hurtling to its end at twice the rate, and 
a consciousness that is certainly not fully actualized as a common human 
species. Elsewhere, in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, Bergson 
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distinguishes between morality’s reliance on a body of common interests 
defined against external threats, and dynamic religion that has the capac-
ity to orient itself to no one in existence, towards a virtual other to whom 
I am not bound by either interest, or passion or sympathy.
Now, a mystic society, embracing all humanity and moving, 
animated by a common will, towards the continually renewed 
creation of a more complete humanity, is no more possible of 
realization in the future than was the existence in the past of 
human societies functioning automatically and similar to ani-
mal societies. Pure aspiration is an ideal limit, just like obliga-
tion unadorned. It is none the less true that it is the mystic 
souls who draw and will continue to draw civilized societies 
in their wake. The remembrance of what they have been, of 
what they have done, is enshrined in the memory of human-
ity. Each one of us can revive it, especially if he brings it in 
touch with the image, which abides ever living within him, of 
a particular person who shared in that mystic state and radi-
ated around him some of that light. If we do not evoke this or 
that sublime figure, we know that we can do so; he thus exerts 
on us a virtual attraction. (Bergson 1935, 68) 
Mankind lies groaning, half-crushed beneath the weight of 
its own progress. Men do not sufficiently realize that their 
future is in their own hands. Theirs is the task of determin-
ing first of all whether they want to go on living or not. Theirs 
the responsibility, then, for deciding if they want merely to 
live, or intend to make just the extra effort required for ful-
filling, even on their refractory planet, the essential function 
of the universe, which is a machine for the making of gods. 
(Bergson 1935, 275)
Where does this leave us today? Certainly it is inadequate to turn back 
to Husserl or Bergson and try to retrieve a humanity or subjectivity that 
would be other than the calculations and interests of warring interests. 
These early twentieth-century gestures of appealing to a virtual spirit or 
transcendental subjectivity occurred in the face of philosophy’s possible 
extinction; if humanity were a potentiality beyond the calculus of matter 
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then it, too, would have an existence outside those disciplines and bodies 
of thought. Something similar occurs today with an appeal to an ethical 
or political subject who must, supposedly, be in existence (if only virtu-
ally) in any claim of interest; there must be an ‘I’ who speaks or demands 
and, therefore, a ‘you’ or ‘one’ from whom consensus is sought. But what 
Husserl’s world annihilation experiment and Bergson’s cosmic time 
experiment disclose is that questions of extinction, annihilation and the 
acceleration of cosmic time destroy a subject or humanity as we know it. 
Further, whereas Husserl and Bergson thought that the task that would 
save thought and philosophy would be the annihilation or acceleration of 
the natural world, and the destruction of man as a natural body within the 
world, today it is the possible extinction of the man of ethics and philoso-
phy that may allow us to consider the survival of the cosmos. At the very 
least, it is time to question the ‘we’ who would subtend and be saved by 
the question of ethics and politics. If that ‘we’ is annihilated what remains 
is less a subject of thought, a common humanity, a proto-politics, but a 
fragile life that is not especially human. And once that is all that remains 
one might ask about the viability of living on: if humanity values life, 
rather than imagining itself as that which supervenes upon or survives 
beyond life, then that valuation would have to consider those modes of 
life beyond humanity, beyond ethics and politics. This would not yield an 
environmental ethics, for an environment is always that which surrounds 
or houses a living being as environs or milieu. What it might be is a coun-
ter-ethic for the cosmos. 
If it is not presupposed that the only life worthy of consideration is 
ethico-political—to do with a sense of ethos, polity, abode or dwell-
ing—then one might consider those modes of life that are not defined 
by milieu. In relation to the human one might ask whether modes of liv-
ing and modes of relation could exist without the assumption of a ‘we,’ 
and without the assumption that ‘we’ are worthy of living on; one might 
ask whether the future should not be saved for another mode of life alto-
gether. Such a question might force a consideration of what is worthy of 
survival, even if such survival appears, today, to be less than certain.
Chapter 8
Just Say No to Becoming Woman 
(and Post-Feminism)
The topic of post-feminism is neither joyous nor rigorous. The ‘post’ of 
post-feminism can either signal the redundancy of a feminist movement 
that has achieved about all it could achieve, implying an acceptance of 
gender politics. From this point of view, we can celebrate that certain 
things are no longer acceptable—unequal pay, sexual harassment, the 
refusal of reproductive rights, discriminatory language or exclusion from 
the public sphere—and these achievements would render feminism tri-
umphant and redundant. Alternatively, post-feminism would be a criti-
cal stance that attends to forces that are far more complex than those 
that could be explicable via categories of gender (McRobbie 2004). It is 
obvious that feminism has made gains that ‘we’ (humans and the non-
humans who benefited from eco-feminism) are now enjoying; and yet we 
might also remind ourselves that such hard-won gains are ‘one generation 
away from extinction.’1 It is no less obvious that for all those gains, figures 
of gender and tired clichés of sexual difference still organize a lot of our 
thinking (insofar as we are still thinking). Indeed, perhaps there is a third 
sense we could grant to the term post-feminism: in addition to referring 
to the completion of feminism, and to the overcoming of the simplicities 
of feminism, perhaps post-feminism might be more akin to terms such as 
‘post-modernism’ or ‘post-structuralism.’ Here, to be post-feminist would 
be at one and the same time a refusal of the implicit borders of gender 
politics, while recognizing that any supposed era after feminism will be 
haunted by the figures of binary sexual difference that were exposed, crit-
icized, deconstructed and parodied. 
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It may well be that we live in a time of the posthuman, where we recog-
nize the claims of animals, technology, the planet and other unbounded 
forces; and yet it is precisely here, in the genre of the post-apocalyptic, 
that the most tiring gender narratives are repeated. One can think of 
Cormac McCarthy’s The Road (2006) in which the world after the end 
of the world (the world after the destruction of capitalism and civility) is 
nevertheless ordered by a familial narrative: a man journeys with his son 
through posthuman wreckage, mourning the child’s mother. Or, consider 
any number of post-apocalyptic cinematic events where the disaster nar-
rative is typically entwined with a heterosexual romance: The Book of Eli 
(2010) is at once a reflection on a world in which the archive of Judeo-
Christianity has been destroyed (with one fabled remaining copy of the 
Bible), and also a terrain in which a heroic Denzel Washington fights the 
forces of posthuman evil. Yet the narrative is still structured (as nearly all 
Hollywood narratives are) by a male-female encounter. The heroic Eli not 
only saves the world by preventing the one remaining bible from falling 
into the wrong hands; he also saves Solara, the young female who signi-
fies the future at the film’s close. One might say that it is easier to imagine 
the end of the world, and the end of capitalism, than it is to think outside 
the structuring fantasies of gender.2 There must always be an active male 
heroism driven by a feminine fragility that appears to hold the promise 
of the future. Explicit narratives of this form, such as Children of Men 
(2006) in which a world that has stopped breeding is given feeble hope 
in the form of a young pregnant woman to be saved by the male lead, 
are surrounded by less overt regressions to the romance plot and its vari-
ants. The Walking Dead (2010), I am Legend (2011), The Day the Earth 
Stood Still (2008), 28 Days Later (2002)—all these imaginings of the 
end of the world nevertheless remain with a sentimental Oedipal struc-
ture of the family. It might make sense to think in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
terms that ‘becoming-woman’ is the key to all becomings (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 291): gender and sexual binaries seem to be the last archa-
ism in a world that is elsewhere happily posthuman. Finance capital has 
destroyed the notion of a locus of capitalism; the era of the brain and 
artificial intelligence has put to rest any notion of the exceptionalism of 
the human; research on non-human languages and cognitive archaeology 
has meant that we are truly post-structuralist (no longer believing in the 
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linguistic paradigm). We are post-capitalist, post-linguistic, post-political, 
post-racial and yet not fully post-feminist. We have gone through the per-
formative turn, the affective turn, the non-human turn, the theological 
turn and the ethical turn, and yet we seem to keep turning back to woman. 
Even so, for all the rigidity of gender and notions of woman, surely 
the twenty-first century seems to demand that we think beyond woman, 
rather than beginning with woman as our first step to human freedom. 
Why, now, would we want to keep talking about a category as tired and 
flabby as ‘woman’? And why would we want to take a philosophical cor-
pus, such as Deleuze and Guattari’s with all its energy directed at mov-
ing beyond human normality and tie it back—again—to the question 
of becoming woman? If Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 280) had anything 
to say on the issue it was to insist on becoming-woman as a moment of 
passage, and so—not surprisingly—they cited Virginia Woolf ’s claim 
that it would be fatal for writing to ‘think of one’s sex. ’ Given this fram-
ing of the concept in Deleuze and Guattari’s corpus, why would one ever 
waste thought and ink on this relatively isolated, and manifestly transient, 
notion of becoming-woman? 
One way of defending a continued focus on ‘woman,’ if not ‘becoming-
woman,’ would be strategic: even if gender and sexual difference were 
blunt organizing categories they nevertheless have their persistence and 
need to be dealt with rather than willed away. Part of the value of psycho-
analysis has been in acknowledging the gap between what we may know 
to be true, and an archaic psychic economy that continues to operate. 
( Juliet Mitchell [1974] argued for the pertinence of psychoanalysis pre-
cisely because despite the women’s movement’s reasoned claims intrac-
table Oedipal structures remained in place.) When Deleuze and Guattari 
wrote Anti-Oedipus they accepted the truth of the Oedipal individual at 
the level of the historical imaginary: insofar as we demand to be recog-
nized as subjects we must submit to an either/or disjunction of male/
female. Yet Deleuze and Guattari also strenuously insisted that subjec-
tion was not the sole logic. Instead, they took up a modernist notion that 
other forms of language, perception and embodiment would be possible, 
beyond the current logic of Oedipal individualism. If modernism in its 
literary-aesthetic mode was in part a critique of the West, and in part a 
critique of the subject, it was also an ambivalent critique of ‘man’ tied to a 
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concept of writing. When Deleuze and Guattari quote Virginia Woolf in 
their plateau on becoming they are drawing upon an author whose mod-
ernism was already in dialogue with centuries of anti-humanist critique, 
ranging from Friedrich Nietzsche’s tirade against a ‘consciousness’ whose 
interiority could only be established by severing itself from the intensity 
of life, to Henri Bergson’s argument that the intellect had reified the life 
of spirit. At first glance modernist anti-humanism seems to be marked by 
a neo-Romantic positing of ‘the feminine’ as that which might operate 
as an exit from the Western subject of judgment. (One can think here of 
the ‘oceanic’ conclusion of Joyce’s Ulysses with the affirmative repetition 
of Molly Bloom’s ‘yes,’ and Julia Kristeva’s [1980] appeal to Joyce’s ‘semi-
otic’ mode pre-Oedipal poetic language.) 
In addition to ostensibly ‘feminist’ modernisms that celebrated a 
redemptive power of the feminine, there was also a modernism that 
refused both man and woman. If Deleuze and Guattari’s aesthetic is 
indebted to modernism it is not surprising that they appealed to Woolf 
in their description of the transition from becoming-woman to becom-
ing-imperceptible. Just as becoming-woman is a divided concept, look-
ing back to a seemingly redemptive figure of the feminine beyond rigid 
being, but also forward to a positive annihilation of fixed genders, so 
modernism was also a doubled movement. Modernism was in part a 
logic of the subject in its striving to be nothing other than the distanced 
observer, or nothing other than any of the personae though which one 
speaks (Ellmann 1987). But modernism was also an anti-subjectivism, or 
rather a pulverization of ‘the’ subject for the sake of a plural and multiply-
ing point of view. In addition to the arched, refined and urbane distance 
of impersonality, modernism was also a tactic of positive and positively 
destructive refusal. Radically anti-humanist modes of modernism would 
not just be other than any determined subject; one would not just be 
posthuman or post-feminist in the sense of negating of distancing oneself 
from ‘man.’ Rather, one would take up and decompose the rigidity or stu-
pidity of the figures that had strangled thinking, not imagining that one 
might simply and too quickly will away the forms, figures or ‘territories’ 
that had oriented thinking.
‘Becoming-woman,’ I would suggest, needs to be read as a defi-
ant and affirmative refusal. It is quite distinct from either the Lacanian 
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notion of imagining that there is no woman (that there is no ‘beyond’ 
that would exceed subjection, and no ‘thing’ that would guarantee my 
enjoyment [Copjec 2002]). Becoming-woman is also distinct from 
attempts to destabilize the ‘heterosexual matrix’ from within by repeat-
ing and distorting gender’s already constituted figures (Butler 1993). 
That is, ‘becoming-woman is not an authentic recognition that gender 
is some fantasmatic lure whose ‘beyond’ I need to think in the form of 
a radical negation (as in the Lacanian insistence that ‘woman does not 
exist.’) Nor does one take up the existing figure of woman to repeat or 
perform it ironically (Cornell 1991). For both these positions—that we 
must negate gender or perform it parodically—suffer from simultane-
ously over-valuing and undervaluing thinking. They overvalue thinking 
by assuming that one can pass from recognizing the fantasmatic status of 
thought’s contaminating figures to adopting a distanced and critical atti-
tude; at the same time the future potentiality of thinking is diminished 
by not creating or writing other modes of perception. The problem with 
Oedipus is both its negating stranglehold on thought, and its inability to 
imagine that thought might be jolted from its familial slumbers. For the 
Oedipal structure is just that, a style or mode of perceiving: one views 
the world as a subject, as a point of view opening onto a world that is 
structured and differentiated according to a certain common logic. The 
broader claim and project of Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus is to 
destroy that style of subjectivism by creating a mode of thought that is 
not that of a world differentiated by ‘a’ system of signification for ‘the’ 
speaking subject. Becoming-woman is one of the ways in which they 
imagine a different mode and temporality of perception: not a world that 
I can only live as always already differentiated, a world to which I am sub-
jected, with only a fantasmatic or negative ‘beyond.’ 
I.
I would suggest that the problem of considering the worth of political or 
tactical concepts such as ‘becoming-woman’ opens onto the broader ter-
rain of human stupidity and the relation between stupidity and time. Is 
it sufficient for us to look back across the philosophical or literary cor-
pus, spot the moments of racial, gendered, sexual, ethnic or historically 
154 Chapter 8
embedded bias (where thought has allowed itself to be captured by cli-
ché), and then proceed to separate the dynamism of ideas from the stu-
pidity of unthinking inertia? If this were so then one could see modern-
ism as an attempt to rid thought of its opacities in order to arrive at a 
moment of renewed vision. One would overcome thought’s limits and all 
its reified points of inertia to arrive at a pure becoming. (And one would 
apply the same criteria of pure becoming to Deleuze and Guattari, read-
ing certain aspects of their corpus as suffering from subjection to a form 
of ‘little Oedipus,’ where they remain too faithful to their Marxist forbears 
[De Landa 2003].) By contrast, an acknowledgment of something like 
a transcendental stupidity (Deleuze 2004, 187; Ronell 2002, 20) would 
require us not to see ‘becoming-woman’ as a local movement, adopted in 
the late twentieth-century to take us once and for all beyond man. If that 
were so then becoming-woman would be a majoritarian shift: something 
‘we’ need to do once and for all to overcome the figure of man. Rather, 
becoming-woman is a minoritarian shift, occurring in multiple, frequent, 
diverging and always shifting incursions. Becoming-woman would be 
a perpetual act of war, waged against both the upright morality of man 
and the redemptive otherness of woman. Further, this might relate to 
the broader project of a counter-organicism: destroying the parochial-
ism in which the thinking body folds the world around its own practical 
needs, imagining itself as a thing among things. There is another capac-
ity for thinking, which would take thought beyond its own bounded self, 
and would do so via perception. Becoming-woman might possess some 
privilege or legitimacy, not just because it was not the perception of man, 
and not because it would be perception from another point of view, but 
because it would shift the problem of point of view. Becoming-woman 
would not be perceiving as a woman, but perceiving in such a way that 
perception would be a form of becoming. 
‘It is fatal for anyone who writes to think of their sex." This way of 
approaching becoming-woman would relate directly to Virginia Woolf ’s 
refusal to think of sex alongside her use of point of view, where sen-
tences move ever closer to intuiting the world of the beings that the nar-
rative voice perceives: the worlds perceived by waves, particles, moths, 
light and air. To accept a transcendental stupidity is to elevate thinking 
above the upright image of pure thought and to encounter a swarm of 
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becomings. Becoming-woman would be a strategy that refused both the 
Lacanian notion that ‘woman does not exist’ (or that woman has served 
as a lure to cover the fact that we are necessarily subjected to a symbolic 
order that produces the effect of a lost and mourned originary plenitude) 
and an easy posthuman exit that would escape man and woman alto-
gether in a moment of post-feminist, post-cognitive and post-Cartesian 
unity. Becoming-woman would be an affirmative rejection of reactive 
negations—would abandon the idea of stepping outside man once and 
for all—but it would also be a refusal of active submission, a refusal of the 
idea that we always already think within a system that we repeat parodi-
cally or ironically. 
Becoming-woman, read as a twin refusal (of both purity and subjec-
tion), may well not be a flippant or dated (merely timely) remark in the 
works of Deleuze and Guattari. Becoming-woman might indicate a dif-
ferent mode of the politics of philosophy: the stupidities that populate 
the philosophical corpus—including the concept of ‘woman’—would 
be indicative of tendencies that always have two sides. The concept of 
becoming-woman would be beyond good and evil: neither a sign that 
we might finally move beyond man to some redemptive outside, nor a 
mark or stain in Deleuze and Guattari’s work that signals a moment of 
weak (1960s and hippy) and unthinking feminist sympathizing. Rather, 
the concept itself—considered as a concept created to do work in recon-
figuring the philosophical plane—serves both to reorient the speeds and 
styles of thinking, and to confront philosophy’s plane of concepts with 
its own stupidity (Weinstein 2010). To this extent the creation of the 
concept of becoming-woman might also be aligned with a certain style 
of modernism: at once recognizing that the canvas is always populated 
with clichés and that we speak in a waste land of dead phrases (Deleuze 
2005, 8, 61), while at the same time insisting that the refusal of cliché and 
dead letters does not give us some grand present of rebirth, but instead a 
more profound death. (Later in this chapter I will turn to Woolf ’s story 
on the perception of the death of a moth. It is the witnessing and writ-
ing of death, the perception of the waning of the spark of life, that takes 
writing beyond the expressing subject to the life that gives itself in both 
annihilation and survival.)
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In the remainder of this chapter I will argue that a certain valorization 
of becoming-woman is already at play in dominant modes of literary aes-
thetics and politics, and that it is a refusal of this assumed or moralizing 
becoming-woman that is enabled by a reconsideration of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s mobilization of Woolf ’s modernism. In brief:
1. If we read modernism as an anti-humanism of impersonality, in 
which the artist is nothing other than the voices he adopts (dis-
tanced as he is from the panorama of futility that he surveys), 
then we arrive at a modernism of ironic elevation and negation. 
This would be a modernism of heightened or hyper-subjectiv-
ism that in many ways paves the way for today’s posthumanisms 
in which man finds himself at one again with a creative life of 
which he is but one self-aware fragment.3 
2. Such a modernism would, therefore, be in line with a long tradi-
tion of celebrating literary ‘becoming’ in which writing is pure 
act, without determining essence, and in which the pure exis-
tence of the creative word destroys man as a being within the 
world, and allows something like a pure subject to emerge. This 
subject would be godlike in his distance from any of the deter-
minations through which he expresses an infinite productivity: 
‘For this is quite the final goal of art: to recover this world by 
giving it to be seen as it is, but as if it had its source in human 
freedom’ (Sartre 1988, 63).
3. A post-modernism that followed such an anti-human and nega-
tive modernism would lead to at least one of the modes of 
posthumanism that is being affirmed today: a posthumanism 
in which there is, and never has been, anything like ‘man,’ for 
man is nothing other than all the events, acts and perceptions 
that bring him into being (Hayles 1999, 3). Man would always 
be other than any determined ‘man.’ Man would always be pure 
‘becoming,’ and whatever was, or has been, determined by 
the notion of ‘woman’ would always provide man with a play-
ground for his own self-becoming.
4. Against this, we might consider the Deleuze-Guattari-Woolf 
concept of becoming-woman in which writing occurs not as a 
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self-unfolding but as an encounter with another becoming—
two quantities entering into a differential relation. Becoming-
woman would therefore not be a pure becoming in which 
‘woman’ would stand for playful self-invention but would be a 
becoming in which positive traits or tendencies would orient 
the event of writing (Lawlor 2008). Becoming-woman would 
necessarily be only one moment in other becomings, and 
would then open a necessarily sexual (but not gendered) writ-
ing: writing would be sexual because it would always be in rela-
tion to other relations, and sexuality would always be a form of 
writing (but not signification) because encounters would pro-
duce distinct maps and orientations. 
5. Whereas ‘the signifier’ indicates the dominant system through 
which the world would be mediated, and would be central to 
theories of gender that define ‘sex’ as that which seemingly 
precedes and is presupposed by gender norms (Butler 1990), 
sexuality is tied to a mode of writing in which differences are 
inscribed in multiple strata. Sexuality would no longer be what 
takes place among signified genders, for genders would emerge 
from sexual processes (processes of inscription, tracing, mark-
ing, miming, coupling, distancing, perceiving): ‘Sexual differ-
ence is the principle of radical difference, the failure of identity, 
destination, or finality. It is the eruption of the new, the condi-
tion of emergence, evolution or overcoming’ (Grosz 2011, 103).
II.
Before we decide to consign becoming-woman to the dustbin of high the-
ory (and its crazier, French and affirmatively pseudo-feminist moments), 
it might be best to consider just once more whether the concept (if it is a 
concept) has any purchase today. Here are the possibilities: 
1. Becoming-woman as transition that is now no longer 
required: however we might have articulated and defined femi-
nist projects to date (equality, difference, androgyny, anti-essen-
tialism, strategic essentialism…) we are now in a post-feminist 
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era. We have achieved whatever could be achieved via gender 
politics and we now need to move on to more complex terrain, 
acknowledging complexities of class, sexuality, ethnicity and 
culture. Becoming-woman would be a post-feminist concept, a 
way of thinking the transition from molar women’s movements 
to a micro-politics in which both man and woman would be 
abandoned as basic political units.
2. Becoming-woman still required because of the centrality of 
‘man’: ‘Becoming-woman’ was indeed, as Deleuze and Guattari 
argued, the ‘key to all becomings.’ If something like the figure 
of man has been crucial to the ways in which politics has pro-
ceeded—assuming a basic social unit of a reasoning individual 
who acts in order to extend and maximize his interests—then 
this is both because a certain notion of becoming has been nor-
mative, and because the Oedipal figuration of the man of reason 
is thoroughly tied to this pure becoming.
The liberal subject, as self-defining, is nothing other than his own 
becoming. One might define this valorization of the self as pure act as 
Oedipal (as Deleuze and Guattari do). According to this structure: the 
world as it is in itself lies beyond the capacities of finite human reason, 
and man can only know the world through the systems and order that 
he himself has constituted: ‘The question remains, though, whether the 
‘social’ sphere designated by ‘the Name of the Father,’ a symbolic place 
for the father, which, if lost (the place and not the father), leads to psy-
chosis. What presocial constraint is thereby imposed upon the intelligi-
bility of any social order?' (Butler 2004B, 253). Man is submitted and 
subjected to a system of his own making, beyond which he can neither 
think nor live. Without that imposed system of differences ‘he’ would 
have no being. The Oedipalism of this mode of pure becoming lies in its 
formalism and proceduralism: man is subject to a general system, and 
must always speak of the world only in terms that are shared and com-
municable; beyond that system of communication and ongoing legitima-
tion there is only the chaos or fantasy of some lost origin. The notion of 
the ‘beyond’ of communicative reason, and politics generally, would be 
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fantasmatic and other, figured Oedipally as that imagined plenitude that 
is constitutively lost when man accedes to the order of society. 
Man is becoming; he is nothing more than his own self-deciding and 
legislating actions. It follows, for Deleuze and Guattari, that there is no 
becoming-man; one cannot take on traits or styles or rhythms of man, 
because the very notion of ‘man’ is that of a being whose existence is 
nothing other than that of free self-variation (without determining 
essence or positive predicates). Becoming-woman challenges this nor-
malizing Oedipalism in a number of ways. First, if there is such a thing as 
becoming-woman, or entering into variation by taking up those traits and 
predicates that lie beyond man, then this is because what is other than 
man is not some dark night of undifferentiated chaos. There are other 
durations and pulsations of life. 
For Virginia Woolf the task of writing was not—as one dominant 
definition of modernism would have it—to present the signifier as sig-
nifier and to de-naturalize a life that has (ideologically) presented itself 
as natural when it is indeed thoroughly human and historical (MacCabe 
1979). Such a constructivist or mediated notion of reality would not only 
be Oedipal in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms (presenting reality always as 
given only through organizing systems), but would be (in Woolf ’s terms) 
fatally destructive because of its location in ‘a’ sex: it would give the world 
to us only as it is for man. The alternative is not then to write from a spe-
cifically woman’s world—for that too would be the world at one remove. 
‘Becoming-animal,’ also, would not be an imperative to write the world of 
the animal, as if life were nothing more than multiple mediated and mean-
ingful worlds (although some claims for animal ‘lifeworlds’ today seem 
to be insisting on just this point [Wheeler 1995]). Beyond the world as 
it is given there would be the durations and pulsations—the moments—
from which worlds emerge: the task would be to write the waves and par-
ticles that might yield a pure perception. ‘Man’ would always be the being 
who—via language, meaning or his own sense of life—gives himself the 
world. Becoming-woman would be a mode of writing in which the waves 
and particles that compose the gender of woman might be released. 
Second, ‘man’ as the basic political unit relies on a racial and histori-
cal (and, again, Oedipalized) narrative: in the beginning is the individual 
who enters into social relations for the sake of collective efficiency; from 
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the nuclear family of father-mother-child, sympathies are extended to 
broader social groupings, with women also—eventually—being granted 
the right to enter the public sphere. But for Deleuze and Guattari the 
reverse is the case: in the beginning is the territory, in which human 
bodies assemble according to various rhythms, durations and sympa-
thies with the earth. From that original grouping, or organization of the 
‘intense germinal influx,’ a certain deterritorialization can occur whereby 
a single body stands above the group, figured as its point of law. That ele-
vated ‘despot’ is able to terrorize the network of bodies, at least in part, 
through an excess of desire—consuming the surplus of production, and 
taking over women’s bodies. (There would be some convergence here 
between Deleuze and Guattari’s account of social machines being consti-
tuted through sexual consumption and Gayle Rubin’s [1975] insistence 
that the token of ‘woman’ is constituted through systems of exchange, 
with woman established as object of consumption. The difference would 
lie in Deleuze and Guattari’s insistence that before there is exchange of 
woman, or before woman is constituted as that which is exchanged, there 
is theft: not theft in the face of scarcity, but a theft that produces a power 
of excess—the despot who, in seizing the surplus of all forms of produc-
tion, including sexual production, becomes a distinct and organizing 
point of power). 
When ‘man’—in the liberal era—regards himself as the basic social 
unit, who gives himself law and mediation in order to avoid the chaos and 
psychosis of bare life, he must do so by repressing the racial and collective 
history that has passed from the intensive differences of life to the gener-
alizing figure of man. For Deleuze and Guattari it is not the case that life 
begins with a figure of man who must come to terms with his world (who 
must become social and extend from the biological family to the social 
collective); rather it is after a long, complex and inhuman history—in 
which racial, sexual and organic complex is increasingly reduced to gen-
eral figures—that the supposedly underlying generality of the human 
emerges. Becoming-woman would be a way of releasing man from the 
notion that beyond the sexual binary there is only the primitivism of 
chaos; by looking at the coming into being of the genders of humanity 
one would open up a geology. This geology would then open out onto all 
the racial and historical differentials that have been frozen into the unit of 
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man, and beyond that into all the differentials of life that have been rei-
fied into figures of bounded organisms opposed to unorganized matter. 
Finally, becoming-woman would challenge both the linguistic figure of 
modern man, as well as a series of declared post-linguistic (supposedly 
posthuman) turns. The notion that we become subjects by submitting 
ourselves to the system of signifiers, and that we then live this subjection 
as a law that prohibits some maternal beyond, is thoroughly Oedipal. The 
concept of ‘the’ signifier is despotic, and both ties modern Oedipalism 
back to a history in which the complex territories of life have been sub-
jected to a body (including language of culture) that has leapt outside 
the assemblages of relations, and also looks forward to a ‘postmodern’ 
world in which there is supposedly no reality or world other than that 
given through signifying systems, or in which the pre-linguistic is always 
given ex post facto after the event of sex. If, by contrast, language were 
considered to be one of many systems—including systems of non-lin-
guistic signs, such as all the gestures we read in a lover’s face, or the signs 
of art in which formed matters can be presented as signs of color or light 
as such—then it might become possible to liberate writing from ‘the 
subject.’ Becoming-woman would signal that there are positive modes 
of difference and articulation. It is not language that differentiates; the 
differences of language over-code far more complex systems. Becoming-
woman opens up a positivity that not only destroys the notion that lan-
guage differentiates (because there are traits that one can follow, develop, 
vary and extemporize beyond the man of linguistic communication), the 
concept of becoming-woman also challenges various supposedly post-
human or post-linguistic motifs. It would do so by destroying both the 
natural kinds of bounded sexes (male or female) and the notion of con-
structed genders; in its place there would be neither a gender politics nor 
a sexual politics (in which the polity would be a site for the contesting of 
variously sexualized interests), but there would be a sexuality of becom-
ing. Every becoming would be sexual because no becoming is a power 
unto itself: there is no self-present, self-sufficient, self-organizing power. 
There is no life; there is only ‘a’ life, distinct powers from which an open 
whole is composed. When we perceive something like an essence (such 
as what color would be in all of its potential manifestations for any time 
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whatever), we perceive the force of its expression, a power’s capacity to 
differ in all its events of encounter and actualization. 
III.
There should be something disturbing, destructive and untimely about 
the concept of becoming-woman. If we were to define becoming-woman 
as a temporary strategy of the women’s movement then we would be 
assuming an orthography of thought: it would be as though we might use 
certain concepts provisionally, achieve the aims of the women’s move-
ment, cleanse thought of its opacities and stupidities, and then move on. 
But what if man were a persistent transcendence: a tendency of thought 
or life to be captivated and rendered docile by images of good sense? If 
man were a tendency of organicism, a tendency to fold the world around 
the organized body’s view of the world, then becoming-woman would be 
an ongoing and tireless destruction, a key to becomings.
One of the notions that lies behind various ‘turns’—the affective turn, 
the vital turn, the performative turn, the non-human turn—is that the 
figure of man, and the notion of linguistic construction, was an error or 
false turn that can be overcome by turning to the true life and vitality 
that is man’s real milieu. It is as though we might recognize, by an act of 
reason, that there is no such thing as man and that we are in fact really 
emotional, embodied, affective and active beings who—following that 
recognition—can now live interactively, ecologically and dynamically. 
The Cartesian subject would be an accident or error that we could will 
away by an act of decision, allowing us to become posthuman and at 
one with a single world of interconnected life. I would suggest that we 
think otherwise: Cartesianism is neither an unfortunate and external 
lapse, but a result of a tendency for thought to be captured by its own 
images (Toscano 2010). That tendency—like all tendencies—has two 
sides, and it is the task of becoming-woman to deterritorialize those traits 
from which the ‘man’ of modernity has been composed. According to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of becoming-woman it is not by annihilat-
ing one’s being and then taking up a relation of proper knowing towards 
one’s milieu that one overcomes the miserable normality of ‘man.’ Rather, 
becoming is always a relation to some other becoming: there would be 
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no posthuman world or single ecology that we could arrive at after man. 
Becoming-woman would be one line of exit, one way of thinking some 
mode of duration and rhythm that would yield a particular refrain. From 
there one might discover other differential pulsions. There would not 
be a single ground of life that could be retrieved or found after man; but 
there would be multiple ways in which one might encounter ‘a’ life. Each 
predicate, trait or singularity would open to the infinite in its own way. 
By beginning with woman—and not some general notion of becom-
ing—one would be adopting the truth of the relative (which is quite dif-
ferent from the truth of relativism). And it is here again that we might 
turn to Woolf and writing: the imperative to write is counter-democratic 
if by democracy one were to refer to consensus or majority opinion 
(and it is no surprise that in this respect modernism in general has been 
accused of having a certain contempt for the masses [Carey 1993]). But 
there might be a destructive, rather than deliberative, democracy in writ-
ing and becoming-woman whereby everything that has stood for good 
sense and propriety is annihilated by a constant and exacting percep-
tion. Rather than begin with a relativism, in which there is no view of 
the world outside that given by various voices, becoming-woman aims 
to write from a positive perception of traits, with each intuition opening 
towards a power’s capacity. There is a truth of the world, but it is given 
infinitely, from all the powers to perceive that compose the world in 
their own way. This might help us to think the specifics of Woolf ’s style, 
and the ways in which she writes neither in a strict free-indirect style 
(in which sentences occupy a certain mode or way of speaking) nor in 
stream of consciousness. 
One of the key features of Woolf ’s mode of writing might be given 
in the contrast between a deliberative democracy and something like 
a democracy of powers, or what Deleuze refers to as the ‘swarm’ of the 
world. Jacques Derrida, for example, has argued that literature is tied 
to democracy in its capacity to ‘say anything.’ Because the literary text 
detaches what is said from any ownership of the voice, language circulates 
freely, as language (Attridge 2004). We see text as text in its own right, 
producing its relations and differences, performing a relation between 
inside and outside in its ‘scene of writing.’ Woolf by contrast speaks of her 
own writing as oriented towards the expression, perception, articulation 
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and life of other powers: waves, moments, particles, predicates, or quali-
ties. If a certain privileging of writing manages to relativize the world, 
presenting the world as always a world from this or that point of view, 
then Woolf ’s privileging of perception and intuition would always tie 
writing to the forces that prompt its movement. Becoming-woman is not 
a writing of, or about, sex—but the writing of becoming-woman is sex-
ual in being drawn towards powers not its own. Such writing would not 
be a form of relativism, but it would open the truth of the relative, that 
each perception opens in its own way onto an infinite and dynamic whole 
(Deleuze 2006, 21).
There is a truth of the relative that would open towards an ethics of 
amor fati, or an embrace of the encounters that do violence to think-
ing (without the prima facie assumption that we know what thinking 
is). Liberalism is, by contrast, a powerful ethics of relativism: I cannot 
know the law, cannot know the other’s good, cannot make an exception 
of my own desires or opinions on the basis of possessing better or higher 
knowledge; from there it follows that I can only act and speak through 
deliberation and an ideal of consensus, aware all the while that every 
achieved consensus must be open to further deliberation. Relativism 
would not be an acceptance that ‘anything goes,’ for it would require 
me to decide upon those systems that enabled the maximum plurality 
of opinions; a liberal might have to intervene in cases where unjusti-
fied exceptions were imposed. But relativism would be in line with what 
Deleuze refers to critically as ‘equivocity’: there is the world as it is on 
the one hand, and the world as it is known on the other (Deleuze 1994, 
410). Deleuze and Guattari’s univocity posits one substance expressing 
itself in infinite difference, in which all voices sing the truth of being in 
their own way: ‘Arrive at the magic formula we all seek—PLURALISM = 
MONISM—via all the dualisms that are the enemy, an entirely necessary 
enemy, the furniture we are forever rearranging’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987, 23). The truth of the relative, in contrast with liberal formalism, 
would pose a quite different imperative. There would be no possibility 
of a ‘veil of ignorance’ that would allow one to act as if one might speak 
from an ideal position of ‘nowhere.’ But if liberalism insists that one can 
only speak as if one might be any subject whatever, Deleuze and Guattari 
offer a counter imperative to speak for ‘any moment whatever’: such an 
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imperative intuits what a force or power would be in all its expressions 
and actualizations. There would not be ‘a’ world that might be suspended 
in order to think in a manner that was purely formal or procedural. There 
would be multiple worlds, each opened from the force of a single becom-
ing. It would be the challenge of perception and thinking to encounter 
the difference of those worlds, not find some abstract point or field of 
conciliation. 
IV.
If the forgoing is true it follows that becoming-woman is only one pos-
sible trait or singularity among others, and that its power lies in moving 
beyond the historical formation of ‘man.’ If so, with the end of man and 
the end of liberalism we might also have reached, happily and finally, the 
end of woman. As already stated, there can be no becoming-man, no ori-
enting oneself towards the styles and motifs of ‘man,’ because man has 
always been pure becoming. He is nothing other than that which exceeds 
and precedes any of his given acts; his essence is to have no essence 
other than that which he gives himself though existing. Once becoming-
woman opens ‘us’ (we humans) to the notion that becoming is always 
singular, always the becoming of this or that singularity and always in 
responsive relation, then writing would be presented with the tireless 
and ongoing destruction of genders and proliferation of sexes; it is not 
that there are beings—women—who become. Rather, what something 
is is its rhythm of becoming: ‘Children’s, women’s, ethnic, and territorial 
refrains, refrains of love and desruction: the birth of rhythm’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987, 330). The refrain that beats time to this rhythm is 
always in relation to other refrains. Becoming-woman would be an ori-
entation to those traits that had been posed as man’s other, but once this 
orientation opened up positive and divergent becomings we would need 
to move beyond genders and dehumanize the predicates through which 
genders and sexual difference had been contained. 
Such a jettisoning of becoming-woman would seem to be particularly 
urgent today, precisely because there is no longer any reason to adopt 
strategies against liberalism and humanism in a twenty-first century when 
the problems of climate change, terrorism, systemic economic collapse 
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and mass disenfranchisement are no longer suitably countered by tactics 
of anti-humanism. It would seem that both sides—both rapacious global 
capital and post-left, post-feminist thinking—accept that there is no 
such thing as the man of reason. It is no longer the case that the ruthless 
market forces of capitalism present themselves as outcomes of free and 
open individual decision making. In the US, where ‘liberal’ has become a 
pejorative (referring to the destruction of family values and leftist inter-
ventionism in free markets) the notion of the freely deciding individual 
seems to have less political force than the sanctity of the markets and effi-
ciency. This is so much the case that when the 2010 US Supreme court 
decided that corporations were individuals, it was the left that was forced 
to defend the human individual, against the notion of free buying power 
that could operate beyond a bounded human person (Cohen, Colebrook 
and Miller 2012). Bourgeois liberal humanism is not the ideological 
enemy it once was. It would seem to make sense to exit this terrain alto-
gether. In the era of global finance—where there is no longer any capital 
to buoy up capitalism, and where systems operate by hedging, default 
swaps, futures and derivatives—it makes no sense either to return to the 
individual against corporations, or to celebrate some posthuman end of 
man in one great ecology of becoming. 
‘Theory,’ too, seems to have long abandoned man, the subject, the sys-
tem of signifiers and (even strategic) essentialism. After language there 
was the turn to the body, in which sex could only be known as that which 
had been belied and reified by gender. If we go beyond the frame of the 
subject who must recognize herself through the gender system, then we 
are left with a vital, affective, emotive and nonhuman order that may be 
sexual (in its proliferating relations, attachments and mutations) but cer-
tainly not gendered. If we get over all our feminist and leftist gripes, rec-
ognizing that workers and women can no longer offer us some outside 
lever against a patriarchy that no longer has any men left to hold the fort, 
then it seems the appropriate direction to move towards what would be 
beyond human figures tout court.
To pause and offer a possible conclusion: ‘becoming-woman’ may 
have had its time, may have once indicated that without some attention 
to sexual difference there could be no real escape from the rigid logic of 
man, but after more sustained work on sexual difference beyond gender 
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binaries, we should accept that becoming-woman is, as Deleuze and 
Guattari suggest, the ‘key’ to all becomings, and that we have moved 
beyond the ‘key’ moment to more nuanced posthuman (perhaps even 
post-sexual) becomings. 
Here is the problem, or series of problems, with such a consignment of 
this ‘key’ of becoming-woman to the past: first, do we accept that humans 
have the capacity to assess their figural and semantic history, locate gen-
der motifs in a blind past, and then move on to the posthuman? Do we 
grant the human species a capacity to see life as it properly is without 
the intrusion of rigid stupidities, and would life be the type of ‘thing’ we 
might view once we liberated ourselves from humanist framings? (Here, I 
would suggest that we read Deleuze and Guattari alongside Paul de Man’s 
concept of the sublime, where the exit from anthropocentric projection 
would not be an intuition of nature or the lived world but a brute sense of 
materiality.4) Second problem: do we accept that within a corpus, such as 
Deleuze and Guattari’s, where the historical event of capitalism and the 
discovery of the differential calculus disclose some universal truth of life 
as such, that sexual difference is an unfortunate dated motif that can be 
grouped with Deleuze and Guattari’s almost embarrassing references to 
drugs (as though they were a little too 60s-ish at certain moments)? Here 
we would assume some practice of critical hygiene, where the real phi-
losophy and theory might be detached from the unthinking regression 
of dated stupidities. Doing so would rely upon a distinction between free 
unimpeded thinking on the one hand, and an external milieu of inherited 
notions. And it is just that notion of thought as pure self-becoming that 
Deleuze and Guattari sought to question. Third problem: what do we do 
with what remains of the archive: do we stop reading all the works of fic-
tion and cinema that are structured around gender binaries, do we (we 
theorists or literary critics) place ourselves in a world other than that of a 
still present and insistent gender binary? Do we avoid the evidence that 
it is easier to imagine the end of the world and the end of capitalism than 
it is to imagine the end of gender? Perhaps the problem with Deleuze 
and Guattari’s affirmation of becoming-woman as the ‘key to all becom-
ings’ was not its dated 70s radical-feminist hint of sexual politics, but its 
suggestion that one might and should move from becoming-woman to 
becoming-imperceptible. It seems that in our posthuman, eco-aware, 
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post-liberal, post-capitalist and even post-racial world we still remain 
firmly gendered. This is not because gender is not just one mode of estab-
lishing distinct kinds, a mode that could be abandoned once we take on 
a ‘process’ notion of being or a vitalist and dynamic conception of cre-
atively evolving life; for gender is the difference that has been deployed to 
figure difference in general. 
It would follow, then, that if we do not pass through becoming-woman, 
and if we go straight to becoming-imperceptible without engaging with 
the logic of man, then all our posthumanisms will remain as ultra-human-
isms. And, to return to Woolf, it would not be the case that Woolf added 
the problem of woman to modernist projects, but rather that whatever 
modernism would be (whether an apocalyptic vitalism or affirmative 
refusal of the trajectory of the West), writing would be destroyed by 
thinking of one’s sex. Writing would need to take place beyond man, 
which in turn would require a destruction of ‘woman.’ The structure of 
To the Lighthouse expresses this at the level of content: the first section of 
familial gender, where Mrs Ramsay appears as the figure of maternal care 
and other directedness (opposed to the subject/object philosophy of 
Mr Ramsay) is severed by the middle section of ‘Time Passes.’ The final 
section—following Mrs Ramsay’s death and the falling of an immense 
darkness—describes the young artist Lily Briscoe being taken over by 
the matters that are presented to her. Her ‘vision’ follows what Deleuze 
and Guattari describe as haptic, as though the eye can feel the paint and 
canvas, and draw out its tendencies. The canvas presents itself not as a 
milieu for creation ex nihilo, but as a resistance or force that elicits a cer-
tain mode of becoming. The canvas itself bears a perceptive power or 
‘cold stare’: 
She saw her canvas as if it had floated up and placed itself white 
and uncompromising directly before her. It seemed to rebuke 
her with its cold stare for all this hurry and agitation; this folly 
and waste of emotion; it drastically recalled her and spread 
through her mind first a peace, as her disorderly sensations 
(he had gone and she had been so sorry for him and she had 
said nothing) trooped off the field; and then, emptiness. She 
looked blankly at the canvas, with its uncompromising white 
stare; from the canvas to the garden. There was something 
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(she stood screwing up her little Chinese eyes in her small 
puckered face), something she remembered in the relations 
of those lines cutting across, slicing down, and in the mass of 
the hedge with its green cave of blues and browns, which had 
stayed in her mind; which had tied a knot in her mind so that 
at odds and ends of time, involuntarily, as she walked along 
the Brompton Road, as she brushed her hair, she found her-
self painting that picture, passing her eye over it, and untying 
the knot in imagination. But there was all the difference in the 
world between this planning airily away from the canvas and 
actually taking her brush and making the first mark.
Lily’s becoming is not one of self-unfolding, but an encounter between 
a physical sensation of surging forth that achieves ‘an exacting form of 
intercourse.’ If there is a posthuman element to this becoming it does not 
lie in a return to life so much as a separation or detachment from the lived:
With a curious physical sensation, as if she were urged forward 
and at the same time must hold herself back, she made her 
first quick decisive stroke. The brush descended. It flickered 
brown over the white canvas; it left a running mark. A second 
time she did it—a third time. And so pausing and so flicker-
ing, she attained a dancing rhythmical movement, as if the 
pauses were one part of the rhythm and the strokes another, 
and all were related; and so, lightly and swiftly pausing, strik-
ing, she scored her canvas with brown running nervous lines 
which had no sooner settled there than they enclosed (she 
felt it looming out at her) a space. Down in the hollow of one 
wave she saw the next wave towering higher and higher above 
her. For what could be more formidable than that space? Here 
she was again, she thought, stepping back to look at it, drawn 
out of gossip, out of living, out of community with people into 
the presence of this formidable ancient enemy of hers—this 
other thing, this truth, this reality, which suddenly laid hands 
on her, emerged stark at the back of appearances and com-
manded reluctant. Why always be drawn out and haled away? 
[…] It was an exacting form of intercourse anyhow[…].
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What emerges is not a figure or scene that expresses the world as it 
is, but something like difference as such, a line that makes no claim to 
a physical eternity—for the canvas may lie unviewed in an attic until its 
destruction—even though it expresses the power of color and difference 
for all time:
Quickly, as if she were recalled by something over there, she 
turned to her canvas. There it was—her picture. Yes, with all 
its greens and blues, its lines running up and across, its attempt 
at something. It would be hung in the attics, she thought; it 
would be destroyed. But what did that matter? she asked her-
self, taking up her brush again. She looked at the steps; they 
were empty; she looked at her canvas; it was blurred. With a 
sudden intensity, as if she saw it clear for a second, she drew 
a line there, in the centre. It was done; it was finished. Yes, 
she thought, laying down her brush in extreme fatigue, I have 
had my vision.
But it is not only the young female artist whose perception opens onto 
a world of other durations. Woolf ’s short story, ‘The Death of the Moth,’ 
begins in standard third-person description, assuming a common shared 
point of view: ‘Moths that fly by day are not properly to be called moths; 
they do not excite that pleasant sense of dark autumn nights and ivy-
blossom which the commonest yellow-underwing asleep in the shadow 
of the curtain never fails to rouse in us.’ This ‘us’ of common accepted 
perception is disturbed by the passage of perception, which eventually 
discerns something akin to ‘an energy’:
The rooks too were keeping one of their annual festivities; 
soaring round the tree tops until it looked as if a vast net with 
thousands of black knots in it had been cast up into the air; 
which, after a few moments sank slowly down upon the trees 
until every twig seemed to have a knot at the end of it. Then, 
suddenly, the net would be thrown into the air again in a wider 
circle this time, with the utmost clamor and vociferation, as 
though to be thrown into the air and settle slowly down upon 
the tree tops were a tremendously exciting experience. 
Just Say No to Becoming Woman (and Post-Feminism) 171
The same energy which inspired the rooks, the ploughmen, 
the horses, and even, it seemed, the lean bare-backed downs, 
sent the moth fluttering from side to side of his square of the 
windowpane. One could not help watching him.
[…]
Watching him, it seemed as if a fiber, very thin but pure, of the 
enormous energy of the world had been thrust into his frail 
and diminutive body. As often as he crossed the pane, I could 
fancy that a thread of vital light became visible. He was little 
or nothing but life. 
Yet, because he was so small, and so simple a form of the 
energy that was rolling in at the open window and driving 
its way through so many narrow and intricate corridors in 
my own brain and in those of other human beings, there was 
something marvelous as well as pathetic about him. It was as 
if someone had taken a tiny bead of pure life and decking it 
as lightly as possible with down and feathers, had set it danc-
ing and zigzagging to show us the true nature of life. Thus dis-
played one could not get over the strangeness of it. 
[…]
The insignificant little creature now knew death. As I looked 
at the dead moth, this minute wayside triumph of so great a 
force over so mean an antagonist filled me with wonder. Just 
as life had been strange a few minutes before, so death was 
now as strange. 
The ‘death’ here is not a death drive in which life is a quantity of energy 
aiming to return to quiescence; it is a positive and multiple death in 
which the sparks of life become discernible in their distinction and sin-
gularity as they approach some degree zero. Deleuze and Guattari’s 
notion of becoming-woman, like becoming-animal, is not one of copy-
ing or miming, but operates by the perception of traits: and this posi-
tive and relational notion of becoming would help to explain why there 
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could be no becoming-man (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 320). It would 
also require a subtle distinction between becoming-woman and various 
notions of performativity. It is not the case that one becomes who one 
is by repeating an already given norm or imperative, and then conclud-
ing that there must have been a subject who was the agent of the action. 
On the contrary, what is repeated when one becomes-woman is not the 
resulting effect—such as female qualities—but the differential power 
from which such qualities emerge. In this sense becoming-woman is the 
reversal of a performative pragmatics or strategic essentialism; one does 
not adopt a style or norm and then destabilize the figure of woman from 
within, nor adopt the role of ‘woman’ ironically (Cornell 1991). Rather, 
one repeats the tendencies, traits or rhythms from which the figure of 
woman emerged. 
The difference, if you like, is that between Madonna (or Lady Ga Ga) 
and a Marilyn Monroe impersonator. The latter focuses on the end result 
and may come to that actuality by any possible ends (cosmetic surgery, 
practice of speech inflections, mirroring of Marilyn’s walk, the creation of 
certain specific dresses); the former repeat tendencies, seizing the event 
of performance, style, display and movement, becoming a hyper-femi-
nine and yet singular icon. If woman—as an actual social figure—appears 
as a general composition of certain styles of dressing, moving, desiring, 
dissimulating, looking, displaying, speaking and feeling, then becom-
ing-woman begins with exploring different modes of dress, appearance, 
affect and movement. If Marilyn Monroe was a singular expression of a 
tendency of body-voice-face-screen stylization then repeating that differ-
ential power (rather than copying the result) would approach something 
like becoming-Marilyn. One of the key features of the notion of the trait 
is tied to a broader notion of singularities or pure predicates: each actual 
individual occurs as the differentiation of a potentiality. Each human 
body comes into being by drawing on a range of virtual potentialities, 
and continues to do so for her entire life: not only does my ongoing bio-
logical and neurological identity occur in my relation to other powers 
(such as my brain becoming a reading brain after encountering script, 
my eye becoming more and more readily distracted with the purchase of 
various portable screen devices, my bones becoming stronger after years 
of running, or my blood pressure rising after decades of a Western diet), 
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it is also the case that my given capacity to become in these ways has a 
long racial, cultural, sexual and political history. This is the partial truth of 
evolutionary psychology and cognitive archaeology, which have sought 
to trace our current responses and capacities back to a hunter-gatherer 
and warring tribal past, along with the early human gendered division 
of labor. But the problem with cognitive archaeology is not its seeming 
sexism, or its assumption that ‘men are from Mars and women are from 
Venus.’ The problem is that these ‘just so’ stories are not sexist enough, or 
that they do not discriminate sufficiently or with any attention to the sex-
uality of discrimination. Man—the hunter-gatherer and hyper-attentive 
tribal prototype of our past—is already the result of a desiring history: 
formed by assembling in territories, organizing the body to react first col-
lectively, and then privately, to visual stimuli. As the history of man and 
social machines continues what counts as ‘man’ in general is the result 
of a history of reduced racial intensities towards an increasingly general 
whiteness, and the formation of the notion that there is a man in gen-
eral, eventually emerging as the reading-thinking-reasoning individual 
of modernity. 
To begin to think about the ‘traits’ that would compose an event of 
becoming-woman would require both an attention to manifestly stylis-
tic features from which any woman (or man) is composed—so that acts 
of drag would emphasize the performance of gender in terms of dress, 
body grooming, and modes of comportment—but also to broader traits, 
the geologies of which are traced by Deleuze and Guattari in their uni-
versal history of capitalism. The reading eye that judges in accord with 
the measuring hand, and that in turn feels itself to be a subject of speech 
submitted to ‘the’ law: this composition of the human animal is, Deleuze 
and Guattari argue, racial and sexual. The notion that there is some uni-
versal underlying humanity, presented in general as ‘man’ (and about 
whom various neo-Darwinists might theorize) occurs after certain traits 
have been rendered hegemonic, and after a certain understanding of sex-
uality as private and familial has reorganized (or reterritorialized) collec-
tive qualities onto the individual. It is only if I assume that one becomes 
human by abandoning one’s pathological and exceptional (racial, sex-
ual, ethnic) particularities, and does so in order to enter into the great 
enlightened conversation of consensus, that sexuality is deemed to be 
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private, personal and individual. For Deleuze and Guattari politics and 
history are sexual: social machines are formations of desire—both the 
despot becoming powerful by hoarding, consuming, and visibly enjoying 
the violence of public torture, and the later formations of fascism where 
a series of traits mobilize a body politic (swastikas, jackboots, tanks, 
anthems, the straight lines of modernist design and so on). 
V.
The concept of becoming-woman—and I would suggest that we think 
of it as a concept, created to reconfigure a plane of related notions—is 
tied to a broader history of capitalism. Capitalism, Deleuze and Guattari 
argue, has always been ‘warded’ off by various social machines that seek 
to limit and over-code flows and exchanges: this ranges from obvious 
examples, such as early modes of despotism and feudalism in which there 
is no open market along with a hoarding of goods by a central power, to 
early modern laws against usury, sumptuary laws, royal displays of excess, 
and protective subsidies, as well as broader and more subtle ways of 
quantifying bodies as units of exchange (such as capitalist democracies 
where laboring bodies and commodities become the two flows of capi-
talism). Becoming-woman is not a solely feminist gesture, or if it is, it is 
only because feminism (for Deleuze and Guattari at least) is a path to a 
broader critique. Capitalism is the abstract essence of social machines: 
desiring life is composed of quantities entering into relation, and it is 
from those dynamic relations that relatively stable points of bodies are 
composed. Bodies—human bodies, political bodies, economic bodies, 
corporate bodies—are mixtures of powers. Quantities, entering into rela-
tion, become qualities and those qualities in turn become relatively sta-
ble bodies. Capitalism tends to liberate quantities from bodies, releasing 
labor power and commodities into a general system without fixed center 
or transcendent body, but capitalism also limits the free flow of quanti-
ties through an axiomatic. Nowhere is this axiom more evident than in 
liberalism, both in its economic form of laissez faire exchange (which 
is always an exchange via the market), and in liberal political theory in 
which I am nothing other than a capacity to deliberate and communicate, 
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always capable of imagining what it would be to think of justice, in gen-
eral, regardless of my position in the polity. 
By contrast, becoming-woman would not abstract from concrete indi-
viduals to individuals in general—would not operate ironically by imag-
ining that justice or humanity would occur as regulative ideas towards 
which a process of consensus would tend, but never achieve. Nor would 
becoming-woman be posthuman if posthumanism were taken to be a 
return of man to a world of living systems of which he would be but one 
of many instances. Rather, becoming-woman is the beginning of a humor 
of depths, moving towards the traits, singularities or predicates that have 
been actualized by differentiation—and then moving towards the intu-
ition of a virtual potentiality that has a full reality beyond the world as it 
is given. Becoming-woman would be quite distinct from a performative 
theory of gender, whereby I become who I am by recognizing, and seek-
ing recognition. Rather, becoming-woman enables a creatively destruc-
tive theory of sexuality in which genders are decomposed into traits, and 
then further decomposed into tendencies, moving towards the infinitely 
small, or ‘a thousand tiny sexes.’
When Deleuze and Guattari write about capitalism they do not adopt 
the still current criticism that capital reduces the qualitative complex-
ity and richness of the world to system and quantities, with the impli-
cation that if we overthrow capitalism’s reduction of qualities to quanti-
ties, we will return to the full dynamic flux of the world (to the praxis 
from which technological systems emerged). Deleuze and Guattari are 
not what Protevi and Bonta refer to as ‘flow enthusiasts’ (Protevi and 
Bonta 2004, 37):
there is no enabling without constraint. (In Foucualt’s terms, 
power is not negative but productive.) Constraint here is a 
reduction in the dimensionality of the connection space of 
components while emergent effects mean the substance has 
increased the dimensions of its connection space (it can do 
more things, relate to more bodies—or at least more powerful 
bodies—than a heap of lower-level substances can). (Protevi 
and Bonta 2004, 37)
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The problem, for Deleuze and Guattari, is that capitalism is not sys-
temic enough, not quantifying enough, not sufficiently technical. We 
allow certain blunt figures—such as the image of the working, desiring 
man of reason to operate as a limit and lure. It is as though exchange must 
always serve individual’s interests, and yet we do not ask how it is that 
something like human interests are constituted historically. How has the 
commodity-acquiring, property-owning, familial, heterosexual, laboring, 
reading, judging, and political man of modernity been formed? And has 
not the figure of gender been crucial here: man is deemed to be defined 
against a femininity that is caring, nurturing, other-directed, domesti-
cally attuned, emotional, empathetic and oriented towards a male who 
(at least according to evolutionary psychology) is chosen because he will 
provide suitable genetic material? The current vogue for evolutionary 
psychology or cognitive archaeology is evidence of a tendency to explain 
quantities and tendencies from already qualified forces: we argue that the 
gender system emerges from (say) male interests in spreading as much 
genetic material as possible, and female interests in investing in quality 
partners. What we fail to look at are how those bounded forms emerged 
from intensities: how the human body becomes a gendered, familial and 
identified laboring individual. 
Life arrives, historically, at capitalism because of a certain potentiality 
that has been ‘captured’ by capitalist political systems, by relatively open 
markets. Relations amongst intensive quantities, such as the various 
forces of a body entering an encounter with—say—the intensive poten-
tialities of another body are organized in capitalism as a relation between 
labor and capital. The standard political response has been to try to find 
some point outside of exchange; but Deleuze and Guattari aim to take 
capitalism beyond itself. What is required is not a step outside exchange 
and quantities, but more exchange, more quantification, a multiplication 
of powers and encounters. Capitalism is neither quantifying nor system-
atizing enough; what is required are far more nuanced, discriminating, 
systemic (rather than imaginary) systems. 
Here, then, one might begin to see the force of becoming-woman: 
what if the figure of ‘man,’ the supposed basic social unity of life—a unit 
that today has become entirely rigid in the proliferating pseudo-Darwin-
ian narratives about the emergence of morality, language, art and all other 
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human practices—were to encounter other traits? As already noted, the 
concept of becoming-woman is not at all similar to strategic essentialism; 
it is not the tactical adoption of the voice of woman in order to create 
a political force. On the contrary, becoming-woman acknowledges the 
reality of traits, intensities and quantities that need to be released from 
the dull and insufficiently nuanced systems of gender. It is not the case 
that—as a certain mode of deconstruction would have it—the concept 
of woman is some imposed abstraction that has no reality, and so one 
might only speak as a woman parodically or ironically. Nor is it the case 
that ‘woman’ is some signifier that we are subjected to, which then creates 
the illusion of the reality of sex. Rather, what has fallen under the concept 
of woman has more reality than the insufficiently technical and systemic 
concept of ‘woman’ in its current form allows: what if, historically, what 
we know as woman were composed from series of complex tendencies? 
Becoming-woman appears, after all, as a concept in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
A Thousand Plateaus where the modern figure of political man covers 
over a complex, multiple and intensive history of racial and sexual invest-
ments. Practices of marriage, kinship, reproduction, pornography, art, fic-
tion, courting rituals, fashion systems, cosmetic surgery, sports, affective 
rituals, body styles (and so much more): all these are techniques operat-
ing in highly complex ways that neither the notions of gender—as two 
stable kinds—nor sexual difference (as reproductive chromosomal iden-
tity) can intuit. It is fatal, when writing, to think of one’s sex.
Notes
1.  I quote Ronald Reagan from his first inaugural speech as governor of 
California, January 5, 1967, for whom freedom was ‘never more than one 
generation from extinction.’ This Reagan quotation was repeated recently by 
Julianne Moore (playing Sarah Palin) in the 2012 HBO film Game Change. 
Such a reminder of generation-paced extinction was timely in 2012 when 
the constant threat of civil rights reversals seemed to actualize into a fully 
fledged war, both with a supposed ‘war on women’ and with a resurgence 
of claims of racial lynching. (Democrats accused Republicans of opening a 
war on women when certain States legislated for compulsory vaginal probe 
ultrasounds prior to pregnancy terminations, while Rebublicans countered 
with an attack advertisement against ‘Obama’s War on Women’ because 
the Obama campaign accepted donations from a supposedly misogynist 
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comedian Bill Maher. [http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/obamas-
war-women_634041.html]) The March 2012 killing of Trayvon Martin was 
not only compared to a lynching, so were the following calls for his alleged 
killer’s arrest. An article on ‘The Lynching of George Zimmerman’ (Martin’s 
alleged killer) was posted on Occidentaldissent.com immediately following 
large rallies calling for Zimmerman’s arrest following what Democracynow.
org declared to be a ‘modern day lynching.’ (http://www.democracynow.
org/2012/3/20/a_modern_day_lynching_outrage_grows) Wars and 
lynching: none of these seems at all ‘post’ anything, and so we might wonder 
why we would want to complicate matters at all by turning to ‘becoming-
woman’ when the basic ‘molar’ issues of race and gender seem so intractable. 
On the other hand, maybe the fact that we seem to be still involved in wars and 
lynching that we might think of other strategies.
2.  The idea that the end of the world is easier to imagine than the end of 
capitalism is widely quoted (though the source is vague). See Jameson 2005, 
199 and Žižek 2011.
3.  Rosi Braidotti (2012), aware of the various modes, perils, lures and forces of 
posthumanism usefully distinguishes between anti-humanisms that are set 
against ‘man,’ anti-humanisms that retain the revolutionary fervor of secular 
humanism and her (quite distinct) line of affirmative posthumanism, that 
creates but does not assume a life and perception beyond man and his others. 
4.  Paul de Man, Aesthetic Ideology ‘The dynamics of the sublime mark the 
moment when the infinite is frozen into the materiality of stone, when no 
pathos, anxiety, or sympathy is conceivable; it is, indeed, the moment of 
a-pathos, or apathy, as the complete loss of the symbolic.’ 126.
Chapter 9
How Queer Can You Go?
[…] no ‘gay liberation movement’ is possible as long as 
homosexuality is caught up in a relation of exclusive disjunc-
tion with heterosexuality, a relation that ascribes to them 
both to a common Oedipal and castrating stock, charged with 
ensuring only their differentiation in two noncommunicating 
series, instead of bringing to light their reciprocal inclusion 
and their transverse communication in the decoded flows of 
desire (included disjunctions, local connections, nomadic 
conjunction). [Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 350]
Consider a number of possibilities for what might count as a queer the-
ory: the use of theory (any theory) to expose bias; the criticism of the-
ories themselves for implicit biases; or, a re-description of theory that 
identifies its orientation as essentially queer. It is this last mode that I 
wish to pursue in this chapter, and will do so by looking at the ways in 
which the long-standing model of theoria as a distanced look or regard 
taken upon an object is intrinsically normalizing.
Such a model of theory as the imposition of order and judgement on 
chaos via a transcendent norm of logic has been identified by a number 
of thinkers as having its origin in Platonism. John Protevi has identified 
this model as ‘hylomorphic’: the ordering of chaotic matter by an exter-
nal and stable system of reason (Protevi 2001). Luce Irigaray has, follow-
ing Heidegger, not only criticized the notion of underlying matter (as 
hypokeimenon) that is then rendered intelligent through representation as 
subjective (for then matter becomes what it ought to be through the per-
ceiving subject’s act of knowledge); she has also identified such a notion 
of theory as phallogocentric. That which is other than the self is the 
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medium through which the self comes to know and affect itself (Irigaray 
1985). Perhaps the clearest critique of this notion of theoria comes from 
Martin Heidegger, who argues that the original experience of the world 
as unfolding and disclosing itself through a time of bringing-to-presence 
becomes covered over with the idea of ‘a’ logic that it is, eventually, the 
task of man to take up as that which renders thought correct and human 
(Heidegger 1998, 240). Rather than pursuing Heidegger’s own way 
beyond this forgetting of the unfolding of Being, I wish to pursue Gilles 
Deleuze’s reversal of Platonism. This is not because Deleuze manages to 
move further beyond Plato than Heidegger—rejecting Heidegger’s calls 
to dwelling, caring and attending to the four-fold—but because Deleuze 
returns to a higher Platonism (Deleuze 1994, 265).
The reversal of Platonism, for Deleuze, is not the overcoming of a tran-
scendent logic in favor of the primacy of lived experience, but an over-
turning of experience and the lived in favor of radically inhuman Ideas 
beyond judgment. This reversed or radical Platonism, I will argue, gener-
ates not only a new mode of theory, and a new relation between theory 
and sexuality, but also a new and positive notion of queerness: not as 
destabilization or solicitation of norms, but as a creation of differences 
that are no longer grounded in either the subject or generating life. To 
anticipate my conclusion: this would yield different ways of thinking 
about practices, and different ways of thinking about sexual identities. In 
the case of practices, rather than examining the actions of subjects against 
existing regulations—such as enquiring whether same-sex civil partner-
ships are a reconfiguration of norms or a submission to normality—we 
would look at the ways in which bodies enter into relations to produce 
events, events that transcend those bodies. To use Deleuze and Guattari’s 
phrase from Anti-Oedipus, ‘ask not what it means but how it works’: when 
faced with a practice try to determine its range of potentiality in the 
future, not its relation to the present system (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 
206). In the case of sexual identities, rather than thinking of masculin-
ity and femininity as constitutive norms to which bodies submit, we can 
see the ways in which bodies play with the ‘pure predicates’ of sexuality 
(Deleuze 1990, 186): in the case of trans-gender and trans-sexual bod-
ies, such bodies may at one and the same time experience their bodies 
as female, dress as male, and have sexual relations with partners who are 
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similarly ‘counter-actualizing,’ or enjoying sexuality in its ideal and inhu-
man form (Deleuze 1990, 238).
If we think of normal theory as the establishment of a paradigm or 
norm for thinking which criticizes the unthinking absurdities, illusions 
and stupidities of everyday thinking, then Deleuze’s theory is, or aims to 
be, queer in its liberation from a normative ‘image of thought,’ while not 
being simply anti-normative (Deleuze 1994, 131). The task is not to dis-
turb thought’s images of itself, but to think imaging as such, via a mode 
of theory that would detach itself from the lived. It does not follow, then, 
that such a queer theory would be a form of relativism, or the use of ‘a’ 
theory (Deleuze) by a group that takes itself to be the exemplification of 
liberating sexual practice. On the contrary, as a radical Platonism and a 
commitment to taking thought beyond itself to Ideas, Deleuze presents 
thought with the challenge of a radical transcendentalism. Before pursu-
ing that option I want to explore the ways in which thought approaches 
the queer: how can thinking, from its base of norms and recognition (or 
what it takes itself to be), approach the queer?
One could use theory to isolate and criticize biases and prejudices 
within putatively neutral positions and paradigms. Not only would there 
be nothing queer about theory, there would be no relation between theo-
retical paradigms and one’s political objectives. One could criticize het-
erosexual or normalizing assumptions from a liberal, deconstructive, 
communitarian or even psychoanalytic point of view. Liberalism, for 
example, defining itself ideally as a pure formalism devoid of any con-
ception of the good life, would necessarily be opposed to any political 
or social system that discriminated against persons on the basis of some 
unacknowledged presupposition regarding personhood.1 Deconstruction 
could, in turn, criticize such a liberalist ideal of pure formalism by argu-
ing that there would always be an exemplary or privileged supplement 
in any system that could not be rendered transparent by the system.2 It 
is possible to imagine this deconstructive orientation to metaphysics’ 
unthought or radically stylistic figurations as being of service to a politics 
that wished to expose normative and normalizing conceptions of the self 
at the heart of figures of supposedly ‘pure thought.’ While psychoanalysis 
from its inception bears an originally normalizing bias, either by positing 
the Oedipus complex as the transcendental frame for the constitution of 
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subjectivity, or the phallus as the signifier of presence, it can nevertheless 
be used against its own assumptions. Again, this would be possible only 
through a critical maneuver, where instead of placing a different notion 
of the body or subject at the heart of psychoanalysis, the queer theorist 
would open the genealogy of the psychic subject to permutations not 
recognized by the original heterosexual frame.
The second possibility for queer theorizing would deploy the notion of 
queerness in a stronger sense, not only arguing that certain positions are 
narrowed by an overly normalizing conception of the subject or life, but 
would go on to point out the ways in which the very structure of a certain 
notion of theory was normalizing. One might contrast here, for example, 
the difference between Judith Butler’s early criticism of psychoanalytic 
Oedipalism with Deleuze and Guattari’s criticism of the Freudian sub-
ject. Butler accepts the structural premises of psychoanalysis—the con-
stitution of the subject in relation to others, the fantasy frame of the self 
and the other’s body, the vicissitudes of the libido in relation to the struc-
tures of desire through which the self is constituted as human, and (most 
importantly) the originally subjected nature of the subject3: one becomes 
a self only through abandonment of potentialities not allowed by the het-
erosexual matrix. The subject necessarily exists in a relation of mourning, 
melancholia and negativity (even if that which the self mourns is consti-
tuted after the event and fantasmatically). For Butler, then, there is noth-
ing intrinsically normalizing about psychoanalysis per se, and so a queer 
theorist can at one and the same time criticize and deploy Freud’s corpus. 
For Deleuze and Guattari, by contrast, it is that negative notion of desire 
and anxiety—the very structure of psychoanalysis as a theory—which 
remains tied to normalizing notions of ‘man’ (1983, 348). For Freud it is 
anxiety that effects repression: the subject, faced with a world of intensity 
and affect, must delimit and organize the libido into a state of equilib-
rium or constancy. We can see that notion of the very economy of desire 
in Butler’s work and its influence on queer theory; it is assumed that the 
becoming-human of the self occurs through a process of recognition that 
must necessarily abandon and repress desire’s more fluid potentialities.
For Deleuze, the notion of theory that begins from the conditions for 
the possibility of a constituted and normative subject, is not only intrin-
sically bourgeois in its ideology of placing thought within a position 
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of compromise and contradiction. It is also committed to a normaliz-
ing metaphysics (Deleuze 1994, 283–84). The psychoanalytic model 
of a pool of energy, which is then structured by attachments to desired 
objects—as opposed to an intensive life that harbors tendencies towards 
expansive and creative desires—can only produce the man of common 
sense and good sense. If subjects are understood as having been effected 
from a general and undifferentiated ‘life,’ understood along the lines of 
nineteenth-century thermodynamics, then the relation between the 
queer and the normal would be entirely conventional. Were we to pur-
sue a queer theory along these lines we would have to argue that queer-
ness would operate as a criticism of presupposed but un-avowed norms. 
It is because there is a heterosexual matrix that constitutes and delimits 
subjective possibilities that we could pay attention to those modes of 
performance and enactment that disturbed normative structures. Our 
theory would not be queer, for we might well be in agreement with the 
general structure of subjects being constituted through social norms and 
structures; the queerness would lie in the attention we paid to those sup-
posedly failed or extrinsic modes of subjectivity, to which we may accord 
a privileged transgressive value. Our approach would be queer only in 
its difference and distinction from effected models of the subject. Such 
a theory might also appear to be ‘posthuman,’ for rather than beginning 
from the man of reason or the subject of phenomenology who synthe-
sizes given experiences into some coherent whole, we would begin from 
a general pool of force, life or energy that—through action or perfor-
mance—constitutes subjects. Those subjects may, through misrecogni-
tion and metalepsis take themselves to be originators of the act. Theory 
would set itself the task of demystifying such illusions of agency, demon-
strating the ways in which everything begins with performance, act and 
relationality—the substance or true ‘sex’ of the subject being constituted 
ex post facto. (I will argue, in the sections that follow that this seemingly 
posthuman theoretical approach remains entirely subjective, and still 
implicated in a highly normalizing ethics).
In principle, then, it would be a mistake to use the term ‘queer the-
ory’ to refer to the projects as I have outlined them so far, for what we 
would really be doing would be queer studies. Queer studies would be 
related to gay or lesbian studies, in its criticism of the assumed normality 
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of heterosexuality, but would go beyond such identified groups to con-
sider the fragility of identity and its excessive character in relation to what 
Deleuze and Guattari refer to as ‘molar politics.’ Queer studies might 
appear to be concerned with molecular or minor forms of politics: not 
the contestation of paradigms from the point of view of recognizable 
(even if marginalized) groupings, but the interrogation of constituted 
subjects from the point of view of a life or desire not yet identifiable as 
this or that specifiable form, a ‘people to come’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987, 106). Queer studies would be different, methodologically, from 
American Studies, Asian Studies, Women’s Studies and so on insofar 
as ‘queer’ would not refer to a kind but might use various methods to 
inquire into the stability and instability of kinds. Rey Chow has already 
challenged notions of area studies according to the degree to which it 
makes such assumptions about various worlds or areas being available for 
purview, so it is quite possible that queerness or identity-instability goes 
beyond queer studies to ‘studies’ as such (Chow 2006). I would argue, 
though, that the true challenge of Deleuze and Guattari’s thought lies in 
its difference from critical models, and in its transformation of the ways 
in which we understand theoretical relations, and relationality in general.
The third possibility would be not simply to challenge the norms that 
dominate a theory—for example interrogating psychoanalysis from 
within by isolating its unquestioned assumption of male-female rela-
tions—but would contest just what it means to theorize. Only then 
would our theory be queer; it would not be the use of theory for queer 
politics, nor would it be an interrogation of our theoretical premises 
or figures regarding implicit normative and normalizing assumptions. 
Instead we would shift the ‘image of thought’—mind constituted as an 
effected point within life—to thought without an image: would it be pos-
sible to think of the emergence of qualities, potentialities or Ideas that 
create an aleatory point? This would not be a position of judgment or 
critique, but a virtual line of sense. Mind would neither be the site from 
which synthesis emerges, nor the subject that would be created via the 
imposition of some subjecting system. Theory would not be the capacity 
of mind to step back from and reflect upon itself, but a capacity to map all 
the distinctions, separations and created strata of life, including the cre-
ation of various lines and powers of thought. If life can be thought of not 
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as substance from which predicates are then differentiated, performed or 
effected, but as a plane of force that allows for the creation of relatively 
stable points, we can think of theory as the creation of a potential which 
is no longer the power of this or that aspect of life (this or that body) so 
much as the thought of the transcendental potentiality of life as such, life 
liberated from any normative image. This is why sexuality would come to 
the fore in the task of new modes of thinking and theorizing. One might 
say that the potentiality for queer theory has always haunted theory. Or, 
one might say that theory has always tended to be queer but has been 
impeded by a counter-theoretical normalizing tendency. Theory, defined 
with theoria in mind would pertain to looking, perceiving, and possibly 
imaging. Undertaken in a normalizing manner theory would reflect upon 
how it is that ‘we’ see; but if we subtract this ‘we,’ or if theory is considered 
without the ground of ‘the people’ then there would be an imaging, per-
ceiving or relation, from which theory would emerge. Theory would arise 
from relations among powers, and would therefore always be hybrid. 
This hybridity demands that we reverse the understood relation between 
theory and metaphysics. If it is the case that our metaphysics—our image 
of what it is to think—is currently effected from the bodies around us, 
or the ways in which we ‘fold’ images around our own ego-centered ori-
entation, then a radical metaphysic of transcendental empiricism would 
free sexuality from organized bodies. It would no longer be the figure of 
mind or the good thinking subject that established the relation to theory. 
The sexual body would not be ‘a’ body constituted in a social field, but a 
‘body without organs’; the sexual (rather than gendered body) would be 
a multiplicity of all those predicates, partial objects, affects and percep-
tions from which we are composed.
To understand how theory as such might be ‘queered’ we can distin-
guish between two senses of the word ‘queer’: the first would be primar-
ily critical and would concern a difference or distinction from a consti-
tuted norm or center. The second sense, which I wish to conclude by 
pursuing here, entails a positive disengagement of substance and subjec-
tivism (so that substance is not that which underlies or precedes; sub-
stance does not give us some ultimate subject). This second sense, in 
refusing substance as some preceding ground, also requires a rejection of 
what I referred to as the thermodynamic model of desire that underpins 
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psychoanalysis and bourgeois ideology. On the thermodynamic model 
there is a ground—some form of life, subject or substance—that then 
requires differentiation; and it would then follow that every actual being 
would be an instance of more or less. There would be certain figures or 
norms, such as ‘man,’ ‘woman,’ ‘family,’ ‘duty,’ ‘justice,’ or ‘democracy,’ 
and every attempt to realize such norms or figures would never quite 
be the norm itself. Every instance would never quite attain the norm or 
ideal itself, and this would leave us with a logic of bad consciousness: on 
the one hand all we have is this world here and now, given some form 
through systems, and yet (on the other hand) no instance would be ade-
quate to some idea of ‘justice’ itself. All performances would be in part 
repetitions of a figure but also disturbances of a figure. There would be no 
life outside norms, but no pure instance of a norm. 
On a positive model, life would not be differentiated through norms, 
but would be more complex than the norms that have emerged. A theory 
would be queer if it challenged the supposed neutrality or undifferenti-
ated nature of life. Queerness would not concern deviation from con-
stituted limits, nor even the acknowledgment—following deconstruc-
tion—that the condition for any constituted and repeatable identity 
is a structure of iteration that bears the necessary possibility of disrup-
tion. The possibility of a genuinely queer theory begins, I would argue, 
only when we challenge the normative image of life that underpins the 
dominant understanding of Western theoria. Perhaps, unexpectedly, it is 
Platonism in its most radical sense that would allow us to rethink the-
ory beyond its vitalist normativity. In order to make sense of this claim I 
want first to look at the ways in which the thermodynamic model of life is 
normalizing and grounded upon an image of thought as good sense and 
common sense.
According to Gilles Deleuze in Difference and Repetition there is an orig-
inally violent, disruptive and impersonal potential in Plato that is imme-
diately covered over by normative images of the thinking and theorizing 
subject (Deleuze 1994, 244). What does it mean to theorize? If every-
day thinking is directed towards constancy, recognition and efficiency, 
it achieves this structure through a certain synthesis of time. Experience 
is lived as continuous: a self is constituted as the ground for the living 
and open-ended continuity of life considered as organic or as ‘lived.’ The 
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recognition and order that make experience coherent was deemed to be 
possible, according to Plato, only because there existed Ideas that were 
beyond the lived experience of the self. Such Ideas could not be consid-
ered as concepts or categories imposed by subjects onto experience for 
the sake of creating coherence. These Ideas were radically impersonal 
and radically alien to any sense of time as a coherent and lived sequence. 
Ideas do not exist at the level of Chronos (sequential or chronological 
time) but Aion, or the eternal power to give difference (over and over 
again, the repetition of difference). Within Plato’s own thought this radi-
cal nature of the Ideas is, however, immediately domesticated; for instead 
of considering a memory in which an Idea could be given to thought that 
was not thought’s own, and that was at odds with the lived order of the 
world, Plato introduced a moral distinction between those experiences 
that truly reflected the Ideas that they actualized, and the simulated and 
dangerous doubles that bore a fragile and unreliable relation to the Ideas 
that were their pure potentiality. Deleuze’s overturning of Platonism is a 
retrieval of the Idea. Deleuze’s reversed Platonism is not a liberation of 
life from all order, distinction, difference and essence. Instead, it is a lib-
eration of essence and distinction from the lived world.4 All our actual 
experiences that are lived as experiences of this or that identifiable and 
specified form need to be understood not as constructed and arbitrary 
impositions on an otherwise undifferentiated life, a life that is only known 
as lived and ordered; rather, actuality needs to be understood as the actu-
alization of Ideas, but the Idea does not—as it would in Plato—issue in 
a proper form. For the Idea is nothing other than a potentiality for dif-
ference, a difference that is given and lived as simulation (or simulacra). 
An Idea can never be given other than in its variation. It is not that there 
is an Idea that is then varied; the Idea is variation. It is the distinctness of 
the Idea, its absolutely differential nature—or its capacity to make dif-
ferences—that entails that it can only be experienced as obscure. Once 
something is clear—recognizable as this or that delimited and perceived 
object—it loses its distinction. Theory, then, is not the adjudication of 
this lived world according to the extent to which it properly incarnates an 
Idea; theory is the intuition of our lived and actual reality as simulacrum, 
as a becoming-clear or identifiable of an Idea (an Idea that exceeds the 
lived, but exists in nothing other than the lived). In turn, once we see the 
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given as the actualization of an Idea that loses its distinction by becom-
ing-actual, we can then take the next step of theorization, which would 
be ‘becoming-imperceptible’: can we try to think of those movements, 
distinctions and potentialities that allow our sensibly given world to be 
sensed but which themselves—as Ideas—are only given as simulations?
How then do we move from this level of abstraction to queer the-
ory? We can begin by going back to the thermodynamic model, which 
Deleuze aligns with bourgeois ideology, good sense and common sense. 
If we follow the modern paradigm and argue that subjectivity is not some 
natural and transcendent norm but is constituted through the synthesis 
of relations, then we seem to have demystified all notions of a ground-
ing normality. But, following Deleuze, I would argue that the thermody-
namic model (in which an undifferentiated life is given structure through 
contingently imposed systems) is the highest mode of normalization, for 
nothing is outside the one grand order of more or less, and every deci-
sion is always a compromise that could really just as easily have gone the 
other way. The subject is not the foundation of experience but is effected 
through experience:
Good sense is the ideology of the middle classes who recog-
nize themselves in equality as an abstract product. It dreams 
less of acting than of constituting a natural milieu, the ele-
ment of an action which passes from more to less differenti-
ated: for example, the good sense of eighteenth-century polit-
ical economy which saw in the commercial classes the natural 
compensation for the extremes, and in the prosperity of com-
merce the mechanical process of the equalization of portions. 
It therefore dreams less of acting than of foreseeing, and of 
allowing free rein to action which goes from the unpredict-
able to the predictable (from the production of differences to 
their reduction). Neither contemplative nor active, it is pre-
scient. In short, it goes from the side of things to the side of 
fire: from differences produced to differences reduced. It is 
thermodynamic. In this sense it attaches the feeling of the 
absolute to the partial truth. It is neither optimistic nor pes-
simistic, but assumes a pessimistic or optimistic tone depend-
ing upon whether the side of fire, which consumes everything 
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and renders all portions uniform, bears the sign of an inevita-
ble death and nothingness (we are all equal before death) or, 
on the contrary, bears the happy plenitude of existence (we all 
have an equal chance in life). (Deleuze 1994, 283)
Equality, or the idea that individuals exist in relation to each other via 
some general standard of the human, partakes of a specifically bourgeois 
inflection: there is some undifferentiated vague generalization of ‘man’ 
that will always approximate some never fully articulated standard. Any 
concept or decision is as relatively good and compromised as any other. 
Indeed, each concept would be—as constituted in relation to an other-
wise undifferentiated ‘life’—an inessential compromise and limitation. 
The subject of such an anti-metaphysical or post-foundational under-
standing would bear a number of features. It would, Deleuze insists, be 
thoroughly at home with contradiction: any constituted concept could 
never master or express the general life that it represents. As a conse-
quence one would always have to deal with the essentially limited and 
compromising nature of the terms and figures of our theory (Deleuze 
1994, 337). Further, such a subject would be oriented towards judgment, 
rather than action: aware of the provisional nature of our grasp of our 
selves and our world, we would always be compelled to consider the limi-
tations and locatedness of our point of view, never capable of appealing 
to life ‘in itself .’ Such a position would also be characterized by an ‘on 
the one hand’ and ‘on the other hand’ logic. Deprived of all foundations, 
norms and essences we would need to acknowledge that any decision 
would always preclude and belie equally justifiable possibilities.
Consider in terms of queer theory how this logic would work. On the 
one hand we need to be critical of constituted identities, which might 
come to function as restrictive norms. On the other hand, without the 
tactical or strategic adoption of such an identity we risk political invis-
ibility and ineffectiveness. The same logic applies to all issues within 
queer theory: on the one hand arguments for civil partnerships seem to 
buy into the normative structures of middle-class lifestyles and capitalist 
property relations; on the other hand, without such rights and entitle-
ments we risk complete marginalization and disempowerment.
Deleuze argues that such a logic takes a partial apprehension for the 
absolute. Always thinking within constituted, delimited and actualized 
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terms, politics becomes a negotiation of the system, with perhaps some 
attempt to transgress or destabilize the system—always aware that no 
break from normativity in general is possible.
At first, such a logic of more or less, and of the minimal requirements 
of some normativity, would appear to accord with Deleuze and Guattari’s 
own more explicitly political statements. In A Thousand Plateaus they 
argue against an absolute deterritorialization (while elsewhere arguing 
for a ‘higher’ deterritorialization), and they also argue for the necessity of 
a molar politics alongside the molecular processes of ‘becoming-woman’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 460). However, by looking at the radically 
Platonic model Deleuze opposes to thermodynamic and bourgeois ide-
ology in Difference and Repetition we can give a more nuanced under-
standing of the relation between territorialization and deterritorialization 
in A Thousand Plateaus. The latter should not be understood as a relation 
between effected identities and their deviation or becoming different 
through time. Here, we might contrast Deleuze’s own transcendental 
empiricism with deconstruction. According to Jacques Derrida, the con-
dition for the possibility of any experience of a being or life as this or that 
ongoing and maintained being is that it be marked and lived through time 
as the same. This means, then, that there must be some iterable trace that 
marks each lived moment as a moment of this supposedly constant pres-
ence; but if this is the case then something can ‘be’ or ‘live on’ only if it 
has already submitted to some structure of tracing or iterability. And, as 
all the queer mobilizations of deconstruction have speedily noted: if an 
identity is effected only by way of a repetition through time of the same, 
then the condition for identity is also a condition for difference and devi-
ation. The self is nothing other than its repeated performances, and is at 
once always already different from itself.
From this deconstructive point of view there is an ‘essential’ queerness 
to all identity in so far as identity is effected through structures that at one 
and the same time make ongoing sameness possible while introducing a 
destabilizing repetition into the marking out of that sameness. I would 
argue that even this most radical of models could, at a push, be under-
stood as indebted to the late nineteenth-century understanding of life 
as force or energy from which identifiable terms are effected. Although 
Derrida (1978) has undertaken a critique of the Freudian theoretical 
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model and the relation between the quantity of force and constituted 
qualities, the dissemination of deconstruction, especially for queer the-
ory, has resulted in the maintenance of the idea of theory as reflective and 
destabilizing judgment in relation to differentiating systems.
Against that thermodynamic model of thinking, which Deleuze 
regards as an overly quiescent adoption by philosophy of scientific 
models, Deleuze argues for an overturning of Platonism that would pay 
attention to the distinct Ideas that are actualized in the seemingly clear 
systems within which we think and move. Life is not, Deleuze insists, a 
general quantity of force of energy that is then differentiated through the 
establishment of relations. Nor, Deleuze insists, should we take the other 
Bergsonian path and think of life as irreducible and unquantifiable qual-
ity that would then be subjected to quantifying systems. Instead, Deleuze 
suggests that we consider ‘intensive quantities.’ Here, intensities are not 
qualities that unfold in time and that are belied by quantity. For intensi-
ties are potentialities for differential relations which, when encountering 
other intensities, produce quantities of this or that quality. Each experi-
enced, perceived or experienced intensity is necessarily given as a quan-
tity of such and such a quality; what is, necessarily, covered over by this 
lived experience is the pure intensity from which relations are effected 
(Deleuze 1994, 210). It is this radically (or passively) vitalist Deleuzian 
theory of life that, perhaps surprisingly, charts its way between the lin-
guistic mediation or linguistic paradigm and the literalism of theories of 
emergence. The vitalism is passive because it is not the case that there 
is something like life that surges forth from itself in order to arrive at 
itself; instead there are quantities of force entering into undecided rela-
tions from which beings emerge that would then provide some basis for 
active decisions. 
One way of thinking about modern theory, or metaphysics after Kant, is 
that we can have no knowledge of things in themselves: things are known 
only as they are given through the categories of experience. The structur-
alist or linguistic turn, after Kant, places those categories, not in the tran-
scendental subject but in social or linguistic systems. Even though post-
structuralism, especially in its Derridean form, criticized the acceptance 
of structure without the consideration of a structure’s genesis, it was the 
tension between genesis and structure that dominated theory: 'And even 
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when one comes to think that the opening of the structure is ‘structural’ , 
that is, essential, one already has progressed to an order heterogeneous to 
the first one: the difference between the (necessarily closed) minor struc-
ture and the structurality of an opening—such, perhaps, is the unlocat-
able site in which philosophy takes root’ (Derrida 1978, 155).
One can only think of genesis, origins or life as they are given through 
structure; but any structure must have had its genesis and it is the pro-
cess of the ongoing maintenance of structure which precludes any sta-
ble system. This leaves us with an ‘on the one hand’ and ‘on the other 
hand’ logic, and also with a judging position of the subject in relation to 
distanced life.
In Judith Butler, for example, we are all necessarily subjected to the het-
erosexual matrix or the social system of recognition. On the other hand, 
the condition for the maintenance of any system (repetition and perfor-
mance) also destabilizes and transforms that system. In terms of specific 
political terms and issues, we must on the one hand take part in the ter-
rain of politics—accepting its lexicon—while at the same time acknowl-
edging the limits of the given. There could, though, be no appeal to that 
which exceeds the given. Queerness would then be understood as the 
destabilization or solicitation of the normative. Theory would be queer 
only in so far as it attended to the conditions for normality and normativ-
ity, exposing a perturbation at the heart of any possible structure.
For Deleuze, by contrast, there is no contradiction or law of exclu-
sion between structure and genesis, and this is because of his reversed 
Platonism. There are Ideas, absolutely distinct potentialities from which 
the differentiated world is actualized. Instead of opposing structure and 
genesis—or the system through which the world is given, and the emer-
gence of that system—Deleuze argues for a ‘static genesis’ (Deleuze 
1990, 124). So we might say this is a case of Deleuze rejecting what he 
and Guattari refer to as ‘exclusive disjunction,’ whereby one must decide 
either that one submits to a structure or that one falls into non-identity. 
Instead, they argue for inclusive disjunction: yes, the world is composed 
of structuring relations, in various strata (including language) but there 
are also potentialities for relations or structures that are not yet actual-
ized. Our given world of relations, qualities, quantities, terms and predi-
cates is dynamic, in flux and organized into relatively coherent series. 
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Our response to such an actualized differentiated world should not be 
to think within a given structure while mourning our non-attainability 
of some ineffable ‘outside.’ Instead, Deleuze’s concept of static genesis 
prompts us to think of distinct potentialities that exceed thought, but 
which are only given as thought. Structure is not imposed upon an undif-
ferentiated life; rather, life as it is differentiated is the result of powers to 
make differences that exist eternally in a plane beyond constituted subjects. 
Static genesis allows us to think of a past that is impersonal and radically 
eternal (not already bound up with this historically constituted world): 
a potentiality for the creation of intensities, which are given to thought 
only in extended terms. We should see the languages, relations and struc-
tures of this world, then, not as organizations or negations/limitations of 
an otherwise neutral reality—where queerness would lie in the instabil-
ity or perturbations of the organizing system—but as actualizations of 
potentialities or Ideas that will be eternally repeated. Thus, for Deleuze, 
there is an Idea of revolution, such that we can at one and the same time 
think empirically of all those revolutions that have occurred within his-
tory; and the Idea of revolution, which all those instances of revolution 
intimate but do not exhaust. The memory or reminiscence of that Idea 
of revolution would take thought beyond human recognition and consti-
tuted terms to that strange virtual potentiality, which at once gives itself 
to be thought while always violating and exceeding thought.
How might we deploy or respond to this abstract attempt to move 
beyond structurations of some ineffable reality to the positivity and affir-
mation of structure? What happens if we see the terms within which we 
think as actualizations of eternal Ideas? The first maneuver would be crit-
ical, for we can—as Deleuze did in Difference and Repetition—look at the 
ways in which our image of thought belies and diminishes the force of 
Ideas. If we think of judgment as negotiation of an arbitrary or imposed 
system in relation to a life that is lost, diminished or mourned then poli-
tics can only be a queering or solicitation of a terrain that will always be 
other than (retroactively posited) life. If, however, we think of theory as 
an attempt to reinvigorate the political terrain by reference to a positive 
plane or ‘depth’ of problems, we open thought to a positive outside. In 
terms of ‘becoming-woman,’ we could then think of new modes of rela-
tionality: not a world that is synthesized by man as a thinking subject, 
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who then turns back upon his own organizing systems, but a world of 
divergent lines of relationality, where forces intersect to produce quali-
ties and quantities without the ground of good sense and common sense. 
Theory is queer, not in the sense of constant destabilization or contra-
diction, but in opening itself up to problems. For Deleuze, life is neither 
oriented to self-maintenance and constancy, nor devoid of positivity and 
distinction. Instead, life takes the form of a problem. A force that encoun-
ters another force is the posing of a problem. We can think of this physi-
cally in terms of evolutionary theory, so that bodies are not passive sites 
for inscription but organized capacities that meet a similarly complex 
environment and produce relatively stable sets of terms. But this physi-
cal understanding does not, for Deleuze, provide a ground for theory. 
Instead, the task of theory is to take this form or Idea of difference—that 
we begin not with substances or subjects but potentialities for problem-
atic relations—and create a new mode of thinking, thought liberated 
from the image.
I want to consider the ways in which two theorists have undertaken 
this challenge. Elizabeth Grosz has, in her work on time and evolution, 
argued that we can think of a ‘pure difference’ that would not be the dif-
ferentiation of some prior, presupposed or posited life (Grosz 2004, 46). 
Such ‘pure difference’ as articulated in Grosz’s later work can allow us 
to go back to her earlier positive work on embodiment, and contrast its 
positive and queer tendency with Judith Butler’s approach in Bodies that 
Matter. The key difference lies in the problematization of the linguistic 
paradigm. Butler acknowledges that we cannot think of language or soci-
ality as imposed upon life, for ‘life’ exists only as always already split from 
itself. Here she follows a post-structuralist notion of the signifier: not as 
a sign that orders reality, but as that aspect of matter which (in present-
ing itself as partial) creates a gap, absence, or prior real which is always 
given after the fact. In terms of politics, then, we are always already within 
subjection and mourning: at once human or recognizable only through 
given systems, while never fully coinciding with such systems. 
The body posited as prior to the sign, is always posited or sig-
nified as prior. This signification produces as an effect of its 
own procedure the very body that it nevertheless and simul-
taneously claims to discover as that which precedes its own 
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action. If the body signified as prior to signification is an effect 
of signification, then the mimetic or representational status 
of language, which claims that signs follow bodies as their 
necessary mirrors, is not mimetic at all. On the contrary, it 
is productive, constitutive, one might even argue performa-
tive, inasmuch as this signifying act delimits and contours the 
body that it then claims to find prior to any and all significa-
tion. (Butler 1993, 30)
Queerness in Butler’s terms, as I have already suggested, can only be 
the effect of an explicit theorization of the conditions for recognition: it 
is because one becomes human or a subject only through processes or 
iteration that there is also, necessarily, a failure or ‘queering’ of identity. 
For Grosz, by contrast, the body was never a site for iteration or inscrip-
tion but always offered its own volatility (Grosz 1994). If we know and 
live bodies through practices and culture, culture itself is a ‘ramification’ 
of a nature that is nothing other than a power of creativity (Grosz 2005). 
Theory is not, then, critical—operating to de-stabilize, de-mystify, or de-
naturalize—but positive and affirmative: an attention to those untimely 
forces that will not so much persist (as ongoing performances) but insist. 
This is why, for Grosz, one can both insist upon sexual difference, with-
out thereby submitting to some system of recognition. Sexual difference 
is not the relation between terms, nor a difference posited ex post facto 
after the gender system has produced relatively stable identities. We 
could think of sexual difference as an originating queerness that produces 
positive and creative difference in relation to natural selection. If natu-
ral selection is a theoretical postulate that explains, after the event, how 
randomly effected differences have survived to produce populations that 
have responded efficiently to the environment, sexual difference intro-
duces an aleatory principle that disrupts life’s tendency to equilibrium, 
striving and self-maintenance (Grosz 2004, 66). We can see this in animal 
life with the production of extravagant mating calls and visual display.
But Grosz makes an important point regarding human culture, where 
those forms of sexuality and coupling that are not oriented towards 
reproduction have ramifying effects that open up spaces and possibili-
ties not accounted for by models of natural selection (Grosz 2004, 83). 
Indeed, the question of fitness comes to the fore once we introduce sexual 
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selection—that is, selection not oriented towards reproduction or ongo-
ing maintenance of the population as it recognizes itself, but the selection 
of traits that operate as an excessive lure.
This question of fitness is, I would argue, a politic-metaphysical ques-
tion of the utmost urgency for our time. What modes of life, what forces 
or selections can be affirmed? This is not the question of a decision—of 
how we might make or recreate ourselves—but the problem of encoun-
ters that are queer (not determined according to recognition and repro-
duction). Queer encounters, from a Deleuzian perspective, are not affir-
mations of a group of bodies who recognize themselves as other than 
normative, but are those in which bodies enter into relations where the 
mode of relation cannot be determined in advance, and where the body’s 
becoming is also ungrounded. Here, we pass directly from Deleuze’s tran-
scendental empiricist motto—relations are external to terms—to mic-
ropolitics and ‘becoming-woman.’ It is not the case that there is a world 
of uniform matter or force, governed or differentiated by a system of laws 
(this is neither the case physically, where interactions of matters produce 
distinct fields and modes of relations, nor socially, for the world we live 
is made up of quite distinct fields of relation that include philosophy, 
art and science). Nor is it the case that there are individuals who enter 
into relations. Rather, Deleuze begins with a differentiating ‘spatium’ that 
unfolds into various encounters, producing terms and relations through 
time (Deleuze 1994, 244). Queer theory then has two features. First, 
it refuses the man of good sense and common sense who must synthe-
size, judge and perceive the relations of this world. Not only does such 
an image of thought reproduce already given terms of gender (mind 
ordering matter, activity organizing passivity, structure giving being 
to non-being), it relies on equivocity, or two already decided levels of 
being: the force or energy of ‘life,’ on the one hand, and the synthesis and 
organization of that life by ‘man’ or systems on the other. Second, having 
refused the location or organization in the mind of man or language we 
can start to think of theory in Deleuze’s sense of intuition: not as a criti-
cal destabilization of constituted terms and systems, but as an enquiry 
into the emergence of terms and relations. This is why Deleuze and 
Guattari regarded ‘becoming-woman’ as the key to all becomings. One 
must escape from the image of thought of bourgeois thermodynamics: 
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the mind as a negotiating point in a field of effected differences, outside 
which is the great undifferentiated (Deleuze 1994, 283-4).
There must be at least one other possibility for thinking beyond 
the man of reason. Sexual difference, or relations that are not oriented 
to judgment and reproduction, would be the beginning (but not the 
end) of theory.
I want to conclude by thinking the practical consequences of such a 
notion for queer theory, now understood not as a theory that sets itself 
against normativity through either a recognition of another group of 
bodies or through a destabilization and negation of norms. Rather the-
ory would set as its task the notion of the Idea as a problem: how have 
relations and terms emerged, what—given effected relations—might 
have occurred otherwise; what are the forces of potentiality hidden in 
our experienced encounters? The concept of relations being external 
to terms, or of forces for structuration that exceed human thinking, has 
been aptly theorized by Levi Bryant. Part of a broader movement of new 
modes of realism (in which reality is not reality for a subject) Bryant 
insists on the capacity for forces beyond relations as already actualized: 
While I readily concede that objects can enter into relations—
how else would open systems be possible?—it does not fol-
low from this that objects are their relations. In short, if it is 
to be possible to form closed systems in which constant con-
junctions of events occasionally obtain as they sometimes do 
in experimental settings, then it follows that relations cannot 
ontologically be internal to their terms or the objects that they 
relate. In other words, objects are not constituted by their rela-
tions to the rest of the world. While relations to other objects 
often play a key role in the precipitation of events or quali-
ties in objects, we must here recall that objects are not iden-
tical to their qualities but are rather the ground of qualities. 
Accordingly we must distinguish between objects and their 
relations, or rather the structure of objects and the relations 
into which objects enter. I call the former ‘endo-relations’ (or, 
following Graham Harman, ‘domestic relations’ ), and the lat-
ter ‘exo-relations’ (or, as Harman calls them, ‘foreign relations’ 
…). Endo-relations constitute the internal structure of objects 
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independent of all other objects, while exo-relations are rela-
tions that objects enter into with other objects. Were objects 
constituted by their exo-relations or relations to other objects, 
the being would be frozen and nothing would be capable of 
movement or change. It is only where relations are external to 
objects that such change can be thought. (Bryant 2011, 68)
I will now turn to an iconic moment from the literary canon, Herman 
Melville’s Billy Budd, and do so through Rosi Braidotti’s concept of an 
‘ethics of affirmation,’ which she summarizes as ‘giving what you do not 
have’ (Braidotti 2006, 208, 259). Such an ethic might at first appear to 
be at once thoroughly capitalist—speculate and project profits in vir-
tual markets of the future—and thoroughly Kantian—we may not know 
our subjectivity but we can acts as if we were free. Where the ethics of 
affirmation becomes ecological, queer and counter-modern is in the lib-
eration of the Idea from the lived: can we offer Ideas to thought that are 
not our own?
In the following scene from Melville’s Billy Budd, Claggart perceives 
Billy at once as an all too desirable object and as a force that threatens his 
personal moral life:
If askance he eyed the good looks, cheery health, and frank 
enjoyment of young life in Billy Budd, it was because these 
went along with a nature that, as Claggart magnetically felt, 
had in its simplicity never willed malice or experienced the 
reactionary bite of that serpent. To him, the spirit lodged 
within Billy, and looking out from his welkin eyes as from 
windows, that ineffability it was which made the dimple in his 
dyed cheek, suppled his joints, and dancing in his yellow curls 
made him pre-eminently the Handsome Sailor. One person 
excepted, the master-at-arms was perhaps the only man in the 
ship intellectually capable of adequately apprehending the 
moral phenomenon presented in Billy Budd. And the insight 
but intensified his passion, which assuming various secret 
forms within him, at times assumed that of cynic disdain, 
disdain of innocence—to be nothing more than innocent! 
Yet in an aesthetic way he saw the charm of it, the courageous 
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free-and-easy temper of it, and fain would have shared it, but 
he despaired of it. With no power to annul the elemental evil 
in him, though readily enough he could hide it; apprehend-
ing the good, but powerless to be it; a nature like Claggart’s, 
surcharged with energy as such natures almost invariably are, 
what recourse is left to it but to recoil upon itself and, like the 
scorpion for which the Creator alone is responsible, act out to 
the end the part allotted it. [Melville 1986, 356]
One way to read such a scene would be as a representation of subjects 
constituted within heterosexual normativity: in this all-male environ-
ment Claggart as a figure of authority is at once attracted to Billy’s beauty 
(where the beauty already tends towards spectacular effeminacy with its 
‘dyed cheek’ and ‘yellow curls’). That very attraction is at the same time 
repulsive, so that Claggart must destroy what he beholds. The isolation of 
such scenes in the literary canon would follow from our attention to the 
ways in which desire at once presents itself within the normative matrix, 
while also expressing moments of disruption, or what Alan Sinfield 
(1992) has referred to as ‘faultlines.’ Another mode of reading would 
be not simply to read this scene—where we as readers view represented 
subjects and sexualities—so much as force an encounter with the Idea of 
reading. If we can read qualities as signs of some desire—see Billy as an 
ideal figure of male youthful beauty—we can then see the world as com-
posed of such signs, the ‘secret forms’ from which we are composed. In 
A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari refer to a positive, productive 
and feminine notion of the secret: not the secret as that ‘gray eminence’ or 
hidden absolute which would be figured by the great feminine ‘beyond’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 280) but the secret as immanence, or the 
metamorphosing and transposing world whose qualities we are. We are 
given in this scene, a scene of sense, a reading of reading, or what Deleuze 
also referred to as ‘time in its pure state’ (Deleuze 2000, 98). We see or 
read Claggart seeing and reading Billy: we perceive perception, not as rep-
resentation, but perception as desire. Here art (as one mode of thought 
among others) strives to encounter the very emergence of relations and 
qualities. Billy is, as actualized, a body desired as male by another male, 
destroyed for that socially prohibited line of desire. But the condition 
for such a series of relations—the eye of Claggart that contemplates an 
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object that threatens his social being—is intimated when one passes 
beyond the moral to the aesthetic: ‘Yet in an aesthetic way he saw the 
charm of it.’ This would approach becoming-woman, or the ‘feminine 
line’: qualities or predicates that are actualized but not exhausted by bod-
ies. There is a certain desirability or potential for desire that exceeds the 
interests and intentions of the subjects it composes. The task of a theory 
that traced such a desire would be directly political. Can we go beyond 
the man of good sense, common sense, negotiation and norms and intuit 
the qualities and the forces of qualities that diminish and compose life? 
Life itself would neither be that which requires the imposition of norms, 
nor a domain from which normativity would follow, but would be that 
creative, queering, divergent, and transposing power that would open up 
relations beyond those of the thinking or acting subject.
Notes
1.  It was in this regard that feminists criticized the supposed pure formalism 
of John Rawls, who argued that subjects should imagine their ideal polity 
from a veil of ignorance. Such a notion of a pure subject liberated from partial 
attachments precludes the consideration of traditionally feminist political 
problems, such as childcare and childbirth: one can either, as ‘corporeal 
feminists’ have done, criticize the theory itself for harboring an implicit 
gender bias (Diprose 1994), or one can make adjustments to the theory 
according to its own ideals of pure formalism (Okin 1994).
2.  Figures of auto-affection, self-fathering, or mind that gives form and 
order to matter, have been identified by Jacques Derrida, and others, as 
‘remainders’ within Western metaphysics that enable the figuration of a pure 
and ideal point of view. Thus ‘man’ would not be one term among others 
in the system but an irreducible norm from which systematicity is figured 
(Derrida 1981). In a more explicit use of deconstruction for queer theory Lee 
Edelman considered ‘homographesis’ as the general scene through which 
homosexuality presents itself as a series of differences to be read, but which 
at the same time thereby opens up sexuality in general to the problem of 
differance (Edelman 1994).
3.  In Giving an Account of Oneself, Butler does, however, distance herself from 
her earlier insistence on the exclusivity of subjection, and suggests other 
modes of relation that are not purely negative. Even so, her central criticism 
of Rosi Braidotti’s feminism—which is the mode of theory I will be pursuing 
here—is the status of the negative. I would therefore disagree with Butler’s 
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own mapping of the relation among her own work, the work of Deleuze, 
psychoanalysis and Braidotti’s feminism: ‘Every time I try to write about the 
body, the writing ends up being about language. This is not because I think 
that the body is reducible to language; it is not. Language emerges from the 
body, constituting an emission of sorts. The body is that upon which language 
falters, and the body carries its own signs, its own signifiers, in ways that 
remain largely unconscious. Although Deleuze opposed psychoanalysis, 
Braidotti does not’ (Butler 2004, 198). I will contest this supposed opposition 
of Deleuze to psychoanalysis; Deleuze opposed the personalization of the 
unconscious, favoring a more radical unconscious or ‘unthought’ that was 
radically inhuman and positive: the Ideas or problems through which we 
think, which give themselves to be thought, even if they cannot be thought: 
‘schizoanalysis attains a nonfigurative and nonsymbolic unconscious, a pure 
abstract figural dimension’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 351). As Butler 
continues, ‘Psychoanalysis seems centered on the problem of lack for Deleuze, 
but I tend to center on the problem of negativity. One reason I have opposed 
Deleuze is that I find no registration of the negative in his work, and I feared 
he was proposing a manic defense against negativity’ (Butler 2004, 198). 
Even if there are modes of subjective relation that are—contra Nietzsche—
not those of force and violence, there can be (for Butler) no mode of self or 
theory which is not constituted in relation to norms. It is precisely, though, 
in Butler’s (2005) critical reading of Nietzsche’s force as violence—in the 
sense of violence done by selves to others—that the limits of her theory lie. 
Another reading of Nietzsche (one pursued by Gilles Deleuze [1983] and 
Elizabeth Grosz [2004]) posits a positive and generating force, not as force 
among bodies or as force of one body over another. To say that ‘life’ begins 
with force is to reject the original position of bodies and terms (or even the 
system through which terms are distributed)—force as relations between or 
among bodies—and instead see force as the differential production of bodies 
and relations. Force in that differential and originally unequal sense is queer: 
not the force of a body, quality or quantity. We could see such a reading of 
force as a radicalization of Spinoza’s ‘field’ metaphysic (Bennett 1984): there 
is not a space that is filled with bodies, nor a general pool of energy which is 
then organized into distinct terms; instead, everything begins with a dynamic 
potentiality for relations, which are then actualized to produce a space or field 
of quantities and qualities.
4.  In a remarkably lucid article, Elisa Glick (2000) has criticized Judith Butler’s 
‘linguistic idealism’ and privileging of representational politics in favor of a 
more Marxist interrogation of the lived practices and historical and economic 
contexts from which practices such as ‘drag’ emerge. Glick draws on David 
Harvey’s work to argue that Butler reinforces a postmodern capitalist lifestyle 
commodity culture in her emphasis on performativity (precisely because 
performance effects, rather than follows, subjectivity). Here I would like 
to pursue an opposite critique: Butler’s performativity is not too detached 
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from lived experience, but too reliant on an image of life as coming into 
being and recognition through effected, critical and destabilizing subjects. 
If we think of life beyond constituted bodies, as Elizabeth Grosz does in her 
re-reading of Darwin, Freud and Nietzsche (2004), or as Rosi Braidotti does 
in her notion of metamorphoses and transpositions that can be considered 
ecologically beyond the human (2002; 2006), then we have a new model of 
queer politics. We abandon the exemplary queer subject of drag and parody, 
to examine the abstract potentialities from which subjects are composed. 
Concretely, this would mean that subjects are not produced as masculine or 
feminine through some decisive cultural matrix (‘exclusive disjunction’ in 
Deleuze’s sense), but that masculinity and femininity are potentialities that 
can be mobilized inclusively: one can be male and female (what Deleuze refers 
to as inclusive disjunction: both a and not-a). This would go beyond being 
a socialized man dressing as a woman: for such parody would be equivocal, 
or a playing of natural being against representation. Instead, we would 
begin by acknowledging something like ‘becoming-woman’ that would be a 
potentiality for life as such, beyond women as socialized groups. Significantly 
both Grosz and Braidotti maintain a positive idea of sexual difference from 
an Irigarayan perspective, which they (correctly) see as compatible with a 
Deleuzian impersonal vitalism. If life is not a general undifferentiated force 
that is then represented by ‘man,’ sexual difference (becoming-woman, 
or understanding life beyond the image of man) opens up a new mode of 
relationality.
Chapter 10
Postmodernism Is a Humanism: 
Deleuze and Equivocity
The Politics of Postmodernism
There was an intense and long-running debate in the feminist theory of 
the 1980s regarding the politics of postmodernism. Was the attention to 
representation, signification and cultural difference a liberation from an 
essentialism that had mired women in their biology? Or was the focus on 
representation yet one more way in which the feminine can be appropri-
ated and homogenized within one all-determining system? One way to 
solve this problem was to shift from feminism, which begins its critique 
from one side of a sexual binary, to gender, thereby problematizing the 
nature or construction of that binary. The very concept of gender pro-
vided a way out of the impasse of negotiating whether women ought to 
seek equality or difference, for the problem of gender lay not in whether 
women were really different but just how that difference had been pro-
duced through the representational system. 
I want to argue that the very structure of the concept of gender is a 
symptom, a symptom that pastes over a certain failure to think. It is quite 
possible, even expected, today to use gender as a self-evidently critical 
term without asking about the nature of those kinds or ‘genres’ to which 
gender refers. Gender difference is either one form of constructed cultural 
difference among others, just one more way in which man as a represen-
tational animal produces his differentiated world. Or, gender difference 
is a privileged figure or phantasmatic frame through which we construct 
the symbolic order. Either way, we are always at one remove from differ-
ence, already within the frame of gender. Against this tendency towards 
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gender, the problem of the status of sexual difference has re-emerged 
recently in a certain attack on postmodernism undertaken in the name 
of Lacanian sexual difference: one cannot reduce the world to a system of 
circulating differences or constructed genders, for one can only live such 
a constructed or symbolic frame through the fantasy of a ‘real’ excluded 
from that frame, and this ‘real’ that resists symbolization absolutely is fig-
ured through ‘woman’ (Lacan 1982:144). This is why, for Lacan, there 
can be no sexual relation, no happy postmodern cohabitation in a world 
of constructed differences with each term being differentiated from every 
other. For one term of that relation—woman—is not an object within 
the system but a fantasized ‘one’ outside or beyond the system (Copjec 
1994:235; Žižek 2003:12). For all their virulence, these attacks on what 
Slavoj Žižek and Joan Copjec among others take to be postmodernism 
do not go far enough, for they remain within the problem of gender, the 
problem of the construction of kinds through signification. Whereas the 
postmodernism under attack supposedly presents the world as a system 
of unfounded difference, of hybridity, multiplicity and simulation, the 
Lacanian anti-postmodern riposte merely points out the conditions that 
must prevail in such a constructed or signified world: one must always 
presuppose a subject for whom these signifiers signify, a sense barred 
by the signifier and therefore a ‘beyond’ of the signifier or ‘not-all’ that 
we phantasmatically live as woman. What I will argue is that even if we 
accept the Lacanian fantasy that underpins the postmodern condition of 
signification we should go further and ask just whose fantasy this is and 
whether one might not be liberated from it.
The very concept of gender—the notion of constituted, represented 
or signified kinds—is tied up with a certain understanding of sexual dif-
ference. Sexual difference becomes ‘gender’ in postmodernism precisely 
because postmodernism remains a humanism, with the subject as the 
point of construction or representation through which the world is con-
stituted. The very idea of genders, as signified kinds or binaries, relies 
upon an equivocal distinction between that which signifies and that 
which is signified. Man in his modern and postmodern incarnations is 
not a rational animal so much as a being who, by virtue of the fact that he 
speaks or signifies, can never be included in the real to which he refers.1 
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There is an idea of postmodermism at the center of Alain Badiou’s, 
Žižek’s and Copjec’s defence of sexual difference: postmodernism sup-
posedly imagines a world of circulating differences without foundation, 
ground, subject or center. According to the post-Lacanian critique of this 
postmodern celebration of difference and hybridity, sexual difference is 
what must be presupposed, even if disavowed, in such affirmatory log-
ics. In Copjec’s case, without the idea of sexual difference—or the idea 
of woman as the Thing that subtends signification—one could not have 
a system. In order to signify, the system must be the signification of some 
being, some non-included object, and this being that is extracted from 
the domain of signifiable, differentiated things is woman, who strictly 
speaking does not exist. That is, in order to imagine the ‘all’ of being 
one has to complete the set of signified objects with that one lost object 
(Copjec 2003:35-6). The entry into the system of signifiers, which is lived 
as prohibition or renunciation, produces woman as that which must be 
renounced. Everything begins with prohibition or the injunction that not 
all desires are permissible (Žižek 2003:103-4), and from that ‘not’ one 
fantasizes the desired thing beyond the law. For Copjec, the way out of 
this fantasy is to face the non-all of being, that there is no lost object, that 
woman does not exist. If women, unlike men, are not constituted through 
the fantasy of this lost object they offer a new model of ethical agency, the 
possibility of acting without the mourning or nostalgia for a precluded 
plenitude. One does not happily inhabit a post-gendered world; one 
lives through the trauma of sexual difference, the necessary gap or hole in 
being that has always been phantasmatically imagined as woman.
Badiou takes this attack on postmodernism further, insisting that his-
toricism, sexuality, multiculturalism, the reduction of the work of art to 
culture, as well as a general laziness and quiescence of thinking, aban-
don the event, an event that tears the actual world of things from itself 
but that is also belied once we take this disruption as a truth within the 
world. For Badiou the event is the rupture of the domain of already con-
stituted things, and it is the exposure of the event that produces the sub-
ject of truth, a subject at odds with, or irreducible to, one’s world. It is 
in the Lacanian relation of love, and not in the world of sexuality, that 
this event opens being (Badiou 1999:83).2 So for Badiou what is wrong 
with postmodernism is its celebration of differences and the absence of a 
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subject at odds with this actual multiplicity. I want to sustain the force of 
this critique of postmodernism—that it is a failure or banality of think-
ing, a reduction of thought to quotation, repetition and signification—
and argue that Badiou, Žižek and Copjec do not go far enough. Rather 
than assert the subject, the sexual relation or the event as a gap or not-all 
of being, one needs to traverse the fantasy of ‘man’ as submitted to a sig-
nification that is radically other. We can do this by taking the psychoana-
lytic genesis of sense one step further. If the emergence of the world, as 
a domain of representable objects, can occur only through signification, 
and if we live this signification phantasmatically—as imposed by an other 
who has subjected my desire to the system of things, thereby denying me 
‘the Thing’—then we can go one step further. Fantasy and signification, 
including the subject of speech, are only possible through sense. Rather 
than remaining within the Oedipal fantasy frame of sense, we might set 
ourselves the challenge of intuiting the emergence of sense.
We might consider this liberation in Deleuzian-Spinozist terms: from 
a finite point of consciousness within the world, we see ourselves as sub-
jected to relations (Deleuze 1992); but if one thinks further, if one strives 
to think from the point of view of the emergence of relations, one will 
no longer enslave oneself to constituted terms, such as the gender sys-
tem, the heterosexual matrix or the framing fantasy. One will ask what 
life must be such that fantasy is possible: what must the body be such that 
its relations to other bodies would take the form of a sexual narrative? 
In general, rather than seeing signifiers as imposed on life, we should 
ask what life is such that it yields signification. This will take us to sexual 
difference in the non-Lacanian sense: bodies are such that their interac-
tions, desires and affects yield a surface of sense. Sense is not an imposed 
or alien system that negates, diminishes or orders life; sense is the infini-
tive (Hughes 2008; Williams 2008). 
In addition to his extended argument in The Logic of Sense, Deleuze 
describes the emergence of sense in his first book on cinema. Following 
C. S. Peirce, we can think of firstness or powers and forces of life; then 
we have secondness or actions, the ways in which powers act upon each 
other. Thirdness, or relations properly speaking, take the form of sense: 
one power does not just encounter another but adds to the encounter the 
sense or perception of the perception. (The eye does not just encounter 
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light but sees something as something, something that could be seen 
again, and is seen as having the power to be perceived.) Sense, then, is 
the emergence of the relation, not just between two terms, but a relation 
to an exchange, a giving or interpretation (Deleuze 1986:197). One can 
only have signifiers—a system of ordered relations—if there is already 
a potential in life for the perceived to refer beyond itself. The perceived 
is not just perceived as having a certain sense—we do not just see the 
world as this or that—for seeing something as something requires that 
the perceived bears a potential to repeat itself, or to be sensed: redness is 
perceived as redness because of a singularity, a ‘to red’ that allows for the 
emergence of sense. This is not an essence in the sense of a predicate—
redness in general—but an infinitive, a power to be repeated, varied, 
extended, actualized, ‘to red …’ (Deleuze 1990:221). So sense emerges 
from bodies but is not reducible to bodies, and sense also emerges 
through the desire of bodies. The psychoanalytic insistence on corporeal 
genesis takes us to the proper problem of sense (Deleuze 1990:197). At 
the level of bodies there is a corporeal perception, such as the eye encoun-
tering light, but at the level of sense there is an incorporeal event. If the 
eye exceeds the located present and sees a color as a power or potential to 
be perceived beyond the present, a ‘to red …,’ an infinitive emerges that 
takes the encounter beyond the present and recognizes its force for all 
time: the eternal truth of the singular (Deleuze 1990:99). Sense is not an 
order imposed on an undifferentiated world; rather sense is orientation 
or relations effected from singularities. This means that there is a not a 
subject or system that signifies; rather, signification and subject are the 
effects of the sense (or effected relations) of singularities:
 Only a theory of singular points is capable of transcending 
the synthesis of the person and the analysis of the individ-
ual as these are (or are made) in consciousness. We can not 
accept the alternative which thoroughly compromises psy-
chology, cosmology, and theology: either singularities already 
comprised in individuals and persons, or the undifferentiated 
abyss. Only when the world, teaming with anonymous and 
nomadic, impersonal and pre-individual singularities, opens 
up, do we tread at last on the field of the transcendental. 
(Deleuze 1990:103)
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Thinking sense in this way requires the challenge of univocity: not 
remaining within the myth of the construction of life through significa-
tion, separating life on the one hand from representational mediation on 
the other. Rather than regarding desire as that which extends the bodily 
drive beyond life to an other who does not exist (Žižek 2003:95), uni-
vocity sees sense as the surface that regards bodies as located within time, 
but perceives in them a potential for all time.
So, if there is a criticism of postmodernism that it has failed to take into 
account the structure of the subject—that to have a lived world of signi-
fiers one cannot avoid positing the subject for whom those objects are 
presented, and a thing or being that those presentations are presentations 
of—this does not mean that one should not take this possibility beyond 
the Oedipal structure it causes. That is, one should go beyond the fantasy 
and structure of signification to its possibility. This involves three prob-
lems that I will address here. First, how has this fantasy—of signifying 
man relating to an absent object of desire—been constituted (what are 
its specific historical and political conditions)?
Second, how is fantasy as such, or sense, possible? How is the world 
always more than itself, not lacking an object that would complete sense, 
but productive of sense as an incorporeality or extra-being? Finally, if 
there is an event or possibility of sense that exceeds a system of signifiers 
how might this lead us to read, and how might we deal with a postmod-
ernism that has so readily reduced what is other than the signifer to an 
effect of signification? These problems need to be approached through 
the concept of equivocity, for it is just the postmodern refusal to con-
sider being or ontology beyond signification that is itself ontological and 
equivocal. How is it that the world is lived as somehow signified through 
a system that is not of being itself? 
The Ontology of Postmodernism: Equivocity
How then is the idea of the postmodern entwined with an equivocal 
ontology? To begin with, we can follow Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari 
(who, in turn, follow Lacan) and argue that the very concept of the 
signifier relies on the logic of the subject.3 In both Anti-Oedipus and A 
Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari trace the historical genesis of the 
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subject through the logic of signification. Once we see life as necessarily 
mediated through a single point of law and system, and once this system 
is identified with language as such, then the subject is formed as nothing 
more than an effect of this one system that ‘overcodes’ all other systems.
Both Copjec and Žižek, following Lacan, also insist on the subject as 
the subject of signification. In so far as I speak and am submitted to a 
law that allows me to articulate my demands in relation to an other—an 
other who is always given to me through the system of signs—I necessar-
ily imagine a remainder of desire, the real subject, that is other than any of 
its signified acts (Žižek 1999:159). 
Postmodernism, if it is understood as a system of signification that 
is radically detached from the real or that produces and constitutes the 
real, is equivocal. As opposed to Deleuze’s ontology of univocity in 
which there is just one plane of expression, equivocity posits two radi-
cally incommensurable levels. This is made clear in the Lacanian insis-
tence on the logic of the ‘not-all’: the linguistic system must, if it is lan-
guage, posit that to which it refers, and in so doing the subject must also 
be posited as the desire to signify that underpins the linguistic system as 
such. The logic of sexual difference here is both subjective and equivo-
cal: subjective because it is only through the desire to speak to or be rec-
ognized by an other that the subject who precedes and exceeds the sign 
is generated: ‘sexual difference can articulate itself only in the guise of 
the series of (failed) attempts to transpose it into symbolic oppositions’ 
(Žižek 2002:12). And this logic is equivocal precisely because that which 
is other than system and signification is not one more thing or being, but 
that which can only be imagined as other than any signified being, and 
yet generated from the very logic of the signifier as that which determines 
and represents beings. The not-all or the failure of being to be given in the 
form of a totality entails both some fantasized point beyond the system 
of signified objects, and the recognition that this beyond is produced by 
the system’s own failure:
At the core of this matter of the unforgettable but forever lost 
Thing, we find not just an impossibility of thought, but a void 
of Being. The problem is not simply that I cannot think the pri-
mordial mother, but that her loss opens up a hole in being. Or, 
it is not that the mother escapes representation or thought, 
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but that the jouissance that attached me to her has been lost 
and this depletes the whole of my being. (Copjec 2003:35-6)
As Copjec goes on to explain, what is important is not some unrep-
resentable beyond, but the formation of a drive that directs itself to 
some representation of this beyond, some part object or thing that we 
desire that is a fragment or sign of the Thing beyond relations (Copjec 
2003:37). What makes this logic truly equivocal is the extreme rigor of 
Copjec’s position: the Thing, or noumenal beyond, is given as other than 
representation only through a peculiar structure of representation. The 
drive is just the formation of a representation of a thing that is desired 
because it is not the Thing: one desires the breast, not for its fulfillment 
of the needs of life but because it is a fragment of, but not identical to, 
that which is other than all life, the mother or Thing: ‘It is not a means to 
something other than itself, but is itself other than itself. The bi-partition 
takes place within the object, not between the object and the satisfaction 
that lies beyond it’ (Copjec 2003:38).
Copjec herself suggests a utopian beyond to this equivocity in the 
title of her book (itself a quotation from Lacan). To ‘imagine there’s 
no woman’ is to refuse the masculine fantasy of the Thing or jouissance 
beyond the law. The position of woman—for whom there is no beyond 
precisely because she is not submitted to the law of castration—might 
therefore offer the model of an ethical act; unlike man who looks back 
to a lost totality, it is woman who acts without the support of truth or a 
barred thing in itself (Copjec 2003:7). Like Alain Badiou, who is highly 
critical of Deleuze’s univocity, Copjec insists on the ethical act as a break, 
rupture or tear in the fabric of being. Not surprisingly, while Copjec 
cites the tragic Antigone as exemplary of such an act, Badiou and Žižek 
appeal to the Christian and Pauline images of a disruption of truth from 
beyond being (Badiou 2003; Žižek 2001). It is just this religious, tran-
scendent or ir-real affirmation that is most problematic in their critique 
of postmodernism.
We may want to be critical of the world as a closed system of signifiers 
that can only be troubled from within, but does this mean we need to 
leap out of the system by an appeal to a beyond of being? The strength of 
the contemporary Lacanian position is its appeal to truth as other than 
received systems, but such a truth can be better and more responsibly 
Postmodernism Is a Humanism: Deleuze and Equivocity 211
secured by Deleuze’s insistence on univocity, and this for affirmatively 
ethical reasons. The problem with equivocity is just its terrifying religious 
heritage, that it affirms that which is other than communication, repre-
sentation, experience, justification and language.
Indeed, this must be so if we understand language as signification, as 
an imposed and arbitrary system, as radically other than its putative refer-
ent. So I would argue that both the simple image of the postmodern—as 
a world of simulation, signification, representation or social construc-
tion—and the criticism of this notion are equivocal without justification. 
The idea of language imposed on the world begins from a binary between 
a world in itself and the mediating or differentiating system. By the same 
token, the criticism of postmodernism that insists on the necessary fan-
tasy or event of the ‘in itself ’ also accepts truth as other than the lived 
real. But this equivocal understanding of the signifier should be chal-
lenged by the thought of univocity, in which truth may be intuited as that 
which expresses itself, not as that which is ‘in itself ’ only to be belied by 
relations, but as that which gives birth to—while remaining irreducible 
to—relations.
Expressionism, which follows from the commitment to univoc-
ity, is not the affirmation of a human subject and his relation to the 
world; expressionism accounts for relations as emerging from one sub-
stance, but a substance that is given not as a single whole but as a play 
of forces and differences from which points of relative stability emerge. 
Expressionism aims to intuit the real possibility of relations: to perceive 
is to establish a relation, to connect or mix corporeal bodies; any such 
mixture results in an event—say, a perceived quality within time—and 
this event then opens another time, a time of singularities or eternal truth 
whereby the what that is perceived can be thought independently of the 
that through which it is perceived. The subject who perceives and speaks 
is made possible through sense. And sense is not the effect of a system of 
signifiers, for there can be signification only if the signifier refers beyond 
itself to a signified. Each actual body that we perceive within time has 
emerged from a potentiality that exceeds its concrete material appear-
ance. It is possible for language to refer, concretely, to ‘women,’ because 
that specific and extensive grouping is an actualization of a broader and 
excessive potentiality. It is this beyond of the signifier—that to which it 
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refers—that Lacan describes in Oedipal terms: to be submitted to lan-
guage is to seek the sense of what we say, some beyond of the signifier, a 
beyond imagined as prohibited by the one who holds the phallus, with 
the phallus as a paradoxical element, for it offers itself as signifier of sig-
nifiers—that there is sense—while strictly bearing no sense. For Deleuze, 
who follows Lacan up to this point (Deleuze 1990:228), one needs to 
go one step further. That there can be sense, that a body part can detach 
itself and present itself as the sense or law of bodies is possible only 
through the event of sense in general: the capacity for bodies—through 
their mixtures, causes or relations within time—to release the thought of 
that which is for all time.
This event or infinitive is sense: it inheres in language but cannot be 
reduced to language. Regardless of whether I affirm, remember, imagine, 
deny or desire what is expressed, the expressed itself remains the same; 
the expressed is therefore not the thing itself (what is denoted). The 
expressed is perceived as that in the thing that marks it out as being the 
thing that it is. So when I say ‘morning star’ or ‘president of the United 
States of America’ I refer beyond the corporeal object (the physical body 
of the planet Venus, or the individual Barack Obama) to that body’s par-
ticular way of being referred to, and if I tried to explain this sense—by say-
ing the morning star is the evening star, or saying that the president of the 
United States is the husband of Michelle Obama—I would then have to 
give you another sense; we can never say sense itself or that which sense 
expresses. Nor is the expressed the mental or psychological idea of the I 
who speaks (manifestation), for the sense of, say, ‘the author of Hamlet’ 
is more than the corporeal body of William Shakespeare (for there would 
still be an ‘author of Hamlet’ if we were to find that the physical individual 
named as William Shakespeare did not actually write the plays we had 
taken him to write. Sense is also more than any individual’s articulation of 
sense, for we can identify the same sense in different articulations. Sense 
is the result of bodies and their encounters, the expression of relations, 
but it also takes on a being of its own that should not be regarded as other 
than being, as imposed on being, but as ‘extra-being.’ 
Univocity enables responsible and responsive thinking: not accept-
ing the world as signified, as mediated through signs, but interrogating 
the emergence of signs. Equivocity, by contrast, is banality, not thinking 
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through the events within which we are immersed, but accepting already 
given distinctions between two substances; equivocity reads art as repre-
sentation, selves as constructs, and genders as mediated kinds. Equivocity 
accepts two levels—signifier and signified, sign and world, representation 
and the real—without asking the genesis of this difference.
Deleuze explains equivocity in his book on Spinoza by referring to two 
ways of apprehending signs. If Adam sees the prohibition placed over the 
tree of knowledge as a command or imposed order, then the sign or com-
mand is seen as other than the world, tyrannically imposed. It is as though 
there is the world on the one hand, and then the laws and commands of 
its governing creator on the other. If, however, Adam sees the prohibition 
as an expression of the world’s relations, as a sign of the harm that will fol-
low from eating the forbidden fruit, then God is nothing more than the 
full knowledge of the world’s powers (Deleuze 1992:247). To see signs as 
signifiers, as differences arbitrarily imposed on an otherwise lawless and 
undifferentiated world, is to imagine the system of speech and the speak-
ing subject as radically other than the world itself. There is posited being 
on the one hand and the subject who posits on the other; this results in 
the radical split of the subject and the symbolic, for any thought of being 
as a whole must always have a remainder, blind spot or not-all that condi-
tions the system but is never able to be articulated within the system. The 
subject is produced in and through subjection (Butler 1997).
There are both ontological and practical or pragmatic reasons to reject 
equivocity. Ontologically, equivocity might be defined as the privileging 
of ontology, or as the decision to grant some being a foundational status 
(whether that foundation is the subject, life, actuality, culture, significa-
tion, God, humans, matter and so on). It follows that equivocity would 
also entail a certain mode of pragmatism, whereby we accept what is true 
in terms of what is true for us, or what works for us—which is of course 
no truth at all. By contrast, univocity does not concern itself with what 
really is and so there could (and should) be arguments about whether 
one can include numbers, fictional characters, relations or values in 
one’s ontology; there would be no privileged being that would provide 
the yardstick for all other beings. It follows that if there is a pragmatism 
it would be without ground: no longer a decision of truth according to 
what works for us, but truth as that which works as such, as that which 
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takes hold or possesses force. (And if one were to answer that this seems 
like totalitarianism—for doesn’t Nazism ‘have force’—one would reply 
that, Nazism doesn’t possess force because it has to operate by vanquish-
ing and denying force. (In fact totalitarianisms are necessarily equivocal, 
grounding the truth of the world on some higher logic of what really and 
truly is.) Univocity affirms one expressive plane of life in which languages 
and signs express or flow from the real, and yet do so in ways that are 
contingent (or that could have issued in different systems). By contrast, 
in equivocal ontologies signifiers imprison and order a life that in itself 
remains radically other or phantasmatic. Our submission to a system of 
signs gestures to an outside that is signified, but out of reach. According 
to equivocal logics, the signifier is a law or command, an order or norm to 
which thought ought to submit. And it is in this process or act of submis-
sion that the subject is split from being; a gap or ‘not-all’ opens a sym-
bolic order that both produces and precludes its mourned outside.
It is just this equivocity that engenders postmodernism and its discon-
tents, for it establishes the signifier, system and subject on the one hand, 
and the real or the retroactively constituted world on the other. For Jean 
Baudrillard, the simulacrum is defined through a loss or absence of the 
real and is therefore both other than the real as well as being the only real, 
or hyperreal, to which we have access (Baudrillard 1994). There have also 
been positive affirmations of this post-metaphysical condition, a condi-
tion abandoning the real and recognizing our linguistic condition. For 
Richard Rorty, postmodern liberal humanism is just this acceptance of 
our existence within contexts along with the abandonment of any grand 
claims to foundations, justification or life as such (Rorty 1983). Jurgen 
Habermas, while critical of what he takes to be the postmodern relativ-
ism of deconstruction, nevertheless insists that only by working within 
speech and negotiation can there be any politics; politics abandons any 
metaphysical outside to focus on procedures of legitimation and commu-
nication (Habermas 1992). Judith Butler, who maintains both the idea of 
a mourning for a lost real, and the recognition that such a real is produced 
only through mourning, insists that it is just this recognition of subjec-
tion that might enable political mobility:
One can certainly concede that desire is radically conditioned 
without claiming that it is radically determined, and that 
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there are structures that make possible desire without claim-
ing that those structures are impervious to a reiterative and 
transformative articulation. The latter is hardly a return to ‘the 
ego’ or classical liberal notions of freedom, but it does insist 
that the norm has a temporality that opens it to a subversion 
from within and to a future that cannot be fully anticipated. 
(Butler 2000:21)
Gender, if one took this dominant equivocal point of view, would be 
an identity or position adopted in order that we might speak, act and 
perform as subjects; but this very condition of required submission and 
normativity would also allow for instability. One must recognize oneself 
as this or that gendered identity in order to take part in what Butler refers 
to as the heterosexual matrix; but, precisely because this matrix is consti-
tuted through speech, acts and performatives, it is also always capable of 
being rendered otherwise, of producing new relations. Gender is a sys-
tem of norms and prohibitions; it is only through the prohibition of the 
object of desire—say, the maternal body—that the subject is produced 
as other than that which he must have desired. One’s sex, or that which 
precedes the gender system, is, for Butler, positioned as real only after 
the event of its loss or abandonment. Sex remains as impossibly other 
precisely because submission to the system of gender is not something 
one does or does not do; there is not a self who then adopts the law. 
Rather, there is law—the norm of speaking as this or that gender—and 
from there one recognizes oneself as a sexed subject who was destined 
to take on this or that position. One is produced as a subject through the 
fantasy of submission. On the one hand, then, Butler appears to be anti-
postmodern, for she rejects the idea of a system of signs imposed on an 
otherwise neutral and inaccessible sex. On the other hand, she represents 
the epitome of equivocal logics. Our position within a system of norms 
produces a radical difference between norm and that which the norm 
supposedly orders, organizes and represents. It is in the repetition of the 
norms or signifiers of gender that one produces oneself, one’s sex or the 
real as that which was there to be signified:
This is not to say that, on the one hand, the body is simply 
linguistic stuff or, on the other hand, that it has no bearing 
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on language. It bears on language all the time. The materiality 
of language, indeed, of the very sign that attempts to denote 
‘materiality,’ suggests that it is not the case that everything, 
including materiality, is always already language. On the 
contrary, the materiality of the signifier (a ‘materiality’ that 
comprises both signs and their significatory efficacy) implies 
that there can be no reference to a pure materiality except via 
materiality. Hence, it is not that one cannot get outside of 
language in order to grasp materiality in and of itself; rather, 
every effort to refer to materiality takes place through a sig-
nifying process that, in its phenomenality, is always already 
material. (Butler 1993:68)
What makes this logic equivocal is not that it is binary so much as the 
character or nature of the binary. In equivocal logics there are no true 
binaries or differences, only one privileged term—such as the signifier 
(or mind or representation)—that generates its pale and dependent oth-
ers. Equivocity or the positing of two substances, going back to Descartes’ 
distinction between mind and matter, precludes real difference. If one 
begins from numerical difference between, say, two substances such as 
mind and matter, then one has to establish a relation between these two, 
and this will always take the form of one substance negotiating its other: 
mind as cause of matter, mind as reflection of matter, matter as cause 
of mind. Once one privileged substance, such as mind or the signifier, 
accounts for relations and differences, differences can always be seen as 
different instances predicated on some quality that is parceled out among 
numerically different bodies. Red, say, would be a generality that could 
appear now here, now there, differentiated as a quality by the real body 
of which it is predicated. Univocity, by contrast, allows only for real dif-
ference. Two instances of red are really and singularly different, each with 
their own singular power; this real difference is released in sense, in the 
perception of this singularity as not being a variation of some generality 
through time, but as a ‘potential to…,’ or an infinitive, that has as much 
being as anything else. If there is only one being, then differences—such 
as the difference between incorporeal sense and the bodies it expresses, as 
well as different qualities—are all equally real and equally different. This 
is revealed most clearly in the singularities of art: what I might perceive 
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or think here, on this canvas, is not redness in general, redness as the vari-
ant of some generality, but a ‘to red …’ that bears a repeatability for all 
time. Univocity or one being enables real difference, for difference is no 
longer differentiation of some being that is other than the differentiated.
In postmodern equivocal logics, however, difference is determined in 
advance on the basis of a difference between one type of being or sub-
stance and another. One term—the signifier—produces, constitutes and 
orders its other. For Butler, the real or matter is just that which divides 
itself into inside and outside, before and after; and the signifier is pre-
cisely that portion of matter that divides life from itself (Butler 1993:68). 
The norms of gender are read as signs of some real and underlying self. So 
the difference between form and matter, subject and world, sex and gen-
der, signifier and signified, are produced by one substance—the signifier, 
language or the speech-act—generating its radically incommensurable 
other. As signifiers, gender norms produce a sexual subject who suppos-
edly precedes the act. For Butler, then, there is no being, substance or life 
that is the one ground subtending all acts; rather there are acts of a certain 
form or type—performatives or significations—that then produce their 
real or cause. So what seems like a difference or a binary, the difference 
between sex and gender, real and signifier, presence and representation, 
is actually the effect of one term (the signifier) producing a phantom, a 
lost and imagined other. And this is only possible because there is a dis-
tinction made between what really is or has being—the signifier—and its 
generated and lesser other (the illusory subject or sex). Postmodernism 
is equivocal precisely because one event or relation of life—the signi-
fier—explains and typifies all relations. Signification is the explanation, 
cause and logic from which all other relations take their being.
Not only is postmodernism equivocal—depending on the signifier 
and an absent or constituted real—it is also the culmination of subjectiv-
ism. (And in this respect we would have to note the profound value of 
Butler’s work in bringing intelligence, rigor and force to the tradition of 
ontology that has for the most part not faced up to the logic of the sig-
nifier that Butler so astutely unpacks.) According to Martin Heidegger, 
western thought as a whole is subjectivist. Some point or underlying 
ground—hypokeimenon—precedes and orders all other relations; dif-
ferences are the effect of, or flow from, some point or logic outside life.4 
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But this substance that grounds and orders life is also, for most of west-
ern thought, imagined equivocally as other than perceived and lived life. 
For Heidegger, and Deleuze after him, overturning Platonism does not 
entail the reversal of the hierarchy of being over becoming, but the rec-
ognition that both sides of this binary have their ground in a single life, a 
life expressed through, but never exhausted by, language. Language is not 
the sign or order of some world; the world gives itself through language 
(Heidegger 1998:200) and through multiple series of signs beyond 
human language (Deleuze and Guattari 1987:117). Western thought 
becomes enslaved to equivocity, for Heidegger, precisely when the truth 
of the world, the logic of being, is located in some source point beyond 
the world itself, when Plato’s Ideas, for example, become correct ideas or 
forms through which the world might be viewed. For Deleuze, this sub-
jection to equivocity has a political origin. Whereas primitive societies 
regarded their inscriptive systems as expressive and productive—with 
rituals of tattooing, scarring and symbolization producing the connec-
tion among human bodies and the world with which they work (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987:176)—modern man regards inscription as significa-
tion, as one system of signs that is relatively translatable and that has as its 
single condition and point of origin ‘the’ speaking subject (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987:159-60).
For both Heidegger and Deleuze, western thought, particularly in its 
humanist mode, is both equivocal and subjectivist, precisely because the 
subject—‘das Man’ for Heidegger, the signifying subject for Deleuze—is 
that point through which all the differences of the world are generated, 
a single point of generation or synthesis that is the ground of all relative 
differences. Humanism is equivocal, not just because there are two sub-
stances—mind and matter—but because one substance is the ground of 
the other: the subject is the point from which the logic and relations of 
the world are recognized and given actuality. Without the synthesizing 
power of mind the order of the world would not be brought into being.
In postmodernity it is the system of signification, the law of speaking, 
communicating man, that constitutes a political ground: ‘The State gives 
thought a form of interiority, and thought gives that interiority a form of 
universality’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987:375). In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze 
and Guattari explain the ways in which the logic of capitalism is built on a 
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fantasy of man and an equivocal ontology. The idea that we are all submit-
ted to a system of signs, and that outside the system of communication 
and recognition there is only the chaos of the undifferentiated, and that 
there must have been an object that was abandoned for the sake of order: 
all these fantasies of submission center on the affective image of signify-
ing man (Deleuze and Guattari 1987:182). Two key aesthetic political 
points need to be made here. The first is critical. The idea that ‘we’ are 
submitted to a system or law that produces us as subjects set over against 
a necessarily prohibited object is a sexual fantasy. Psychoanalysis tells me 
not to kill my father and desire my mother and I realize that that’s what 
I wanted. We should, however, not see ourselves as submitted to a sys-
tem of speech beyond which lies the undifferentiated night of chaos and 
incest. On the contrary, for Deleuze and Guattari, systems of signs are 
expressive; they flow from life, and a life that is more differentiated than 
any formalized system of signs. Signs are not arbitrarily imposed. They do 
not differentiate and order the real. They are themselves real, have their 
ground in the real and flow from the real. Signs become signifiers—an 
imposed system generated from the point of law and the subject—only 
with the aesthetic investment in the affective perception of man as a 
speaking animal, or what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as ‘faciality’ or 
the regime of the ‘despotic signifier’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987:117).5 
Contrary to the view that we can include Deleuze and Guattari within a 
postmodernism that has freed itself from the real or substance, they insist 
that the structures, forms and systems within which we operate are sub-
stantial. Their theory of language insists that there is a form both to the 
signs emitted—a form of expression—and a form to what those signs 
express—a form of content—and these forms, stratifications or expres-
sions take place through substance. ‘The signifier’ for example expresses 
the subject, the body of man organized through the face. This affective 
investment in the signifying body—‘the interpretosis of the priest’—can 
be historically delimited:
the form of the signifier has a substance, or the signifier has a 
body, namely, the Face […]. Not only is this semiotic system 
not the first, but we see no reason to accord it any particular 
privilege from the standpoint of an abstract evolutionism. We 
would like to indicate very briefly certain characteristics of 
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the other two semiotic systems. First, the so-called primitive, 
presignifying semiotic, which is much closer to ‘natural’ cod-
ings operating without signs. There is no reduction to faciality 
as the sole substance of expression: there is no elimination of 
forms of content through abstraction of the signified. To the 
extent that there is still abstraction of content from a strictly 
semiotic point of view, it fosters a pluralism or polyvocality of 
forms of expression that prevents any power takeover by the 
signifier and preserves expressive forms particular to content, 
thus forms of corporeality, gesturality, rhythm, dance and 
rite coexist heterogeneously with the vocal form. A variety of 
forms and substances of expression intersect and form relays. 
It is a segmentary but plurilinear, multidimensional semi-
otic that wards off any signifying circularity (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987:117)
Deleuze and Guattari write here of ‘warding off ’ circularity, which is 
precisely how one might describe postmodern equivocal logics: a signi-
fier is not a signifier unless it is the signifier of something signified, and 
yet the signified is given as signified only by way of the signifier. So, from 
the critical point, where we reject the idea of signs imposed on life, we 
can move to the constructive point of asking whose life is expressed in 
this Oedipal fantasy of man submitted to language for the sake of being 
saved from the dark night of maternal incest? (And how did what is other 
than the signifier—the form of content—get reduced to a pre-linguistic, 
undifferentiated and unthinkable abstraction?) When confronted by 
a language—such as the language of postmodernism, the language of 
signifying man—we can ask about the genesis of linguistic system, and 
about the desires it expresses. 
Now, according to the early Deleuze, there is a sexual genesis to sense, 
and he follows psychoanalysis strictly on this point. The self-preservative 
and destructive drives produce a series of partial objects, which are then 
related to the phallus as a paradoxical object: for the phallus is that body 
part that signifies but does not yield the sense of what it signifies. There 
are two series: the concrete body parts that make up our actual body, 
and then the organism that experiences itself as a unified identity only 
through reference to some organizing point. In the case of the Oedipus 
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complex, the self is unified by imagining that its bodily integrity or the 
image of the body as a coherent whole might be fragmented if another 
body—the father who possesses the law—were to impose castration. 
Oedipalism creates a specific causal series: it refers the series of multiple 
parts to an imaginary whole—the self or subject who speaks and answers 
to the law—and then (ex post facto) regards fragmentation as that which 
would follow if the self were to transgress the prohibition on desire. 
The body’s actual parts are organized via a virtual scene. And this enig-
matic resonance between two series—the series of bodily objects and 
the series of the object elevated above the body—yields sense only with 
the Oedipus complex, which refers the series beyond itself to the event 
(Deleuze 1990:220). For Deleuze, here, the event emerges from sexual-
ity but then liberates itself from a personal sexuality. So, for example, the 
mouth that connects to the breast through the drives of life, articulates a 
demand that is addressed to an other who is beyond life (for the breast 
is also a promise of love, and an indication of an other whose desires can 
be imagined but never known). It is with speech, emerging from sexual 
relations, that a sense irreducible to speech is liberated; any act of speech 
expresses a sense that is at once within a context (referring to this sense 
here and now) but also beyond a context, for the same act of speech could 
be repeated in other contexts. Sense is sexual in a ramified sense. Sense is 
a pure attribute, an infinitive or power that detaches itself from bodies.
Concretely, one can say that bodies allow for perceptions or qualities. 
One can perceive a certain quality, and this perception might then be 
expressed in a proposition. It is in and through this expressed proposition 
that sense is liberated: a perception of x is perceived as a power to x, a red-
ness, for example, that is capable of being repeated and varied in any time 
whatever. Sense may emerge dynamically from Oedipal relations among 
bodies, but can never be reduced to bodies. You and I can converse and 
understand each other only because our language transcends us both, 
and exceeds any single body. Indeed, if we are to think, one needs to move 
beyond constituted sexualities to the sense that appears as their ‘quasi-
cause’: it seems that we speak only because we are subjected to a single 
system that grants us our distinct identity, but this supposedly founda-
tional or causal law is possible only because of relations among bodies.
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This allows us to move to the positive argument of univocity. There 
is an affective component of any system of signs, any assemblage; 
there is a form of expression (or a particular character to the regime of 
signs) as well as a form of content (or a particular distribution of what 
is expressed). In capitalism we imagine the form of expression to be the 
signifier, an imposed and purely differential system, and we imagine the 
form of content, or what is signified, to be the undifferentiated, negative 
or retroactively posited real. But if all regimes are expressions of life, and 
if we question the universality of the signifying model, we can ask what 
mode of life the despotism of the signifier expresses. How did we come 
to think of ourselves as subjected to systems? How did we come to think 
of life as that which can only be thought (phantasmatically) as other than 
the law? What investments, desires, connections must be presupposed 
for me to think of myself as a speaking subject positioned within a law 
that is radically other than some supposedly negated pre-Oedipal real? 
If we see signs not as radically other than life but as expressions of life we 
can undertake two tasks.
First, we can ask what the image of signifying man expresses. What 
configuration of desire has produced a submission to law that remains 
forever in a state of negation, loss and mourning of the real? Deleuze and 
Guattari give a direct answer in Anti-Oedipus. Lacan is quite right to note 
that we are all Oedipal, but this Oedipal subject is historically, politically 
and sexually specific. It is the man of the bourgeois family who sees him-
self as dominated by an internalized father. And this internalized, punish-
ing and castrating father—this man of law within us all—has a political 
and historical origin. Whereas law and force once emanated from the 
despot, the king or the tribal ruler, we now see law as ‘human,’ as gener-
ated from the simple fact that we are speaking beings. A certain body—
that of white, laboring, familial man, the man of propositions and judg-
ments—provides the affective image that underpins the Oedipal fantasy. 
(And underpinning that Oedipal fantasy is the ‘image of thought’ in gen-
eral, or the equivocal notion par excellence: that there is some thinking 
being, subject or performativity that precedes and conditions the world.) 
The fantasy of signification is therefore expressive of a reactive desire, a 
desire that posits man as a speaking animal, submitted to the logic of the 
signifier, set over against a desiring life that can now only be imagined as 
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retroactively constituted through the very fantasy of prohibition. And as 
long as we do not question this fantasy we remain within what Deleuze 
refers to as the ‘neurotic novel’; we repeat the symptom as our own 
(Deleuze 1990, 276). Žižek has recently defended this persistence of 
desiring negativity on two grounds: first, without the gap of desire or the 
illusion that there is a distance between the emptiness of the subject and 
the world, the desires we would be left with nothing, but subjectivity lies 
in this ‘less than nothing,’ in acknowledging that the subject is an illusion 
but one that nevertheless persists through the desire of the drive. Second, 
this allows for creativity: no object answers to my desire, and ‘my’ subjec-
tivity is nothing other than this gap or distance between desire and what 
I can grasp, know or have: 
Far from being the same as the nirvana principle (the striv-
ing towards the dissolution of all tension, the longing for a 
return to original nothingness), the death drive is the tension 
which persists and insists beyond and against the nirvana 
principle. In other words, far from being opposed to the plea-
sure principle, the nirvana principle is its highest and most 
radical expression. In this precise sense, the death drive stands 
for its exact opposite, for the dimension of the ‘undead,’ of a 
spectral life which insists beyond (biological) death. […]. 
What Lacan calls ‘symbolic castration’ is a deprivation, a ges-
ture of taking away (the loss of the ultimate and absolute—
‘incestuous’ —object of desire) which is in itself giving , pro-
ductive, generative, opening up and sustaining the space of 
desire and meaning. The frustrating nature of our human 
existence, the very fact that our lives are forever out of joint, 
marked by a traumatic imbalance, is what propels us towards 
permanent creativity. (Žižek 2012)
This dimension of Žižek’s thought comes close to the Deleuzian insis-
tence that one also recognize the subject as a production: the key differ-
ence lies in the nature of production, whether it can be located in a death 
drive of the psyche or whether there is a broader extra-human field of 
force of which the human death drive would be but one actualization. 
I would suggest that the difference lies in the commitment to univocity: 
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should we affirm the subject as the gap or ‘less than nothing’ that intro-
duces an ‘undead’ haunting or absent element allowing for creativity, or 
should we distribute distance across an entire field, beyond organisms, 
subjects and what is taken to be life? Univocity would not deny the force 
of subjects and desires, but would locate such forces or drives in a larger 
plane—with no mode of drive being any more significant than any other. 
This would also mean that one would challenge certain accounts of ‘the 
political,’ such as Judith Butler’s account of subjects and bodies as being 
given through political systems:
If one can speak about the ‘being’ of the body, it is a ‘being’ 
that is always given over to others, to norms, to social and 
political organizations that have developed historically and 
that allocate precariousness differentially. It is not possible 
first to define the ontology of the body and then to refer to the 
social significations the body assumes, or the social networks 
that form its conditions for subsistence. Rather, to be a body 
is to be exposed to social crafting and form; it is to be this very 
exposure. That is what makes the ontology of the body a social 
ontology. In other words, the body is exposed to socially and 
politically articulated forces as well as to claims of sociality—
including language, work, and desire—that make possible the 
body’s persisting and flourishing. (Butler 2011, 382)
If we think beyond the polity then we move from equivocity—the pol-
ity and the bodies its creates by way of subjection—to univocity, where 
there is no polity so much as a field of forces that are micro-political, cre-
ating thousands of tiny interactions, relations and resistances.
The challenge of both thought and art is to construct a symptomatol-
ogy: to read the symptom as a response to a problem, to read the work of 
art not as an arbitrary or contextually bound signification but as an event 
of sense. For Žižek the imperative is to ‘enjoy your symptom,’ because 
without the subject’s attachment to some contingent object that prom-
ises (but also stands in the way of) full enjoyment there would be no life, 
force or resistance. For Žižek the gap or distance of the symptom is tied 
to the distinct difference of language:
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Everybody now knows that ‘we can do things with words’: 
[…]. And indeed, is not the very kernel of psychoanalysis 
embedded in the dimension of language embedded in the 
dimension of language as speech act? Is it not confined to this 
dimension by the very fact that it is a talking cure, an attempt to 
reach and transform the real of the symptom solely by means 
of words, i.e., without having recourse to an immediate opera-
tion on the body […]. The point is not to arrive at the fac-
tual truth of some long-forgotten event—what is effectively at 
stake here is, quite literally, the recollection of the past, i.e., the 
way this remembrance of the past bears on the subject’s pres-
ent position of enunciation, how it transforms the very place 
from which the subject speaks (is spoken). (Žižek 2001, 32)
For Deleuze, by contrast, symptoms trace back to a field well beyond 
subjects, to a plane of forces from which relatively stable points emerge. 
Expressionism works against the craven ressentiment that would proclaim: 
‘I am constituted through the system of signifiers therefore I can only 
think what is beyond signification as some absent cause.’ Expressionism 
prompts us to look beyond the fantasy of signifying man to the very pos-
sibility of signs. Expression—seeing signs as events that flow from the 
real—is tied to univocity: not world and signification, not real and system, 
but one flowing life. And yet this flow of life gives itself in articulation, in 
ever and ever finer distinctions, cuts, bifurcations, disturbances; the cuts 
are not differentiations of the real, for ‘the real’ is the force of distinction 
and difference. Both expression and univocity in turn are dependent on 
the recognition of affect, and yet affect is not emotion. If affects are con-
sidered to be what we feel when our bodies respond to certain forces or 
perturbation, then affect is once again the sign of some outside. Part of 
the force of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy is to detach affect from 
the lived and from feelings and emotions; one might say that there are 
affects or the powers and forces that occur in the relations among quanti-
ties, some of which are felt. Forces of light meet with the resistance of my 
skin; I feel warmth. I probably do not feel the other quantities produced 
(vitamin D, melanoma, ageing and so on.). What if a painter could paint 
this light? Not light as felt or absorbed, but light in its capacity to warm? 
Then an affect would be seized upon that might stand alone. Further, we 
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might say that persons and other organisms are possible because there 
are affects: powers of encounter from which we are assembled. 
It is the critical concept of affect that allows us to ask just what the 
equivocity of postmodern man expresses. It is through affect and its 
extension that we can explain the emergence of the image and fantasy of 
man. In his book on David Hume, Deleuze explains how all life is affect 
or sympathy (Deleuze 1991:34); a body lives and desires in its partial 
connections and attachments to other bodies. From the connection of 
one body part to another the self forms regular sympathies with present 
bodies, say in the formation of a family or tribe (territorialization). But 
one can extend these sympathies to bodies that are not present. A body 
can become exemplary, and represent the law or identity of the whole 
(deterritorialization). For Hume, the family produces the father as the 
exemplary body, and we can imagine communities as extended families, 
such that social virtues are fictions that enable us to think of imaginary 
wholes that express and extend sympathies (Deleuze 1991:35). This fic-
tive extension can produce the image of man or humanity: a commu-
nity of those who are not present or can be thought of only potentially 
(Deleuze 1991:41). Two points need to be made and the first is directly 
aesthetic-political: the extension of sympathy or affect begins from 
expressivity and image. One body stands in for the whole, allowing us 
to think the community of bodies or the family of man. And this allows 
us to understand why our supposedly universal concepts of humanity, or 
man in general, are always different and micro-political. The supposedly 
generic ‘man of reason,’ is more often than not the white, bourgeois man 
of modern capitalism. (In the beginning is not the polity, but the affect 
or attachment from which a figure of ‘the body’ is assembled.) The sense 
of ‘man’ or the subject is always the affective extension or deterritorial-
ization of this or that body. Despite all our proclamations of humanity, 
human rights and universal sympathy recent events ought to lead us to 
question why, when we know this distant, different suffering other has as 
much right as my similar neighbor, we nevertheless feel more sympathy 
for those who are like ‘us.’ The western trauma of September 11 is a salu-
tary reminder of just how affective our image of humanity is, for was not 
this incident traumatic precisely because it was an attack on the West, on 
us, on ‘man’? Only an affective and expressive approach to sense—not a 
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logic of the signifier—can deal with a politics that is pre-discursive. Far 
from insisting on the logic of sexual difference, as differentiation, which 
would have to do with the formal structure of signification, thinking of 
sex expressively allows us to intuit the articulations of the body that is 
imagined and presupposed in our fantasy of the speaking subject.
The subject of rights and language, who is supposedly any speaker 
whatever, is a body who precedes exchange, who communicates, calcu-
lates, labors and submits to inter-subjective norms; this affective body of 
the ‘speaking subject’ is produced from the body of white western man, a 
body governed by the signifying face and expressive eyes:
The face is not universal. It is not even that of the white man; 
it is White Man himself, with his broad white cheeks and 
the black holes of his eyes. The face is Christ. The face is the 
typical European, what Ezra Pound called the average sen-
sual man, in short, the ordinary everyday Erotomaniac […]. 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987:176)
Deleuze and Guattari also argue that the image of speaking, judging 
and signifying man—the subject produced through the system that dif-
ferentiates life and negates the real—is equivocal. Its desire for that which 
is necessarily or constitutively prohibited, the definition of man through 
Oedipal or negated desire, sets the signifying subject radically apart from 
‘his’ world. On the one hand there is the order of speech, signification, 
difference and relations; on the other hand there is a real that remains for-
ever out of reach, retroactively produced or imagined only from within 
the limit of the system: man and his other(s). Nowhere is this more 
apparent than in fetishized ethical models of the face, where the radical 
distance and absence of the other closes the world upon the subject and 
what cannot be apprehended. For Deleuze, reading through Proust, the 
face, like all fragments, does not present itself as a radical alterity set apart 
from the world, but it does open out onto proliferating worlds:
By setting fragments into fragments, Proust finds the means 
of making us contemplate them all, but without reference to 
a unity from which they might derive or which itself would 
derive from them. […]
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Even the final revelation of time regained will not unify them 
nor make them converge, but will multiply the ‘transversals’ 
that themselves are not interconnected[…]. Similarly, the 
faces of the other have at least two dissymmetric sides, like 
‘two opposing routes that will never meet’ : thus for Rachel, 
the way of generality and that of singularity, or else that of the 
shapeless nebula seen from too close and that of an exquisite 
organization seen from a right distance. Or else for Albertine, 
the face that corresponds to trust and the face that reacts to 
jealous suspicion[…], and again the two routes or the two 
ways are only statistical directions. We can form a complex 
group, but we never form it without its splitting in its turn, this 
time as though into a thousand sealed vessels: thus Albertine’s 
face, when we imagine we are gathering it up in itself for a kiss, 
leaps from one plane to another as our lips cross its cheek, 
‘ten Albertines’ in sealed vessels, until the final moment in the 
exaggerated proximity. And in each vessel is a self that lives, 
perceives, desires, and remembers, that wakes or sleeps, that 
dies, commits suicide, and revives in abrupt jolts: the ‘crum-
bling,’ the ‘fragmentation’ of Albertine’s departure, must be 
learned by all these distinct selves, each at the bottom of its 
urn. (Deleuze 2000, 124)
Expressionism
For Deleuze the problem that poses itself if we think of expression, 
rather than signification, is how we might discern and intuit a life that 
exceeds and solicits the enclosure of the subject. If postmodern subjec-
tivity depends on the affective image of man—the self positioned within 
exchange, communication and the negation of life—then the path to 
expression might be through sexual difference, a difference that would 
have to be rethought at the level of style. Instead of seeing sexual differ-
ence as the logic through which life is signified—with the man of speech 
and law set over against the feminine ‘not-all’ or beyond of signified 
objects—one might imagine sexual difference as the style of life.
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If there is not life on the one hand and signification on the other, but 
one expressive life that gives itself only in its styles, then we can propose 
a series of connections. Sense is sexual precisely because the corporeal 
body and its relations create a sexual surface, a series of zones and territo-
ries that extend and thereby transform the drives of life. Sense is possible 
through the Oedipal relation that creates a surface or frontier between 
the body on the one hand and the incorporeal expressed on the other. 
Even in The Logic of Sense, Deleuze will insist on a further metaphysical 
surface: the impersonal singularities that are irreducible to the Oedipal 
relation from which they emerge. But in Anti-Oedipus, with Guattari, he 
is more stringent: the mother-father-child schema is one fantasy of sense, 
one way in which bodies and their connections deterritorialize, or allow a 
body or body part—the phallus—to provide the sense of all bodies.
The way to think through the Oedipal enclosure of sense is through 
style, for style creates sense, especially in the form of the paradox. 
Paradox is only possible through sense but also displays sense as emerg-
ing through a language that it also exceeds. ‘I do not mean what I say’; 
‘this has no meaning’; ‘this is not what I’m saying’; ‘I am lying’; or ‘this 
is not true’: such acts are performative contradictions. They are so 
because the ‘I’ who speaks is split from the ‘I’ denoted; paradoxes allow 
the speaking subject to inhabit the system of sense, while also refusing 
sense. This is only possible because sense operates in two directions at 
once, down towards the denoted or what is said, and outwards towards 
the expressed that is released from the denoted. Sense, therefore, relies 
on an aleatory or paradoxical element, such as the ‘I’ that at once grounds 
the speech in a here and now and releases a sense of the act that exceeds 
this ‘I’ (Deleuze 1990, 77). It is this creation of a surface or paradoxical 
element that occurs through style. Style is sexual if we take sexuality to be 
the extension of the drive beyond its object. Sense is not tied to sexuality 
because a sexual scene or fantasy of difference is required in order for the 
signifier to be split or barred from the subject; sense is sexual because by 
sexuality Freud referred to the event: the power for an affect, quality or 
perceived to be thought and imaged beyond the corporeal body.
Styles do not refer to or organize some underlying life; styles are prob-
lems, expressions or strivings of a life that gives itself in its variations 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987:318). These variations or styles are sexual 
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because they are productive, connective and desiring. ‘Becoming-woman’ 
can then be seen to indicate a counter-Oedipal movement of sense: not 
the ‘woman’ who does not exist because she is man’s projected, fantasized 
other, but woman as variation. There are becomings, or positive expres-
sions of life, that occur as powers or styles of variation that are differ-
ent from the centered subject of speech and enunciation. Whereas the 
image of the subject is that of some site or point that manages, subtends 
or imposes difference, becoming-woman is always ‘becoming-towards.’ It 
is not creation ex nihilo. Becoming-woman can be intuited as an expres-
sion of that life of which man is only one distinct effect: ‘A woman has 
to become-woman, but in a becoming-woman of all man’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987:292). ‘Man’ and ‘woman’ are not binary differentiations or 
genders; both terms are expressions of a sexuality that goes beyond the 
human (233), a sexuality that can only be intuited if we go beyond the 
logic of signifying man and think of a life that articulates itself in distinct 
powers or potentials to become. There is no single point, term or actual-
ity—no man as subject—that can act as ground and enunciating center 
for all becoming:
There is no becoming-man because man is the molar entity 
par excellence, whereas becomings are molecular. The facial-
ity function showed us the form under which man constitutes 
the majority, or rather the standard upon which the major-
ity is based: white, male, adult, ‘rational,’ etc., in short, the 
average European, the subject of enunciation. (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987:92)
Conclusion
In order to give this reference to style more specificity we might con-
sider Virginia Woolf ’s novel To the Lighthouse. First we can consider the 
novel critically, at the semantic and narrative level, as both an allegory 
and manifesto of aesthetics. The first section of the novel, ‘The Window,’ 
sets up a series of oppositions that take the binary form of equivocity: 
one term—man—is the ground, origin and center from which the other 
term ‘woman’ is effected as different. Mr Ramsay the philosopher who 
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works with defined and closed problems and who is concerned about his 
place in history (or whether he will be remembered in the great canon 
of philosophers) is set against Mrs Ramsay who is the classically other-
directed, emotive, empathetic, beautiful and uncomprehending ‘woman.’ 
Lily Briscoe is trying to paint Mrs Ramsay as an iconic representation of 
all things human and wholesome, but has to deal with the phrase emanat-
ing from Tansley, one of Mr Ramsay’s university colleagues, that ‘women 
can’t paint, women can’t write.’ The binaries of this first section are equiv-
ocal precisely because they organize sensible, physical and emotional 
being as the lesser, dependent and distinct other of intellectual being. 
Lily’s painting of Mrs Ramsay will be a representation of meaning, of the 
female body as the principle of life and nurturance; it will also take its 
place within history. Just as Mr Ramsay is fearful that his personal con-
tribution to philosophy might pass unnoticed and that his proper name 
might remain unrecorded, so Lily’s painting aims to take its place in the 
great hall of art. We could see this first part of the novel as critical.
Woolf repeats the standard oppositions of western thought—male/
female, reason/body, logic/emotions, philosophy/art and viewer/
viewed—in order to expose their rigidity. As Jane Goldman has noted, 
there is more than one way to read Woolf ’s declaration that on or about 
1910 human nature changed (Goldman 1998). 1910 was the year of the 
Post-Impressionist exhibition, when forces of light and difference were 
freed from the organizing point of the human eye. We should therefore 
consider the style of the novel with regard to the problem it expresses, 
what the novel as an event of sense is striving to do, and the potentials 
or infinitives it releases. This is given at two levels in the novel. First, in 
the concluding section of the novel Lily Briscoe no longer represents Mrs 
Ramsay, nor is her artwork pure form and imposition; she is invaded by 
perception. Her work is neither an intended act, nor a performance that 
produces her as a distinct subject, so much as a perception in which two 
terms—Lily’s desire and the painting—are produced as distinct through 
their specific relation.
With a curious physical sensation, as if she were urged forward 
and at the same time must hold herself back, she made her 
first quick decisive stroke. The brush descended. It flickered 
brown over the white canvas; it left a running mark. A second 
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time she did it—a third time. And so pausing and so flicker-
ing, she attained a dancing rhythmical movement, as if the 
pauses were one part of the rhythm and the strokes another, 
and all were related; and so, lightly and swiftly pausing, strik-
ing, she scored her canvas with brown running nervous lines 
which had no sooner settled there than they enclosed (she felt 
it looming out at her) a space. (Woolf 1977:148)
It is the event of sense, or the emergence of a difference, that creates 
Lily and the surface to which she is directed. (Lily and canvas operate in 
modes of mutual creation or transversal becoming.) Lily finally draws a 
dark line on the canvas, thus reversing the idea of a single light that illu-
minates and gives form: ‘with a sudden intensity, as if she saw it clear for 
a second, she drew a line there, in the centre’ (Woolf 1977:192). Here it 
is dark—the zero degree of light, the positivity of light’s absence—that 
expresses a pure difference, not this or that different thing, but the pure 
potential to differ. If the God of Genesis gives form to being and mat-
ter through light, Lily’s creation produces form through dark on light, a 
light that is not differentiating so much as given in difference. This iconic 
moment in the novel expresses a manifesto or desire for a certain style: 
style as the response to differing light, and not style as a form-giving or 
illuminating power set over a dark matter.
With this iconic moment in mind, we can now read the style of Woolf ’s 
novel as a whole in terms of its refusal of the position of subject and object 
and its tracing of singularities. The power of Woolf ’s sentences, we might 
say, is that they fail to connect or logically follow. How, we might ask, can 
a sentence, such as the following, describe a light that allows something 
to be heard, a sound that harbors a memory and longing, and that illu-
minates lost objects, and then draws a smell, and ultimately produces 
a tactile sensation of grit. In the following sentence the subject of the 
sentence is a perception, first of light (‘the sun poured’); this light then 
enables the auditory (‘so that every footstep could be plainly heard’); 
the sound evokes a distant scene or desire (‘sobbing for her father’); and 
then, we might ask, just what is it that ‘lit up bats’? For this same subject 
that illuminates, allows to be heard and recalls is eventually referred to as 
olfactory—‘a smell of salt and weeds’—before concluding with the tac-
tile ‘gritty’:
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while the sun poured into those attics, which a plank alone 
separated from each other so that every footstep could be 
plainly heard and the Swiss girl sobbing for her father who 
was dying of cancer in a valley of the Grisons, and lit up bats, 
flannels, straw hats, ink-pots, beetles, and the skulls of small 
birds, while it drew from the long frilled strips of seaweed 
pinned to the wall a smell of salt and weeds, which was in the 
towels too, gritty with sand from bathing. (Woolf 1977:13)
No longer adopting the propositional style of a subject who predi-
cates qualities of an outside world, nor of a subject who is nothing more 
than the mechanical repetition of a disembodied system, Woolf ’s style 
moves beyond the free-indirect inhabitation of styles towards monadic 
points of perception. The sentences confuse perceiver and perceived, at 
the same time as they express a substance that does not exhaust itself in 
any of its terms. Essence is power, and power is the capacity to affect and 
be affected. To intuit the essence of a text, to think beyond its composed 
terms, is to strive to perceive or be affected by the problem to which it is 
a response. From the rigid binaries of male and female, light and dark, 
Woolf ’s style moves to the singular differences covered over by depen-
dent oppositions; sexual difference supplants gender. There are no longer 
distinct kinds or generalities, or genders, so much as essences that oper-
ate as powers to differ, essences that are sexual precisely because they have 
their sole being in creation.
Notes
1.  ‘[T]he paradox is that the Real as external, excluded from the Symbolic, is in 
fact a symbolic determination—what eludes symbolization is precisely the 
Real as the inherent point of failure of symbolization’ (Žižek 2000:121).
2.  The relation of love, in Badiou’s work, is only one way in which we might 
consider the event, which also manifests itself in the poem, the matheme 
and the revolutionary situation. I am here deliberately narrowing the terms 
of debate to the question of sexual difference and gender. The figures whom 
I am contrasting with Deleuze—Judith Butler, Joan Copjec, Slavoj Žižek, as 
well as Alain Badiou—do offer highly nuanced reflections on the problem of 
sexual difference. By drawing a stark contrast between their approaches and 
that of Deleuze—despite the fact that there are certain sympathies—I hope 
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to focus on the ways in which the work of thinkers like Butler has (however 
unwittingly) led to an unthinking celebration of the performance, discourse 
and constitution of gender at the expense of the positivity of sexual difference.
3.  Deleuze and Guattari historicize what Lacan takes to be a transcendental 
condition. We are, they concede, subjected to the signifier, regarding our 
desires as mediated through the law of the father; but this is the consequence 
of capitalism’s shift of the law away from an external prohibition towards a 
general axiom. It is the act of speaking as such, existing in a world with others, 
that now imposes a command of prohibition. We are now tyrannized by a 
supposedly general human condition of lack.
4.  If Luce Irigaray and Deleuze share the same project of sexual difference, 
albeit with different outcomes, this is because they both draw on Heidegger’s 
recognition that western thought has been dominated by a Platonism that 
the works of Plato, if read carefully, would allow us to challenge. That which 
truly is, substance or hypokeimenon, cannot be identified with or exhausted 
by any of its expressions or representations. The thought of substance is just 
the opening of thought to that life or being that is beyond thought’s own 
limited images; the thought of substance therefore allows for real difference. 
However, once substance is seen as numerically distinct from perception 
as other than or different from the represented world then we fall into 
equivocity: the perceived world on the one hand, and its different ground on 
the other. Man or the subject becomes that point in the world from which 
difference and representation are explained in advance.
5.  Deleuze and Guattari therefore spend a great deal of time in A Thousand 
Plateaus describing regimes of signs and various strata. Strata refer to various 
ways in which the one expressive life produces distinct levels, such as the 
strata of language in the narrow sense that borders the life it signifies on 
one side, and the system of speaking subjects on the other. But there are 
other stratifications, such as the social arrangement of bodies that faces 
law on the one side, and the desires of bodies on the other. One side of a 
stratum faces towards territorialization or organization, while the other faces 
towards deterritorialization or the freer flow of singular, not yet connected, 
differences. This allows us to think of various regimes of signs, with formal 
language being one of many. A sign, for Deleuze and Guattari, is not other 
than life, not an order imposed on life, but a relation within, or of, life. 
Sexual difference can be considered as a sign, with one body’s perception 
and desire of another body producing a relation that is both sexual—because 
it is desiring, connective and productive—and a sign , for life is just this 
relation of singular differences that must somehow read, code or perceive 
other differences both in terms of its own life and striving, while also being 
transformed through this perception. So all perception is (a) sexual or 
desiring, (b) a sign, because the difference encountered must be read, (c) 
anti-interpretive, because this reading or perceiving does not posit a meaning 
Postmodernism Is a Humanism: Deleuze and Equivocity 235
behind what it perceives but creates a body and relation, a territory of 
assemblage, and (d) expressive, because these signs, perceptions and strivings 
are not signs of a life that lies outside them, for life is just this striving, 
perceiving whole.
Chapter 11
On the Very Possibility of Queer Theory
Is queer theory a reflection on what it means to be queer, or does the 
concept of queerness change the ways in which we theorize? On the one 
hand the concept of theory appears to be inextricably intertwined with 
the concept of the human: man is that rational animal possessed of a soul 
capable of intuiting the essential, or what truly is, and thereby liberating 
himself from determined and merely actual perception (Irwin 1988). On 
the other hand, the possibility of a true theory—a mode of thinking that 
operates without a normative image of thought—seems to be opened 
only after the death of God and the death of ‘man’ (Deleuze 1994: 109). 
For Deleuze, true thought and true theory—a real break with the norma-
tive image of ‘man’—must include both the intuition of the ground from 
which sense, truth and problems emerge, and must fulfill the promise of 
transcendental inquiry, which has all too often fallen back upon a self or 
subject who subtends theory. Contrary to a popular idea of a simple anti-
humanism Deleuze does not reject the intuition of essences, the eternal, 
genesis and grounds; on the contrary, his work is best understood as 
an argument in favor of a superior transcendentalism that would think 
beyond the residual humanism maintained both by forms of Kantian cri-
tique and by popular notions of community and interrogation (Deleuze 
1994, 197). 
While abandoning the idea of a metaphysical outside or ‘beyond’ 
which might ground metaphysics, post-Kantian thought has nevertheless 
maintained the possibility of renovating thought from within (O’Neill 
1989). If, in modernity, we have abandoned the idea of theoria as an intu-
ition of essences, we can nevertheless sustain some commitment to cri-
tique: an interrogation of our situation from within (Habermas 1992). 
From such a commitment to interrogation from within, or resignation to 
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an ironic attitude, it might seem that the values of queer theory would 
be the values of the postmodern, posthuman, post-metaphysical attitude 
in general. If our situatedness is, by definition, that which also counts as 
normal and normative, then theory as such might be intrinsically queer, 
as an attempt to deviate from, or pervert, that which appears self-evident, 
unquestionable and foundational. Accepting such a definition of queer 
theory would render the enterprise both parasitic and relative; queer the-
ory would always be a solicitation of the normal, and if homosexuality 
and bisexuality were to become legitimate social models, then queerness 
would not have withered away, but merely shifted terrain: queer theory 
would be queer politics and would proceed by way of interrogating any 
supposed normality or normativity, having no intrinsic power. What I 
would like to consider in this final concluding chapter is a less negative 
and less relative formulation of queer theory, one concerned more with 
the intuition of essences than with the critical distance from the natu-
ral attitude. 
There are two ways to think about the theoretical point of view in 
modernity. The first is critical. After Kant’s ‘Copernican turn’ we recog-
nize that there can be no ‘view from nowhere.’ To experience or live a 
world we must be related to that world through knowledge or perception; 
there cannot, therefore, be any intuition of that which exists outside the 
relations through which the world is received (Langton 1998). All our 
concepts are concepts of some intuited world, and all our intuitions are 
formed as conceptually meaningful and ordered. Kant therefore defines 
theoretical knowledge as given through the forming power of concepts 
and the receptive power of intuition. There can be no theoretical knowl-
edge of any supposed foundation or law that would lie beyond experi-
ence: to know is to relate to, and conceptualize, what is other than one-
self. There cannot be a theory of that which underpins experience; theory 
is, by definition, always situated, relational and grounded. Theory can, 
however, reflect on the conditions of our situation, and this would yield 
practical rather than knowable outcomes. If there can be no law intuit-
able beyond experience, then we are compelled to give a law to ourselves 
(O’Neill 1989). We cannot appeal to a foundation or ground, for we are 
always already grounded. Asking the question of grounds requires some 
grounded position from which questions can be posed. Theory can only 
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tell us that we exist within mediation and experience, but cannot step 
outside that mediation. 
Practically, though, this recognition of our location within experi-
ence allows for a radical anti-foundationalism. In the absence of any 
law or ground we must give a law to ourselves, and because this law is 
ungrounded—because there is no position beyond experience—no 
point of view can claim to speak for the law. One must give a law to one-
self, always aware of that law’s provisional status. As a consequence, lib-
eralism remains a primarily critical and reflective ethic. Even though one 
is always located, one must strive to imagine a law that could in princi-
ple be agreed to by any subject whatsoever; one must neither make an 
exception of oneself—say, by not acting in a manner that would be uni-
versalizable on the grounds that one knows better—nor can one attri-
bute one’s located preferences to others. One can only will, ethically, 
that which would be willed as such (Kant 1990). Such a critical recog-
nition of locatedness has served feminism and radical politics well. No 
one can be excluded from the practice of self-determination; there can 
be no exclusion from the public sphere of reason on the basis of spurious 
empirical claims. Thus, Mary Wollstonecraft (1975) argued that there 
was no way of knowing whether women were less capable than men at 
the art of reason; there could be no exclusion of women from education 
and argument, for if there is such a faculty as reason then it behooves us 
all to extend that faculty to its highest power. It is precisely the absence 
of foundations and the impossibility of basing theory on anything other 
than our situatedness that releases the subject from ‘imposed tutelage’ 
and issues in the central value of autonomy, of giving a law to oneself 
(Kant 1990). 
In addition to Kantian liberal anti-foundationalism, the other possibil-
ity for modern political theory would appear to be some form of com-
munitarianism. On this model, like liberalism, there can be no view from 
nowhere; however, the liberal appeal to the rational self-constituting 
individual cannot function as a legitimate point of departure. Selves, 
including the modern ideal of the autonomous self-critical subject, are 
constituted through others. One is a self only through relations; to be 
a self requires that one maintain oneself as recognizable through time, 
as having this or that character. Such recognition requires others, both 
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so that one might be recognized as who one is now, and also so that 
there will be a context of norms, traditions, expectations and narratives 
through which one understands what it is to be human. On this commu-
nitarian model, theory does not take the form of abstracting from one’s 
particularity to produce a purely formal procedure. Theory is not the reg-
ulation of those who would seek to exempt themselves from the claims of 
a universal unfounded reason. Theory is reflection on constituted norms, 
and is often enabled not by limiting contradiction and particularity, but 
by paying acute attention to those cultural moments when the conflict 
of founding (but irreconcilable) values are brought to the fore. If auton-
omy—relying on no law other than the law one can give to oneself—is 
the key value of liberal anti-foundationalism, recognition is the key value 
of communitarianism. Both values follow from an acknowledgement of 
the theoretical predicament: that to live or be a self is to have a law, but 
no such law can be known or intuited. Autonomy asks how one must reg-
ulate oneself in the absence of a founding shared law; recognition looks 
at the ways in which such shared laws are founded communally, histori-
cally and culturally. 
Judith Butler’s work, from its very beginning, has maintained the force 
of both these founding values of modern theory. On the one hand, the self 
is not given as a knowable substance but must be performed or given to 
itself through action. On the other hand, such self-giving or performing 
is only possible through others and recognition. It is for this reason that 
Butler’s work is not so much a mobilization of twentieth-century theory 
for queer politics, but a theory in which the queer body becomes exem-
plary. For it is the queer body that exposes the essential tension between 
autonomy and recognition. One must both be recognized as a subject 
who subtends various performances, but there must also be a self who 
is not reducible to performances, such that actions can be posited intel-
ligibly as issuing from this or that coherent self-fashioning subject. To be 
a self requires that one take on a norm; one must be recognizable as this 
or that subject. The condition of being a self—that one remain the same 
through time—requires a certain iterability: there is no self who repeats, 
for it is through the event of ongoing repetition that a self is constituted. 
The various performances or actions that the self undergoes must be rec-
ognizable as repetitions of some style or mode of being. Gender is one of 
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the ways in which various differing performances can be recognized as 
differences of this or that sexual subject; if one’s actions do not bear this 
iterability then one cannot be recognized as a subject. At the same time 
as the self exists only in performing itself as a self to be recognized, one 
must not be reducible to one’s performances alone. If performances are 
normative, intelligible or readable then one can be recognized as a sexual 
subject who exists above and beyond any of her recognized actions. The 
self who asks to be recognized is, in the very claim for recognition, never 
reducible to the norm or system through which she speaks and per-
forms. Without a difference or deviation in the repetitions of the norm 
one could not be a subject who subtends or performs that norm. Theory, 
then, maintains the necessary and essential tension between subjection 
(to the norm) and activation: the norm has its being only through the 
various performances but these performances also introduce differences 
and instabilities. 
In many respects we might consider Butler’s work to be both exemplary 
of the precarious model of the self that is presupposed in cultural studies, 
as well as being critical of the premises of identity politics. Without the 
mutability of the self the critique of cultural norms makes no sense; but 
this radical capacity for self-redefinition is also at the heart of contempo-
rary capitalist modes of identity. On the one hand, one can be a self only 
through some recognizable identity; on the other hand, the performance 
of that identity is also the condition for the subject’s destabilization and 
possible (but not necessarily enabling) undoing. Such a theory at once 
provides a way to think through the classic problems of representation 
in cultural studies. How do we judge images of political identity? On the 
one hand we might argue that stereotypical representations of certain 
images in the media reinforce rigid norms, preclude self-constitution and 
do not allow for subjects outside limited norms to be recognized. On the 
other hand, there can be no creation of oneself ex nihilo. Butler’s answer 
to the politics of representation is not to judge between good and bad 
representations, dividing the authentic from the imposed. Rather, the 
conditions of representation themselves will yield a politics in which one 
can be a self only through the repetition of a norm, at the same time as 
that very repetition is essentially queer. For the queer is not radically out-
side or beyond recognition and selfhood; it is that which makes a claim 
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to be heard as human—within the norms of speech, gender, the polity 
and the symbolic—at the same time as it perverts the normative matrix. 
Perhaps too much has already been said about Butler’s early champion-
ing of parody and drag (Bersani 1995), but her work is dominated by the 
claim that it is the necessary repetition of a norm that both allows a self to 
be recognized, at the same time as the repetition is the self ’s undoing. To 
perform as queer is to maintain and demand recognition for that which 
has, hitherto, exceeded the bounds of cultural recognition. Thus, the 
queer is that which both partakes in the norm—one can be recognized as 
male or female—and destabilizes that norm, for this male or female will 
not take on the desires of the heterosexual matrix. 
Butler’s theory therefore allows for the (albeit problematic) mainte-
nance of identity politics: the assertion of oneself as this or that subject 
demanding recognition is both necessary for the social system at the 
same time as it introduces a necessary dynamism into the system. At the 
same time as it maintains specified groupings, identity politics must also 
be recognized as queer: one is not asserting one’s difference from some 
already recognized other. One is asserting difference as such: that one is a 
self only insofar as one, through repetition, also creates and performs dif-
ferently. If I were merely the exemplification of a norm, if being straight 
or gay exhausted my identity, then I would have no identity at all. The 
condition for identity is difference, but for Butler this is iterative differ-
ence. There is not a substance or subject who then goes through time and 
difference; it is by way of the repetition of this differing act that a subject 
might be retroactively posited. Theory, in its Butlerian or critical mode, 
is an analysis of the conditions of performative difference; this mode of 
critical and destabilizing analysis exposes the fragile and precarious status 
of the supposedly stable and conditioning norm. The conditioning norm 
is itself conditioned, possible because of processes of iterative difference. 
Against the model of iterative difference, which allows for the criti-
cal maintenance of identity politics, Gilles Deleuze offers a theory of 
positive difference. Crucial to the understanding of the distinction 
between the post-Hegelian iterative model of difference and Deleuze’s 
understanding of difference is the status of relations. In her early work 
on Hegel, Butler explains Hegel’s critique of internal relations: if rela-
tions were internal, then the way in which any being related to the world 
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would be determined in advance. Encounters, journeys and interactions 
would merely unfold from what that being already is (Butler 1987: 35). 
Against this, Hegel argues that something is only in its relations; it is not 
that there are beings that then encounter difference. Rather, there is dif-
ference or relationality from which points of stability and recognition 
emerge. Absolute consciousness is just this differing—or not being the 
self-same—recognizing itself as its own negating power. Subjectivity is 
a relation to relationality, a consciousness aware that it is nothing other 
than its distance and difference from itself:
The Hegelian subject cannot know itself instantaneously or 
immediately, but requires mediation to understand its own 
structure. The permanent irony of the Hegelian subject con-
sists of this: it requires mediation to know itself, and knows 
itself only as the very structure of mediation; in effect, what 
is reflexively grasped when the subject finds itself ‘outside’ 
itself, reflected there, is this very fact itself, that the subject is 
a reflexive structure, and that movement out of itself is neces-
sary in order for it to know itself at all. (Butler 2012, 7-8)
We might say, then, that we have abandoned internal relations: the 
encounters, qualities, events and individuality of a being do not unfold 
from any single point but occurs in relation to another relation. There is 
an unfolding of relations that then produces a specific difference between 
terms; consciousness is just this coming to recognition of oneself as 
nothing more than relationality. The essence of what something is—that 
which makes it what it is—is its existence, its actualization, or the way in 
which it has established itself as this or that complex of relations. 
Butler remains committed to the idea that relations are produced 
through a process of difference and repetition. Something is identifiable 
as something only if it is repeated through time, but each repetition also 
introduces a certain difference or not being at one; the self in remaining 
itself is always subjected to, or negated by, that which is not:
When we ask, what are the conditions of intelligibility by 
which the human emerges, by which the human is recognized, 
by which some subject becomes the subject of human love, 
we are asking about conditions of intelligibility composed of 
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norms, of practices, that have become presuppositional, with-
out which we cannot think the human at all. So I propose to 
broach the relationship between variable orders of intelligi-
bility and the genesis of the knowability of the human. And 
it is not just that there are laws that govern our intelligibil-
ity, but ways of knowing, modes of truth, that forcibly define 
intelligibility.
[…] Subjectively, we ask: Who can I become in such a world 
where the meanings and limits of the subject are set out in 
advance for me? By what norms am I constrained as I begin 
to ask what I may become? And what happens when I begin 
to become that for which there is no place within the given 
regime of truth? (Butler 2004A, 57)
Quite recently new developments in theory have subtly shifted the 
emphasis on relations (Harman 2012). If we insist that something can 
neither be, nor exist outside of the relations through which it is actual-
ized, then this might lead us—as Butler has done—to insist on a subject 
as relationality (and perhaps to attribute that subjective relational capac-
ity to linguistic or social beings alone, the latter including animals). But 
there is another inflection of the insistence on relations, which is to say 
that a thing comes into being through relations but has a force to pro-
duce other relations, and that for every actual relation there are a ‘thou-
sand tiny’ virtual relations not given (but that ‘swarm’ in the background, 
accessible only in part and fleetingly). In most modes of theory relations 
are external to terms; very few writers today would insist on substances 
being nothing more than that are what they are, with relations being 
determined in advance by a being’s intrinsic properties. In Deleuzian the-
ory relations not only yield the dispersed world of actual beings but also 
remain as real virtual potentialities beyond the world as we know it, and 
beyond the world as it is at present.
That is, whatever systems or relations happen to have been formed, the 
forces that produced those relations could always have produced other 
relations. Relations do not follow from self-sufficient terms, but they do 
emerge from tendencies. Deleuze posits a positive virtual plane, or ‘pure 
past,’ that is actualized in each encounter to produce both the term that 
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is repeated, and the difference established in each term. Tendencies are 
never known or given as such, only in their inflections. Deleuze seeks to 
find syntheses of difference and repetition that are asymmetrical, posi-
tive and pre-individual. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze makes two 
key points with regard to the establishment of an active synthesizing 
subject. First, the self who repeats and from whom relations to the world 
are established depends upon passive, pre-individual syntheses: the indi-
vidual who acts is composed of a thousand tiny egos, each effected from 
an encounter. Thus, it is not the self who must receive sensation and orga-
nize a world, for sensations are already the effect of intensive encoun-
ters or syntheses, and emerge from potentialities to be sensed. Synthesis 
does not occur as the repetition of the same through time; synthesis is 
not the maintenance of sameness. Rather, there can only be a relative sta-
bility through time of a quality if two forces of difference have entered 
into relation. Synthesis occurs first as difference before identity. Color, 
for example, occurs as relation between waves of light and an organism’s 
eye, but the eye, in turn occurs as the relation between organic living mat-
ter, milieus of light, and evolutionary tendencies towards formation. An 
intensity’s synthesis (or the coming into being of a quality) is not the 
repetition through time of the equal but is an asymmetrical synthesis; 
a quality, such as color, occurs as the relation between quantities. There 
can be more or less light, more or less of a quality, because of a relation of 
quantities, or forces entering into encounters. Before there is the ‘I’ of the 
self who repeats itself actively, there is the ‘eye,’ which is already the estab-
lishment of a qualitative relation or the unfolding of an intensity. The 
‘eye’ is the result of a passive synthesis that has organized the problem 
of light, and light—as intensity—is that which might also have unfolded 
or been explicated in other relations or other qualities: so that each of 
our organs, according to Deleuze, is a contemplative soul, not receiving 
so much determining data, but giving a quality to the intensities of all it 
encounters: 
The passive self is not defined simply by receptivity—that 
is, by means of the capacity to experience sensations—but 
by virtue of the contractile contemplation which constitutes 
the organism itself before it constitutes the sensations. […] 
There is a self wherever a furtive contemplation has been 
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established, wherever a contracting machine capable of draw-
ing a difference from repetition functions somewhere. The 
self does not undergo modifications, it is itself a modifica-
tion—this term designating precisely the difference drawn. 
Finally, one is only what one has: here, being is formed or the 
passive self is, by having. Every contraction is a presumption, a 
claim—that is to say, it gives right to an expectation or a right 
in regard to that which it contracts, and comes undone once 
its object escapes. (Deleuze 1994, 100) 
Second, while the self is nothing other than repeated modifications, 
what is repeated is not the actual, existing, material or bare present. Nor 
does repetition happen to an individual: what is repeated is the pure past. 
Each event is the actualization of a pure potentiality, a power to be which 
each present repeats. All revolutions are the repetition of the power or 
potentiality of revolution; all selves are repetitions of a potentiality for 
modification. All the objects that constitute an individual’s reality are 
haunted by another series of virtual objects that are never fully present; 
these are not psychic, wished for or imagined, but exist as pre-individual 
potentialities. A virtual object opens any material objective individual 
series to a contemplation beyond the self, a pure intensity that is beyond 
the habitual time of the body, and the remembered time of the psyche. 
The beyond of pleasure—or the outside of any individual’s definition 
through a series of desired objects—is not an indeterminate negativity 
or undifferentiated ‘beyond.’ Deleuze objects to psychoanalysis’ ground-
ing of the ‘beyond’ of pleasure on an opposition between death and life, 
between the self and its return to a state of inanimate matter. Instead, 
Deleuze insists on the pure past as a virtual, eternal, intense, pre-individ-
ual and positive series that each actualized present repeats. If the individ-
ual appears in the form of organized, actual and life-serving objectifica-
tions—the desired objects towards which the subject is directed—this 
is because the individual is grounded upon a series of virtual objects. 
These virtual objects are pure fragments, or shreds of the past: a past that 
was never present and does not exist, but is always absent from itself and 
insists (Deleuze 1994, 124–5). 
To give this concrete form, we can note that any actualized, existing, 
acting, repeating subject—a self who defines itself both against others 
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(autonomy) and through others (recognition)—has as its prior condi-
tion pre-personal series. The aim of Deleuze’s ethics and politics is to ana-
lyze, affirm and open these series. Most importantly, in terms of theory 
and the life and humanity of theory, Deleuze insists on the importance 
of the ground or dark precursor. Any two series of resonating differ-
ences—such as the differences of a language and the differences of our 
bodily identity—resonate with each other and can experience forced 
movement only through a ‘dark precursor’ or ground. So, in order for the 
self who says ‘I’ and speaks the language of man to be coordinated with 
the bodily movements of the self-interested, active and organized human 
organism there has to be some silent, unstated, undecided, passive 
ground (or sense) that itself cannot be simply stated. Much of Difference 
and Repetition is concerned with trying to intuit those silent presuppo-
sitions of representation and identity that tie the series of philosophical 
concepts—of the self, the ‘I,’ truth, identity and recognition—with the 
body of man oriented toward maintaining a state of equilibrium. 
For Deleuze, thinking beyond the human requires some forced move-
ment; this force can be thought of as the pure past, as desire, as the dark 
precursor, as the body without organs, and as the virtual—all of which 
open the constituted field of relations to that which is given through rela-
tions, but is not exhausted by any actualized relation. In Difference and 
Repetition, Deleuze writes of the ‘beyond’ of a life and pleasure of self-
maintenance: this beyond would be ‘death,’ but not a death opposed 
to life and Eros. Thanatos, he argues, is Eros carried to its ‘nth’ power: 
desexualized, or rendered purely virtual and inhuman. Only here would 
we encounter pure intensity. The self or ‘I’ who loves another self (eroti-
cally) is already the effect of a whole series of virtual and intersubjective 
objects. Any actual couple draws upon, while repeating and transform-
ing, the history of erotic encounters. To think the power of Eros beyond 
bounded bodies, would be to imagine syntheses beyond the organism 
and beyond the maintenance of life—a positive and annihilating ‘death.’ 
This conception of a ‘beyond’ of pleasure does not rely on the notion of 
returning to a state of nothingness, but it does raise the thought of how 
we might think intensities tending towards minimal thresholds. If we 
took desire beyond its human and bounded form, what minor intensities 
of desire might we discern: the movements of plants towards the light, 
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the movements of particles towards (and away) from each other? Such a 
conception of desire in terms of small intensities, enables a redefinition 
of the objects of desire, and a non-Oedipal approach to psychoanalysis. 
If the self is given positively through the objects it desires, then it makes 
sense to see certain privileged objects as the outcome of a pre-individ-
ual and supra-individual plane of history. The phallus would not be a 
universal signifier of promised presence, the desire for which orients all 
subjectivity to an always concealed absence. Any actualized object that a 
body desires is possible because of a positive history, or a series of events 
that might have issued in an entirely different present. (The positivity of 
history is outlined in Anti-Oedipus where the phallic totem begins as a 
collective investment: Deleuze and Guattari insist that once capitalism 
develops as a concrete form, it is then possible to discern that capitalism 
was always lying in wait as a potentiality.) The phallus, through historical 
and political syntheses, becomes a virtual object; it organizes desires and 
bodies prior to their actual and individual encounters. Deleuze refers in 
Difference and Repetition, and in The Logic of Sense, to the aleatory object 
which allows series to resonate. So, before ‘I’ can love or recognize ‘you,’ 
our perceptions have already been synthesized in advance by the sense of 
our encounter: the sense or orientation of what counts as human, what 
counts as love, what counts as a recognizable body. For Deleuze this vir-
tual plane is precisely not linguistic, for language as such can only orga-
nize bodies after those bodies have been intensively and affectively orga-
nized or synthesized. The true aim of thinking or theory would be to go 
back to the singular points from which relations and affects have been 
determined: 
Underneath the large noisy events lie the small events of 
silence, just as underneath the natural light there are little 
glimmers of the Idea. Singularity is beyond particular proposi-
tions no less than universality is beyond general propositions. 
Problematic Ideas are not simple essences, but multiplicities 
or complexes of relations and corresponding singularities. 
(Deleuze 1994, 203) 
How does each individual or the self who says ‘I’ repeat and modify 
a virtual series of affections, encounters and intensities that are not its 
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own and that might also be repeated otherwise? Against iterative differ-
ence—which is a repetition of a being that has no existence outside its 
seriality, or that produces that which repeats only through a maintaining 
of the same through time—Deleuze insists on the positive insistence of 
the virtual in all its intensity. 
If we were to draw an example from genetics we might say that iterative 
difference gives us the idea of an organism that would undergo change 
and modification through repeating itself; each generation or copy intro-
ducing more and more instability and alterity. Deleuze’s positive dif-
ference shows how each modification of an individual is preceded by 
micro-perceptions or encounters: before the self repeats itself there are 
repetitions of intensities or pure qualities. A virus might be repeated in 
my body, creating not a different organism but a different potentiality—a 
new virus or the modification of an organ, which might then effect my 
body’s motility—not the ways in which I act but the ways in which I am 
acted upon. Difference is not the reiteration of some quality but occurs 
through the eternal return of the power to create relations, to produce 
connections. Concretely, this idea of difference does not result in an 
organism being modified through selection, but an individuation and 
selection that disregards the organism, creating connections among bod-
ies that are the undoing of any organized body: 
For the I and the Self are perhaps no more than indices of the 
species: of humanity as a species with divisions. […] The I 
is therefore not a species; rather—since it implicitly contains 
what the species and kinds explicitly develop, in particular 
the represented becoming of the form—they have a common 
fate, Eudoxus and Epistemon. Individuation, by contrast, has 
nothing to do with even the continued process of determin-
ing species but, as we shall see, it precedes and renders the lat-
ter possible. It involves fields of fluid intensive factors which 
no more take the form of an I than of a Self. Individuation 
as such, as it operates beneath all forms, is inseparable from 
a pure ground that it brings to the surface and trails with it. 
(Deleuze 1994, 190)
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In political terms we can also distinguish iterative and positive repeti-
tion. For Butler, an individual does not exist ex nihilo but can be a self 
only through an other whom the proto-subject repeats and modifies. 
Claiming to be a queer subject might involve laying claim to certain nor-
mative practices—such as marriage and gender—which would have the 
effect both of normalizing the self by subjection to convention and rec-
ognition, but also disturbing convention by introducing a new mode or 
style of claim. To a certain extent all politics is queer politics, or an ongo-
ing negotiation between the degrees of repetition to which the self sub-
mits and the amount of deviation or difference from normativity that the 
self can effect. The queer, on such an understanding, would be negative, 
defined as the difference from those conditions of recognition and nor-
mativity that both enable and preclude autonomy. Deleuze offers a quite 
different ontology and ethics of non-being. We are mistaken if we think 
of non-existence as the failure, deviation or difference from the present 
and actual. We need to think of non-being as positive, real and affirma-
tive. Each existing, actualized individual is therefore the actualization of a 
non-being, which is better defined as ‘?-being’ or as a series of problems. 
The queer self might be better thought of as a counter-actualization of the 
material repetitions that make up ‘man,’ rather than as a deviation from 
actual norms of man. Similarly, we could think of queer politics, not so 
much as a de-formation of what is constituted as normal, but as the com-
position of questions based on what bodies might be able to do. We could 
see marriage in its current bourgeois normative and heterosexual form as 
the solution to a certain problem or question: how the self forms its gen-
der, manages its desires and property, and organizes its child-rearing. The 
queer self would repeat, while also recomposing, the problems that ori-
ent the self: counter-actualizing the present by drawing on the pure past 
of the questions from which we have emerged. How might a self desire, 
what might count as an object of one’s desire, what future relations or 
events might the couplings of bodies produce and enable? 
Whereas Butler’s model of theory is to begin with the subject and then 
interrogate its conditions of possibility in the tension between recogni-
tion and autonomy, Deleuze’s theory is one of positive intuition. Here, 
we go beyond composed selves and problems to the affects and intensi-
ties from which they are organized. For Butler a queer theory is one in 
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which the conditions of being a subject are essentially queer—one must 
claim to speak as a self, but can do so only through an other who is not 
oneself. At the same time, the condition for being queer is to become a 
subject: one must be recognized as having a claim to speak, a claim to be 
and exist. For Deleuze, the conditions of theory require a going ‘beyond’ 
of the self and the organism. As long as we are concerned with identity, 
with the repetition of who we are, we remain within constituted matter 
and lived time. To think transcendentally we need to think the pure form 
of time and difference, the pure intensities that each present repeats and 
actualizes both in the present and for all time. For Deleuze, then, the 
conditions of the queer and the conditions of the new are the same: to 
counter-actualize the present, to repeat the intensities and encounters 
that have composed us, but not as they are for us. 
In quite specific terms this requires a radical and distinct break from 
identity politics. As long as ethics is defined as the maintenance of indi-
viduals as they are we restrict the potentiality of life to one of its con-
stituted forms. Only by thinking intensities beyond the human can we 
begin to live ethically. Thus queer politics would involve neither recog-
nition of the self, nor a refusal of normativity, but the affirmation of the 
pre-personal. Rather than assessing political problems according to their 
meaning and convention—or the relations that organize certain affects 
and desires—we need to think desires according to virtual series, all the 
encounters that are potential or not yet actualized. 
Such a queer politics has two direct consequences. First, practically, 
once we abandon conditions of recognition we can interrogate a practice 
according to the potentiality of its encounters. Rather than seeing gay 
marriage, trans-gendering or gay parenting as compromised maneuvers 
in which the queer self repeats and distorts given norms, we need to look 
at the positivity of each encounter. How do bodies establish relations in 
each case, and what powers are opened (or closed) to further encounters 
and modifications? Second, aesthetically, against an art of parody or drag 
that would repeat the norm in order to destabilize it from within, positive 
repetition and difference make a claim for thinking time in its pure state, 
by attending to those powers to differ that are pure fragments. Art would 
not be the representation or formation of identities but the attempt to 
present pure intensities in matter, allowing matter to stand alone or be 
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liberated from its habitual and human series of recognition. The sensa-
tions presented in art are not those of the lived subject but are powers to 
be lived for all time, allowing us to think the power of perception beyond 
the selves we already are. 
This aesthetics would, in turn, give us a new distinct model of reading. 
On the critical identity-based model of queer theory, where the queer 
self is the destabilizing repetition of an enabling normativity, we look at 
the ways in which works of art introduce a difference or dissimulation 
into the image of the human. A reading of Shakespeare’s A Midsummer 
Night’s Dream, for example, might focus on the ways in which the final 
image of normative heterosexual desire has to go through a series detours 
and deviations in order to arrive at the supposedly normal destined end. 
Queer reading would attend to all those moments in the text in which 
the normal has to be achieved, produced, effected and also, therefore, 
exposed as contingent, constituted and open to change. To a great extent 
the queer theory industry has been mobilized around a re-reading of the 
literary canon’s images of heterosexual desire to show moments of insta-
bility, deviation and mobility. Deleuze, however, offers a quite distinct 
model of reading, both of the literary work in Difference and Repetition, 
and of art in general in The Logic of Sensation and (with Guattari) in What 
is Philosophy? In The Logic of Sensation (2003) Deleuze describes all art 
as the repetition of the history of art, but a repetition that struggles to 
release sensations from their subjection to figuration and repetition. 
There is, for Deleuze, no such thing as a bare canvas, for we are always 
already composed and dominated by clichés. The creative future can 
arrive, not through the assertion of greater and greater individuality, but 
only in a destruction of the personal to release the figure. This would not 
be the figuration of some repeatable form, but the delineation or pro-
cess of differing from which this or that determined figure is drawn. In 
Difference and Repetition, Deleuze draws upon Shakespeare’s Hamlet and 
Proust’s Remembrance of Things Past to describe the profound synthe-
ses of time that go beyond the body that is composed of habits, and the 
self that is composed of memories. The act in Hamlet exists above and 
beyond Hamlet’s individual existence; it is a pure potentiality, something 
that he may or may not live up to, actualize or bring into the present. The 
future, or the opening of the new, can come about not through Hamlet 
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drawing upon himself, his desires or his personal past, but by living out 
or allowing that power to differ which exists above and beyond him: 
As for the third time in which the future appears, this signi-
fies that the event and the act possess a secret coherence 
which excludes that of the self; that they turn back against the 
self which has become their equal and smash it to pieces, as 
though the bearer of the new world were carried away and dis-
persed by the shock of the multiplicity to which it gives birth: 
what the self has become unequal to is the unequal in itself. In 
this manner, the I which is fractured according to the order of 
time and the Self which is divided according to the temporal 
series correspond and find a common descendant in the man 
without qualities, without self or I, the ‘plebeian’ guardian of a 
secret, the already-Overman whose scattered members gravi-
tate around the sublime image. (Deleuze 1994, 112)
Here, for Deleuze, the art of theatre is not about the representation of 
plots, individuals and desires, but somehow giving form to a power of the 
pure past. Beyond the habitual repetitions that organize a body—‘this is 
what I do’—and beyond the repetitions that constitute a self—‘I am who 
I am by being the same through time’—drama exposes this higher repeti-
tion which destroys the self and its world of coordinated actions: ‘Drama 
has but a single form involving all three repetitions’ (Deleuze 1994: 115). 
The task of art is the presentation of this higher power, and reading the 
work of art is intuiting this power of time. In Proust the art of the novelist 
lies in presenting a self with its habits and recollections, and then present-
ing the pure potentiality from which that self was actualized: the past not 
as it was actually lived and recalled, but as it never was, but only could be, 
‘in a splendour which was never lived, like a pure past which finally reveals 
its double irreducibility to the two presents which it telescopes together: 
the present that it was, but also the present which it could be’ (Deleuze 
1994, 107). Against a critical reading, which would look at the ways in 
which art or literature queers the pitch of the normal, Deleuze offers a 
positive reading in which temporality in its pure state can be intuited and 
given form as queer, as a power to create relations, to make a difference, 
to repeat a power beyond its actual and already constituted forms.
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